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PROPOSITIONS 
I 
NICHOLLS is correct in asserting that both "in theory and policy, economists have 
largely neglected the initial importance of the production side of agriculture, which 
they try to make the cart behind an industrial horse". 
W. H . NICHOLLS, "An 'Agricultural Surplus' as a Factor in Economic Development," 
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 71, No. 1,1963, p. 2. 
II 
The view of certain western economists that the extended or joint-family system in 
most Asian countries is necessarily an obstacle to economic development is as ethno-
centric as it is ambivalent. 
Ill 
In the context of economic development today, the law-and-order bureaucracy im-
posed by the British on the Indian sub-continent has rightly been attacked as being 
"adverse to the organization of men". 
IV 
It seems that one of the fundamental weaknesses of the rural extension services in 
most underdeveloped countries is the lack of social identification of the extension 
agents with the peasants. 
V 
There are strong reasons to believe that in a Muslim society a determined and well-
directed population policy, particularly a family-planning campaign, would be accepted 
without any organised resistance. 
VI 
"It is suggested here that in an underdeveloped community which is supported by 
long-standing social institutions, the decision-making process under certain conditions 
may be centralized in the hands of a few". 
ASGHAR FATHI, "Leadership and Resistance to Change: A Case From an Underdeveloped 
Area," Rural Sociology, Vol. 30, No. 2,1965, pp. 208-209. 
VII 
The existing administrative organisation of the community development programmes 
in many underdeveloped countries seems to be basically defective in that it often 
helps to waste these countries' critical resources. 
VIII 
Thesis MAHMOOD HASAN KHAN 
Wageningen, February 18, 1966 
Bilateral economic aid to the underdeveloped countries is by and large not only 
inadequate but politically charged. 
IX 
Land reform measures in most underdeveloped countries are often undertaken without 
any prior assessment of their consequences on the economic system for the improve-
ment of which these reforms are ostensibly advocated. 
X 
Doctrinarian economic planning in the contemporary developing economies may 
prove more detrimental than no planning at all. 
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In analysing the role of agriculture in the process of economic development, first of all 
it is essential to define the notion of economic development itself. In the context of this 
study, this process embodies (a) the growth of output per head of the population, and 
(b) distinct changes in the structure of the economy under investigation. The first also 
includes the distributive aspect of the total output, thus signifying economic progress. 
The structural changes in the economy refer to the inter-sectoral shifts in the distribu-
tion of output and employment. While these changes may be sufficient to indicate eco-
nomic development in a particular economy, they do not explain the why and how of 
the process itself. 
The answers to these questions may be sought in the causes of such changes.1 While 
formulating the general frame-work of the present study all these factors have been 
taken into consideration. In fact, they indicate in abstract terms not only its scope but 
also its limitations. 
The present work could be conveniently divided in two parts. The first part, compris-
ing Chapters 1 and 2, is mainly theoretical. The second part, from Chapter 3 to 6, con-
sists of an empirical study of the Pakistan economy. The theoretical part attempts to 
provide an analytical frame-work for the study of economic development in which the 
role of agriculture is given the central place. In the empirical part, the attention is focus-
sed on (a) the basic features of the economy of Pakistan, with special reference to the 
place of agriculture in the economic system, (b) some major causes of the backward-
ness of agriculture, (c) the role of the State in the development effort, and (d) the pros-
pects and problems of self-sustained growth during the next twenty years. 
The starting premises of the theoretical explanation of economic development is the 
characterisation of the structure of an underdeveloped economy. Here such an econo-
my is characterised by dualism, a concept which is specifically defined. The most im-
portant feature of this dualism lies in the preponderance of an agricultural sector which 
shows hardly any sign of change. Since this stable equilibrium represents economic 
stagnation, it has to be broken. Thus economic development requires the initiation of 
growth-inducing forces in excess of growth-depressing ones. While both of these for-
ces are always present in any economy, economic development begins if and only if 
certain factors propitious to growth are generated. 
I On this subject there are innumerable works. However, for a brilliant discussion on the method of 
analysis of economic development, see: W. A. LEWIS, The Theory of Economic Growth, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 11-18. 
1 
Since in the initiation of growth the emergence of certain conditions is essential, both 
in quantitative and qualitative terms, the concept of'take-off' has been found operatio-
nally useful. However, in keeping with the basic objective of this study, in addition to 
the conditions suggested by ROSTOW, the acid-test for a successful take-off lies in the 
ability of agriculture to fulfil three basic requirements which are described in Chapter 
1. Following this scheme, in Chapter 2 an attempt is made to outline a strategy for 
agricultural development during the take-off period. 
Obviously in selecting a theoreticalframe-work for analysing the problem under con-
sideration many abstractions had to be made. However, the salient feature of this 
approach lies in the limited nature of the problem itself, i.e. the characterisation of a 
dual economy, the identification of some crucial factors consistent with economic de-
velopment, and the required fulfilment of certain conditions by the agricultural sector 
consistent with its role during this process. 
The part dealing with the Pakistan economy follows the scheme given in the first 
part. Thus, in describing the basic features of the economy in general and its agricul-
tural sector in particular, the problems of dualism become quite clear. In Chapters 3 
and 4 a detailed analysis of the structure of agriculture and its problems are presented. 
In so doing the accent is laid heavily on those factors whose presence or absence may 
explain the present state of backwardness in Pakistan agriculture. Almost all of this 
analysis refers to the period from the birth of Pakistan to 1960-61. 
The realisation that economic development in Pakistan is both desirable and possible 
has already become manifest in the increasingly keen participation of the State through 
planning. In planning, the government in Pakistan have found a reasonably good in-
strument by which peoples' interest in economic development can be aroused and par-
ticipation ensured. In Chapter 5 the various aspects in which the State has been playing 
a leading role are presented. 
In fact, with the completion of two five-year economic plans by 1965, there is a grow-
ing confidence in the kind of changes which have so far taken place throughout the 
economy. These changes are manifest not only in the institutional frame-work, infra-
structural development and the reorganisation of the major sectors, but also in the 
growth rates of those factors which are essential to achieving self-sustained develop-
ment. However, with these encouraging developments, the strain on the economic sys-
tem in general and on the agricultural sector in particular is also becoming greater. 
With a view to demonstrating the prospects and problems of economic development 
in Pakistan, the government have recently formulated a Perspective Plan for a period 
of twenty years, from 1965 to 1985. The selection of this period seems to concur with 
the notion of take-off: the apparent similarities between the projected changes in the 
Plan and those identified in this study with the take-off resulting into sustained growth. 
Therefore, in Chapter 6 the Plan is appraised critically and conclusions are drawn. The 
major conclusion is that the alleged take-off, occurring during 1965-85, cannot be 
completed within this period because some of the crucial assumptions and changes pro-
jected in the Plan are either unrealistic or inconsistent. 
This study has several limitations which should be mentioned here. On the theoretical 
2 
level, the very intricate nature of the process of economic development itself puts 
severe restrictions on the choice of a suitable analytical frame-work. Moreover, this 
choice is also influenced by the limited scope of the subject under study. While these 
limitations may be due largely to personal choice, the ones present in the part related 
to the economy of Pakistan are of a more substantive character. 
There are three maj or Umitations with regard to the analysis of the Pakistan economy. 
The first is the inadequate nature of the data presented. This is the more so in the case 
of most agricultural statistics. The second originates in the physical separation of 
Pakistan into two provinces, East and West Pakistan. Finally, the analysis of the 
future prospects and problems of economic development in Pakistan is even more limit-
ed in its predictive value. This is partly also due to the first limitation. While these 
Umitations are the most obvious ones, there are others which are mentioned in the 
course of the analysis itself. 
3 
1 Economic Development and the Concept of Take-off 
1.1 Introduction 
Most of the contemporary underdeveloped economies have a distinct dual character. 
In such economies a small market sector, which comprises almost all the industrial 
activity, trade and some part of agriculture involved in foreign trade, is superimposed 
upon a large subsistence sector producing food and other such commodities which are 
used primarily for the self-consumption of the agricultural population. The latter 
sector is characterised by a very low factor productivity, especially caused by a severe 
shortage of capital and technical know-how, whereas the growth of the population 
adds to the superfluity of labour. Thus the role of the agricultural sector is of pivotal 
importance in transforming the dual structure of these economies into an integrated 
whole. However, as NICHOLLS has so clearly pointed out, the process of industrialisa-
tion is often, and most regrettably, misread to mean that the 'Law of the Declining 
Relative Importance of Agriculture' must be emphasised at the cost of a simultaneous 
development of agriculture itself.2 
In attempting to analyse and explain the transformation of the dual economies, sever-
al approaches have been adopted. For the present study the analytical frame-work 
provided by the stages-of-growth schema will be used. Before attempting to formulate 
such a theoretical frame-work, in which the process of economic transformation could 
be analysed with a view to giving agriculture its due place, a few essentials of the con-
cept of dualism will be recapitulated, along with an explanation of the initial mecha-
nism by which this dualism could emerge. 
1.2 The Emergence of a Dual Economy 
Since the concept of economic dualism has come to be regarded as a fundamental pro-
position in the study of an underdeveloped economy, it deserves a clear-cut explana-
tion.3 Initially, at least for the convenience of a theoretical analysis, it may be assumed 
that the agricultural economy is more or less at subsistence level, where the total volu-
*W. H. NICHOLLS, "An 'Agricultural Surplus' as a Factor in Economic Development," The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 72, No. 1, 1963, p. 2. 
8See: W. A. LEWIS, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," The Manchester 
School, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1954, pp. 146-47, and J. C. H. F H and G. RANK, Development of the Labor 
Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D . Irwin, Inc., 1964), Chapter 2. 
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me of agricultural production is consumed in such a manner that every person gets his 
bare sustenance. In other words, there is an equilibrium, although at a very low level, 
between the supply of and demand for agricultural goods. Thus itis only aftertheemer-
gence of the industrial sector that this equilibrium may change. But what can be the 
source for the opening up of an industrial base? In fact, under the given circumstances, 
hardly any, for ex hypothesi capital is almost totally absent in such a subsistence econo-
my. 
However, there are at least two considerations which may help to create anindustrial 
sector. First, capital might be injected into the economy by a foreign institution or by 
a public body through outright grants or loans from abroad. Second, since a large part 
of the redundant agricultural labour force represents a stupendous waste of manpower, 
it might be employed directly to create real capital by some 'bootstrap' operations.4 
Both prospects suffer from serious hmitations. Let it, in the first instance, be assumed 
that either a foreign-based capitalist or a public body at home emerges to attract some 
part of the agricultural labour force to alternative job opportunities. Whatever the 
exact form of the industrial activity, in so far as it can attract the initial group of the 
agricultural labour force from the agricultural sector by offering them a margin over 
their real income level, many of these workers may leave their homes permanently. But, 
as soon as this happens, ceteris paribus, the previous stationary equilibrium will be dis-
turbed in two ways.5 
Firstly, with the departure of a part of the agricultural labour force (and assuming no 
change in the total agricultural product), the increase in the average product or an im-
provement in the real income of those workers who are left behind in the agricultural 
sector will induce them to increase their own food consumption. This is the more likely 
because these workers will have to work harder and longer for keeping the total agri-
cultural output at the same level. This means that, with an increase in per caput food 
consumption in situ, those of the workers who move out cannot afford to carry with 
them, as it were, their own 'bundles'. In fact, with the given supply of total agricultural 
produce, even if some total surplus of food should result, - the consumption level of 
the remaining population is not likely to proceed along the average product curve - the 
obvious consequence of labour reallocation will be a shortage of food per person re-
leased from the agricultural sector. 
Secondly, in the new industrial sector, additional employment is likely to increase the 
total consumption of the community. However, it is quite possible that this extra con-
sumption may not entirely equal the additional wage bill. For one thing, there may be 
some saving from the industrial wage itself and, for another, the people on whose in-
come the marginal worker was formerly living in the agricultural sector may now save 
a part of the expenditure which they had to undertake in maintaining this worker. In 
*R. NURKSB, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1953), pp. 32-47, and C. N . VAKIL and P. R . BRAHMANAND, Planning for an Expanding Economy, 
(Bombay: Vora and Co., 1956). 
•That this disturbance is not taken into account by Fat and RANIS in their 'static' model is the major 
fault of their entire thesis: op. tit., pp. 24-27. (fn. 3) 
5 
any case, extra employment means extra consumption. The volume of extra consump-
tion following one unit of extra employment can be estimated by the equation: 6 
x = (c . w) — (d — c'. d), 
where x is the unit of extra consumption, w is the industrial wage-rate per newly em-
ployed person, d is the consumption per person when disguisedly unemployed in the 
agricultural sector and c and c' are the propensities to consume of the industrial worker 
and his former hosts, respectively. 
Since it is most unlikely that the workers or the farmers will have a low propensity to 
consume, the values of c and c' may be very near unity, so that the extra consumption 
almost equates the wage bill. Then, the alleged 'saving potential' left in the agricultural 
sector, after the disguisedly unemployed workers emigrate to the industrial sector, 
cannot be realised until at the same time the total product of the agricultural sector be-
gins to increase. What is even more likely is that, if the exchange mechanism starts to 
work, the terms of trade will move against the industrial sector because of the rigidity 
of the given total agricultural product curve. 
Now, turning to the second major argument, if the redundant agricultural labour for-
ce is mobilised to create real capital (for it may be assumed that there is hardly any 
other source of capital formation) the limitations remain as severe as in the context of 
the first argument. Given the stationary situation in the agricultural sector with regard 
to food production, however ingenious the bootstrap operations might appear to be, 
as a part of the redundant labour force is withdrawn from agriculture the economy 
must face a shortage of food. In this case, even if no extra wage is paid to these mobilis-
ed workers (which again seems to be a doubtful proposition) it is very unlikely that 
they and their former hosts in the agricultural sector can work extra hours (or put in 
extra effort) without also increasing their former level of consumption. 
The upshot is: that if an industrial sector has to emerge and further sustain itself, the 
agricultural sector must also increase its total output right from the beginning.7 
Once the economy assumes a dualistic character, the role of an 'agricultural surplus' 
becomes even more crucial if the transformation process has to continue further. It is 
the more so when the population also grows, as it indeed must. If some people are to 
be engaged at an increasing rate in economic activities other than agriculture, the latter 
sector must be capable of producing a total output which, in addition to meeting the 
needs of its own members, can also feed those who move out of it. But while the evo-
lution of a dual economy could be explained in its socio-historical perspective, the fact 
remains that this type of economy usually does not create out of its own dynamics 
those forces which can sustain the change necessary for each consecutive higher level. 
Notwithstanding some occasional spurts, the economy is not able to generate a rate of 
growth of output which can outstrip the annual increases in its total population, thus 
leaving it to remain in a stage of semi-stagnation. So long as this condition perpetuates, 
"A. K. SEN, Choice of Techniques, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 61-67. 
Thus the basic error in such models as that of F n and RANIS is very clear. 
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and there are strong reasons for it to do so, and unless there is a basic change in its 
socio-technological frontier, the dualistic character of the economy cannot possibly be 
transformed into an integrated whole within a reasonable span of time. This is preci-
sely the very core of the problem of economic underdevelopment in the world of today. 
Within the scope of the present study the basic characteristics of an underdeveloped 
economy broadly speaking are: labour surplus, a relatively high rate of population 
growth, poor resources (including reproducible capital), and an acute shortage of 
entrepreneurship. 
With a view to transforming such an economy it is necessary not only to expand the 
already existing narrow industrial base to absorb the redundant labour force dwelling 
in the agricultural sector, but it is equally essential to obtain continuous increases in 
agricultural productivity. This can be fulfilled only if some basic socio-technological 
changes are acecpted in the process of economic development. And, since the rate of 
growth of population in the early period of development is likely to be considerable, 
especially viewing it on the basis of the availability of other factors of production, 
both the absorption of the redundant labour force and the tempo of the increase in 
agricultural labour productivity have to be still higher. Thus the minimum will be to 
avoid the Malthusian trap and, at best, it seems to provide a road to self-sustained 
economic development.8 
1.3 Approaches to Economic Development 
In recent economic literature the epiphany of the phenomenon of economic develop-
ment has taken a variety of courses, ranging from some loosely defined myths to pan-
physical abstractions. The veneration with which the problems involved are viewed 
seems to originate mainly from the contemporary socio-political scene of the world. 
For one thing, the world-wide upsurge of the 'revolution of the rising expectations' and 
the 'will to modernise', usually following the liquidation of colonial and semi-colonial 
political systems, have hastened the pace of theorising. Besides, the fact that a large 
part of the world's population thrives in extreme poverty, as against the increasing 
affluence in a few developed countries, has innumerable political ramifications.9 
"This statement should in no way be misconstrued to imply that the social objective of economic 
development, viz. the betterment of the mass of people in a society, is being confused with the means 
to attain this end. On the contrary, no economic development in aggregate terms could be worth its 
name without also taking into consideration two important factors. Firstly, it is not the volume of 
national product which must increase secularly, nor is it the rate of its increase alone, but that this 
rate should always outstrip the rate of population growth thus indicating an increasing output per 
capita. Secondly, the increase in output should not be accompanied by an increasingly skewed income 
distribution: the poor should not get poorer and the rich richer. 
"For a penetrating analysis of this subject, see: G . MYRDAL, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1957), pp. 6-8. 
7 
Economic development is at once a catchword: a term which, among other things, 
adds a special dimension to the present international political situation. To one side it 
seems to hold the key to individual political freedom, summed up in that elusive term 
democracy; to the other side it means the liberation of the have-nots from the clutches 
of the haves. 
Thus, given such broad and often uncompromisingly rival loci of interest with differ-
ent time and spatial perspectives, it is not surprising that the concept of economic deve-
lopment has been treated in a variety of ways. The fact that economic development is a 
process which forms only a part of the more complex phenomenon of social change 
has made some approaches more relevant than others, depending upon the specific 
object of study. The mere recognition that economic development entails economic 
and non-economic factors does not, however, solve the problem of ultimate choice. 
Any choice which weighs some factors as more important than others will obviously 
leave many facts unexplained. But the economist must make a choice and explicitly 
state its limitations. 
1.4 A General Evaluation of the Theories of Stages of the 
German Historical School 
In economics, several attempts have been made to present a general account of the 
process of economic transformation in human societies. A loose, and to a certain ex-
tent systematic, body of knowledge has been made available by the exponents of the 
German Historical School.1 0 Their writings form the general basis of the 'theories of 
stages' of economic growth. However, both in the original German writings and in 
their interpretations, there is a great deal of confusion. In the words of HOSELITZ, the 
confusion can be attributed to the following main factors: 
"The first is the problem of whether the identification and classification of different economic stages 
is a means of studying the progressive development of a given economy, or whether it is a device for the 
comparative analysis of economic systems. The second is the question of whether these are stages essen-
tially "ideal" constructs, designed to facilitate the analysis of economic systems and their dynamic 
aspects, or whether they are abbreviated and somewhat schematic presentations of actual historical 
developments. The third problem - and this interests us most in connection with the study of economic 
growth - is the question of identifying the factors which make for change, especially those which 
determine the transition of an economy from one stage to the next.' 1 1 
The German economists, while attempting to discover some laws of development in 
different societies, have not succeeded in identifying the factors that make for the stages 
in this process.12 This failure can partly be ascribed to the complexity of the many inter-
1 0 In a condensed form the writings of various authors of this School are given in Theories of Economic 
Growth, ed. B. F. HOSELITZ, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960), pp. 193-238. 
uIbid., p. 194. 
l a See the exception of SCHUMPETER: The Theory of Economic Development, pp. 57-94. 
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twined factors which, determine change. But also the change itself cannot always be 
clearly discerned. For one thing, the nature of several determinants, even if some of 
them could be isolated, is not always explicable. The other thing is that the historical 
perspective is not the same one: it varies very much from one society to another. Thus 
the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of social and economic phenomena cannot be 
compressed into one broad yet operationally useful frame-work to explain economic 
development. Neither can these changes be predicted to follow only one characteristic 
course experienced by some societies in the past. 
1.5 The Rostovian Schema of the Stages of Economic Growth 
1.5.1 General Discussion 
The German Historical School has recently reappeared, although in a different and 
perhaps more persuasive manner, in the writings of ROSTOW. 1 3 While he seems to have 
avoided the analytical weaknesses inherent in German writings, he has nevertheless 
failed in substantiating many of his claims, based as they are on scanty and often 
questionable evidence. Nor has he succeeded in presenting an analytical frame-work 
which can be completely relied upon without additional investigations and systematic 
judgements. Viewed by contemporary interest in the problems of economic develop-
ment, the greatest contribution of his Manifesto, besides perhaps its elegant metaphor-
ic usage of such terms as the 'take-off' and 'compound interest', seems to reside in its 
timing, coming just when a compact body of some prophetic message was somehow 
badly needed to relieve the anxieties of those engaged in the sordid task of development. 
This is perhaps also the greatest fallacy of his work: his misconception, unless others 
have missed the point entirely, about the applicability of his schema to all societies and 
all times. In other words, he attempts not only to explain the economic history of man-
kind through his stages-of-growth schema, but he also wishes to see other societies 
developing through such a neat and discontinuous sequence of stages. His assertion, 
although he does not state it explicitly, that these stages follow a fixed sequence 
cannot be substantiated fully by historical evidence. 
The fact that some leading economists regard ROSTOW'S schema with great scep-
ticism can well be justified, partly by the very unwieldy nature of the task which he 
1 3 W. W. ROSTOW has written three main works on this subject: The Process of Economic Growth, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), hereinafter referred to as The Process; "The Take-off into 
Self-sustained Growth," The Economic Journal, Vol. 66, No. 261,1956, pp. 25-48, hereinafter referred 
to as The Take-off; The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), hereinafter referred to as The Stages. However, besides these 
works, ROSTOW has spelled out some new arguments on the validity of his stages-of-growth hypothesis 
in a more recent publication of the International Economic Association: The Economics of Take-off 
into Sustained Growth, ed. W. W. ROSTOW, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1963), pp. xiii-xxvi and 
pp. 1-21, hereinafter referred to as The Economics. 
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appointed himself to undertake and partly, both for time and evidence, it is still too 
early to prove entirely the validity of the essential characteristics contained in his ana-
lytical frame-work.14 It appears that this resentment originates often from the uncanny 
way in which, sifting through the economic history of so many diverse societies and 
different time perspectives, he has been able to disregard diversities and to force resem-
blances. However, if ROSTOW has paid little or no attention to the empirically testable 
qualities of certain features in his schema, it is probably not because he is unaware of 
them. Perhaps it is the enthusiasm for prophesying which proves fatal to some of his 
basic assertions. Therefore, once the almost evangelic trappings are removed from his 
Manifesto, it is possible to make use of his characterisation of the process of economic 
growth. 
Returning to the three criteria suggested by HOSELITZ for analysing the value of a 
theoretical frame-work such as ROSTOW'S three sets of questions must be put. They 
are: 
a. Does ROSTOW want to explain the progressive development of a given economy by 
identification and classification of economic stages? Or, alternatively, can this cate-
gorisation explain the development of different economic systems? 
b. Is his schema essentially an 'ideal' construct designed to facilitate the analysis of 
different economic systems? Or, does it present a somewhat abstract explanation of 
the actual historical development of different economies? 
c. Does ROSTOW'S schema highlight those factors which determine change in an eco-
nomy during its transition from one economic stage to another? 
Judged on the basis of the above three questions, it seems that the total of ROSTOW'S 
writings promises to fulfil all of them. This can be readily illustrated. For instance, at 
the very outset of his Manifesto, he makes such a promise almost unequivocally in the 
following terms: 
'Having accepted and emphasized the limited nature of the enterprise, it should be noted that the 
stages-of-growth are designed to grapple with a quite substantial range of issues. Under what impulses 
did traditional, agricultural societies begin the process of their modernization? When and how did 
regular growth come to be a built-in feature of each society? What forces drove the process of sustained 
growth along and determined its contours? What common social and political features of the growth 
process may be discerned at each stage? And in which directions did the uniqueness of each society 
express itself at each stage? What forces have determined the relations between the more developed 
u F o r some adverse comments and analysis, see: J. R. HICKS, "Review of W. W. Rostow's The 
Process of Economic Growth," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1953, pp. 173-74; 
J. H. HABAKKUK, "Review," The Economic Journal, Vol. 71, No. 283,1961, pp. 601-4; P. A. BARAN 
and E. J. HOBSBAWM, "The Stages of Economic Growth," Kykhs, Vol. 14, Fasc. 2,1961, pp. 234-42; 
G. OHLIN, "Reflections on the Rostow Doctrine," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Vol. 9, No. 4, 1961, pp. 648-55; A. K. CAIRNCROSS, Factors in Economic Development, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 131-44; E. E. HAGEN, On the Theory of Social Change, 
(Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962), pp. 514-22; S. ENKE, Economics for Develop-
ment, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 194-204; and H. BAUDET and 
J. H. VAN STUDVENBERG, "Rostow's Theory on Growth," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Band 90 
Heft 1,1963, pp. 57-78. 
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and less developed areas; and what relation, if any, did the relative sequence of growth bear to the 
outbreak of war? And, finally, where is compound interest taking us? Is it taking us to Communism; 
or to the affluent suburbs, nicely rounded out with social overhead capital; to destruction; to the 
moon; or where?'1 6 
Ironically enough. ROSTOW emphasises the 'Hmited nature of the enterprise' in the 
statement preceding the above-quoted passage as follows: 
'I cannot emphasize too strongly at the outset, that the stages-of-growth are arbitrary and limited 
way of looking at the sequence of modern history: and they are, in no absolute sense, a correct way. 
They are designed, in fact, to dramatize not merely the uniformities in the sequence of modernization 
but also - and equally - the uniqueness of each nation's experience.'18 
When the foregoing two statements are put in juxtaposition, the platitudinous nature 
of ROSTOW'S emphasis becomes quite obvious. Thus tested by the set of three criteria 
(and they all seem to be interrelated in some respects) it is remarkable that he is grappl-
ing with almost every one of them. But how far he succeeds in doing so is the more rele-
vant question to answer.1 7 
For the present study there are two alternatives: either to accept ROSTOW'S stages-of-
growth schema in its entirety (as answering the test of the third criterion), or to accept 
in part his schema as an ideal construct. Notwithstanding the temptation to qualify 
ROSTOW for his all-embracing explanation of the various intertwined factors which 
stresses the transition of an economy from one stage to the other, the first problem is to 
judge the presence of a stage itself. It will be pointed out later on that the complexity of 
the constellation of various forces does not permit the acceptance of the neat and al-
most irreversible nature of stages. Therefore, with some modifications, it will be ar-
gued that ROSTOW'S schema must basically be viewed as an ideal construct if his 
analytical approach is to be made operational. 
Since economic development is regarded essentially as a process which brings about 
in a more or less 'traditional society' those changes in its production function (along 
with the gradual emergence of a new social setting) which are usually conducive to the 
furtherance of basic changes, the Rostovian schema is quite relevant. The relevance of 
the validity of the Rostovian frame-work, for the purpose of this study, can be demon-
strated by the following two conditions: 
a. the stages-of-growth approach is regarded primarily as an ideal construct: there is no evidence to 
conclude that this model would fit all human societies; 
b. some leading features in this frame-work, not necessarily only the bone-structure proposed by 
ROSTOW, suggest ways of determining changes during the period of economic development: it is 
not necessarily as sequential as he suggests. 
"ROSTOW, The Stages, op. cit., pp. 1-2. (fit. 13) 
"Ibid., p. 1. 
"In fact, in grappling with as many questions as ROSTOW puts initially, he is influenced more by the 
contemporary political controversies than by intellectual objectivity. In so far as he keeps the former 
as his primary objective, it must be confessed that ROSTOW sounds quite convincing; but, if judged by 
the rigours of economic theory alone, there is much more to be desired. 
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Thus the range of questions is quite limited: Firstly it has to be established whether the 
transition of a traditional society from the quasi-equilibrium state of stagnation to the 
'take-off' stage can be usefully examined within the analytical domain of ROSTOW'S 
thesis. Secondly, whether the characterisation of his stages can be modified to include 
those strategic variables which can explain the cause of change in one society but not 
necessarily in another. This way of looking at the Rostovian schema will, it is hoped, in 
the end provide an analytical frame-work in which the process of economic develop-
ment can be isolated and identified in a particular society. 
1.5.2 The Two Stages of Economic Development 
ROSTO w suggests in all five stages of economic growth, of which two are relevant here : 
the 'pre-take-off' and the 'take-off'. His central issue is to isolate a relatively short 
period - a 'brief time interval of two or three decades' - during which time 'the eco-
nomy and the society of which it is a part transform themselves in such ways that eco-
nomic growth is, subsequently, more or less automatic'. 1 8 But a traditional society, as 
ROSTOW envisages it, does not propel towards take-off without a transitional period in 
which the preconditions for the eventual take-off are developed, hence the need to 
regard the two periods separately, each representing a different stage. However, as will 
be argued later, there is no need to establish a preconditioning period of such a long 
duration as ROSTOW envisages. Nor are the conditions, which he so confidently puts 
forward, necessarily present. Likewise there is no need to believe that the take-off oc-
curs in such a short period, or that it is manifest in only those characteristics which 
ROSTOW takes for granted. These two stages, not so much for the reason that they are 
separate and follow each other in a neat sequence, should be analysed in turn. 
ROSTOW describes the departure of a traditional society to the pre-take-off stage as 
follows: 
'We start with a reasonably stable and traditional society containing an economy mainly agricultural, 
using more or less unchanging production methods, saving and investing productively little more than 
is required to meet depreciation. Usually from outside the society, but sometimes out of its own 
dynamics comes the idea that economic progress is possible; and this idea spreads within the esta-
blished élite or, more usually, in some disadvantaged group... More often than not the economic 
motives for seeking economic progress converge with some non-economic motive... Education, for 
some at least, broadens and changes to suit the needs of modern economic activity. New enterprising 
men come forward willing to mobilise savings and to take risks... The commercial markets for agri-
cultural products, domestic handicrafts... widen. Institutions for mobilising capital appear;... Basic 
capital is expanded, notably in transport and communications... And, here and there, modern manu-
facturing enterprise appears, usually in substitution for imports.' 
'Since public-health measures are enormously productive in their early stages of application and, 
as innovations go, meet relatively lower resistance in most cultures, the death rate may fall and the 
population begin to rise, putting pressure on the food supply and the institutional structure of 
agriculture...' 
"ROSTOW, The Take-off, op. cit., p. 25. (Jh. 13) 
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"The rate of productive investment may rise...; but this is unlikely to do much more than keep ahead 
of the population increase. And, in general, all this activity proceeds on a limited basis, within an 
economy and society still mainly characterised by traditional low-productivity techniques and by 
old values and institutions which developed in conjunction with them. The rural proportion of the 
population is likely to stand at 75 % or over.'1 9 
As to the take-off, ROSTOW has this to say: 
"The beginning of take-off can usually be traced to a particular sharp stimulus. The stimulus may take 
the form of a political revolution which affects directly the balance of social power and effective 
values, the character of economic institutions, the distribution of income, the pattern of investment 
outlays and the proportion of potential innovations actually applied; that is, it operates through the 
propensities. It may come about through a technological (including transport) innovation... It may 
take the form of a newly favorable international environment...; but it may also come as a challenge 
posed by an unfavorable shift in the international environment...'20 
In any case, the take-off is a crucial stage, for it 'is the interval when old blocks and 
resistances to steady growth are finally overcome. The forces making for economic 
progress, which yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, expand and 
come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its normal condition. Compound 
interest becomes built, as it were, into its habits and institutional structure'.2 1 In a more 
systematic form the following main characteristics are attributed by ROSTOW to the 
pre-take-off and take-off stages. 
For the pre-take-off stage at least three conditions must be fulfilled, i.e. (a) there 
must emerge an effective national government, composed of an elite which thinks that 
economic progress is possible and, being desirable for the society at large, it must some-
how be striven for; (b) there should be a steady increase in both land and labour pro-
ductivities for food as a stimulant for the emergence of the industrial sector; and (c) 
the social overhead capital must be strengthened during this period. 
The take-off stage must show: (a) 'a rise in the rate of productive investment 
from, say, 5 % or less to over 10 % of national income'; (b) 'the development of one or 
more substantial manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth'; and (c) 'the 
existence or quick emergence of a political social and institutional framework which 
exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external eco-
nomy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character.'2 2 
1.5.3 A Critique of the Pre-take-off and Take-off Stages 
A moment's reflection will show that both of these stages present difficulties as has also 
been pointed out by some other authors. As for instance, KUZNETS has raised some 
uIbM., pp. 27-28. 
wIbid., p. 29. 
"'ROSTOW, The Stages, op. cit., p. 7. (Jn. 13) 
**Ibid., p. 39. 
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very interesting questions, especially with regard to the fact that, if one were to accept 
the stages-of-growfh approach, one must be able to draw a distinct line between the 
pre-take-off and take-off stages.2 3 
Thus it seems that the fundamental problem must be set in terms which do not ne-
cessarily imply the presence of a neat sequence of all events which ROSTOW attempts to 
convey: that it is only after the preconditions have been met, that the take-off will 
occur. In the following an attempt will be made to give a critical examination of the 
validity of the preconditions of take-off and the characteristics of the take-off itself. 
1.5.3.1 The Preconditions of the Take-off 
The assertion that the preconditions as referred to by ROSTOW should occur first in 
time is not always borne out by historical evidence. Instead it could rightly be argued 
that the kind of broad changes, to which ROSTOW alludes to be occurring in the pre-
take-off period, seem to have taken place during the take-off rather than preceding it. 
However, the establishment or the emergence of an effective socio-political frame-
work could be regarded as an exception. 
As to the changes in the socialframe-work, perhaps no one will be so naïve as to sugg-
est that the changes in social attitudes and the emergence of an élite are not necessary 
preconditions for self-sustained economic development. In fact, the growth process in 
a traditional society can begin only by a change in its social system. However, to say, 
and without much concrete evidence, that 'specific case studies show the same emer-
gence of more favourable political, social, and economic institutions by degree, while 
economic growth also proceeded by degree and without waiting upon any given insti-
tutional structure'2* amounts to an extreme statement. For, despite all good intentions, 
unless some basic institutional changes (or more accurately reforms) are carried out in 
a given traditional society, there can hardly be any foundation for economic growth to 
start and later sustain itself. Attitudes are perhaps too complicated to be explained 
within a narrow and discreetly selected frame-work of economic variables alone. They 
seem to change by degree, hence take a relatively long time to manifest real change. 
T o an objection raised by S . KUZNETS, ROSTOW has replied as follows: 
"The history of traditional societies offers us many cases of growth, including cases of significant 
changes in production functions. What is lacking is a more or less regular flow of innovation on a 
scale capable of defeating Ricardian diminishing returns and the Malthusian propensities of the 
people. On this view of what modern growth is about, the take-off has particular meaning that 
transcends the aggregates and the sectors; it is the phase when a society demonstrates the capacity not 
only to mount an accelerated industrial surge, but to move on to absorb and apply new production 
functions, progressively spreading the techniques that modern technology can offer, as deceleration 
operates on the initial leading sectors." 
From this ROSTOW goes on to assert that "the take-off is a definitive watershed in a society's history : 
the innovational process has ceased to be sporadic and is a more or less regular institutionalized part 
of the society's life." ROSTOW, The Economics, op cit., p. xxiii. (fit. 1 3 ) 
M H A Q E N , op. cit., p. 5 1 8 . (fit. 14 ) 
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However, the institutional structure of the same society could be reformed discreetly. 
Thus economic development may not wait upon appropriate changes in the attitud-
es, impulses, motivations and drives of every member of the society; it can certainly be 
induced initially by the emergence of a congenial socio-political frame-work. Any re-
forms thus enforced by the legal apparatus of an effective public authority (usually a 
national government) will surely be able to win the acceptance of the great majority, if 
their effectiveness can be demonstrated. However, gaining the co-operation during the 
initial process may prove to be an arduous and usually a long drawn-out task. And if 
the process of economic take-off is to be compressed into, say, one generation, as 
historical evidence has it, the entire society must be well prepared to respond to the 
fundamental changes in its various institutions. It does not, however, mean that in 
doing so all classes of people in the society will necessarily have to undergo the un-
speakable experience of violent changes in the whole system.25 
That agricultural productivity must increase in the pre-take-off period to perform its 
vital role during the take-off, ROSTOW neglects that in the normal course of events 
virtually nothing new originates in the rural milieu: an exogenous force is required to 
push forward the jluggish animal. Agriculture, especially its food producing sub-sec-
tor, exhibits a low supply elasticity thus inhibiting the prospects of economic develop-
ment; this inertness should be recognised as a distinct characteristic of the pre-take-
off period. 
During the early period of economic development, whatever expansion of the total 
output of food may take place, it results from the cultivation of previously marginal 
and sub-marginal lands and by way of increasing the possibility of exchange with 
other commodities. Thus, while productivity in agriculture does not show any signifi-
cant improvement, the disposable food commodities have to compete with an ever-
growing population. If new techniques have to be effectively institutionalised, so that 
an autonomous shift in the total food output via improved land and labour productivi-
ties may arise, the agricultural sector (and society in general) must have a social bed 
prepared to accept these changes as essential to economic development. 
Both in the past and in the contemporary world, there are several instances where 
improvements in agriculture have not preceded an accelerated growth in the industrial 
sector. This has been true in Japan, where agriculture experienced massive changes in 
its labour productivity during the take-off stage rather than before it. What is even 
more significant to note is that in Japan the accretionary process of capital formation 
in agriculture was set in by those institutional reforms which made the release of agri-
cultural surpluses increasingly possible.26 
2 6Japan is a good example, where, although its economic development proceeded much in contrast to 
the evolutionary growth in most western countries, it did not prove to be as cataclysmic as it did in 
some instances of communist countries. Among others, on Japan, see: W. W. LOCKWOOD, The 
Economic Development of Japan, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954). 
a 6Again the case of Japan is very illustrative on this point, as is given in: FAO, World Food Congress, 
Agricultural Development in Modern Japan, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 3. (Mimeographed). 
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In India, if one accepts, even though reluctantly, ROSTOW'S remark about the be-
ginning of her take-off in 1952, there is so far no evidence of any significant change in 
agricultural labour productivity even after the take-off began; instead, India's food 
sub-sector has remained more or less stagnant during the last three decades. Then, if 
ROSTOW'S categorisation is correct, India is in fact still preparing for the eventual 
take-off as far the agricultural sector is concerned. However, there has been, especially 
after Independence, an appreciable development of social overhead capital in the 
country. This again has not preceded by very much the accelerated growth of industrial 
activity in India. 
In China, there seems to be occurring of late an increase in the agricultural labour 
productivity, and so her infrastructure is also being speedily developed during the 
period of take-off which, according to ROSTOW, also began in 1952. 
In the beginning the social overhead capital is usually very limited, both because of the 
lack of resources and the extreme apathy or even aversion to economic progress, and it 
is often economically ineffectual in exploiting the economies of scale. Since accelerated 
economic growth in itself is a basic symptom of the take-off, the establishment of the 
strategic and large-size infrastructure accompanies rather than precedes the take-off 
stage. This is well demonstrated by historical evidence in several countries.2 7 
Thus, in conclusion, it must be said that in many economies there is hardly any evi-
dence to suggest a necessary increase in agricultural productivity and a massive devel-
opment of social overhead capital as preconditions to the take-off. Or as HABAKKUK 
puts it: 'In many cases the increase in agricultural output and the creation of overhead 
social capital are not conditions whose pre-existence explains the acceleration of 
growth; they are part of the acceleration which needs to be explained'.28 
1.5.3.2 The Take-off Stage 
As to the characteristics of the take-off, ROSTOW sounds quite unambiguous. He isola-
tes a relatively short period during which, 'for the first time' in the economy, 'one or 
more modern industrial sectors take hold, with high rates of growth, bringing in not 
merely new production functions but backward and lateral spreading effects on a 
substantial scale'; and further, 'the economy must demonstrate the capacity to exploit 
the forward linkages as well, so that new leading sectors emerge as the older ones decel-
erate'. 2 9 Thus, according to ROSTOW, the crucial test lies in 'this demonstration of the 
capacity to shift from one set of leading sectors to another which distinguished abortive 
industrial surges of the transition period from a true take-off'.30 
a , T o give but two examples, HABAKKUK cites England and China to substantiate this argument 
HABAKKUK, op. cit., p. 602. (fit. 14) 
wIbid. 
M ROSTOW, The Economics, op. cit., p. S.(Jh. 13) 
30Ibid. 
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About the need to attribute a certain period for the take-off, ROSTOW goes on to 
assert that the above 'functional requirement has determined that the take-off be de-
fined as embracing, say, a 20-year interval'. Justifying further this period he has this to 
say: 'Some such substantial period is necessary to demonstrate that a society is capable 
of overcoming the structural crisis which the initial surge of growth is likely to bring 
and is capable of introducing the changing flow of technology upon which sustained 
growth depends'. 3 1 He proposes some tentative dates of the take-off in the economic 
history of thirteen countries.32 
From the standpoint of selecting an analytical frame-work for this study, the first 
thing is to disregard the durational aspect of the take-off and then to dwell upon the 
characteristics which mark this substantial period. Its substantial nature must therefore 
be viewed by the intensity with which many strategic variables will change in the eco-
nomy. In other words, it is the rate of change which at once becomes the central issue. 
During this period not only do the growth-inducing variables such as capital, sectoral 
and total output increase faster than ever before, but so too are such growth-depress-
ing variables as population likely to multiply at increasingly higher rates. In so 
far as a few selected characteristics obtain during this stage, they provide a frame-
work in which many structural changes in an economy can be analysed meaningfully. 
1.6 A Suggested Analytical Frame-work for the Process of 
Economic Development 
While accepting in part ROSTOW'S essential characterisation of the take-off stage, 
which was given in the former section, a more crucial test to its validity will be suggest-
ed, depending of course upon the characteristics of the economy under consideration 
here. The present approach, however, deviates in a major point from his schema, as it 
also attempts to demonstrate the hmited applicability of the suggested frame-work. 
At the outset a few comments on the validity of the notion of prerequisites of the 
take-off must be made. To suggest that there are some omnibus preconditions, which 
an economy must fulfil before it can embark upon accelerated development, is a mis-
leading generalisation. Must every economy exhibit more or less similar precondi-
tions? 3 3 The acceptance of some concrete categories of prerequisites presupposes their 
universaUty. But in reality the notion of prerequisites can at best be viewed as an ideal 
construct in which, given the state of a society, certain existing obstacles must be re-
moved and other forces propitious to industrialisation created. Once this double-edged 
criterion is accepted, there is no need to be dogmatic about its characterisation in a 
31Ibid., p. 9. 
3 2ROSTOW, The Process, op. cit., p. 282. (fit. 13) 
T o r an interesting discussion on this subject, see: A. GERSCHENKRON, "Reflections on the Concept of 
'Prerequisites' of Modern Industrialization," Vindustria, No. 2, 1957, pp. 357-72. On more or less 
similar lines is the essay by H. J. HABAKKUK, "The Historical Experience on the Basic Conditions of 
Economic Progress," in: L. H. DUPRIEZ (ed.), Economic Progress, (Louvain, 1955), pp. 146-69. 
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given socio-economic order. The choice of detailed selection should in fact be left to 
mdividuafanalysis. 
In keeping with this view of preconditions, one assumption underlying the present 
study should now be stated explicitly. The process of economic development has to be 
considered primarily as an induced phenomenon. In other words, it is assumed that 
there exists a priori an effective national government, which is both willing and capable 
of determining and executing those essentials which are conducive to sustained econo-
mic development. 
The case of this prerequisite needs no defence, for in the words of LOCKWOOD: "The 
truth is that the great bottleneck in economic development is usually not a dearth 
of capital resources, or even skills. This may be serious at the outset. If it persists as a 
major obstacle, however, it is apt to be because of resistances encountered in con-
structing a social framework which will provide incentives and opportunity for human 
enterprise in new forms, thereby releasing the productive capabilities latent in most 
peoples of the world'. 8 4 
This means that many economic and non-economic forces operating within a socie-
ty must be amenable to discreet manipulation by a legal machine - as it must because 
it manifests the desires, aspirations and power of the élite controlling almost all the 
nerve centres of policy making and execution - which is also committed to economic 
progress as its ultimate objective, not of a small and particular group but of the whole 
society. Thus, initially, the hegemony of one or few power groups averse to economic 
development will lead nowhere. For instance, the presence of a unicentral power group, 
such as the feudal landlords, may often preclude the possibility of a change in the 
existing socio-economic structure of a society. Barring exceptions, under such circum-
stances an increase in agricultural productivity, capital formation and investment, and 
the emergence of the industrial sector appear only as secondary objectives to this 
group. 
1.6.1 The Conditions of a Successful Take-off 
Now the stage is set to envisage a frame-work in which the development process can be 
represented. ROSTOW'S characterisation of the take-off provides essentially only two 
elements in the transformation process, namely, an increase in capital formation and 
the establishment of one or more leading' sectors, the latter being usually manufactur-
ing with high rates of growth. Since he takes the ability of agriculture to expand its out-
put as a precondition to the take-off stage, in the present study the point of departure is 
this: that the agricultural sector must exhibit a once-for-all change in its production 
functions not necessarily preceding the take-off but accompanying it. Thus the follow-
ing three elements, in addition to the two conditions laid down by ROSTOW, should 
form an integral part of the characteristics of the take-off. 
MLOCKWOOD, op. cit., p. 4 9 9 . (fit. 2 5 ) 
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a. Agricultural productivity, especially of land, must begin to show substantial im-
provement so that economic development does not suffer from acute shortages of 
agricultural products in general, and of food commodities in particular. 
b. The initial state of underemployment of the agricultural labour force, if it exists in 
a chronic form, must begin to disappear by a simultaneous transfer of the redundant 
labour force from the agricultural sector to the newly emerging industrial sector and 
by the application of techniques within agriculture which favour the intensification 
of labour input. 
c. The end of the take-off stage, the moment when the integration of the economy is 
more or less completed, must clearly indicate that, on the one hand, the surplus agri-
cultural labour in its initial form is exhausted and, on the other, the labour force en-
gaged in the agricultural sector begins to decline absolutely. 
Since in this study the major interest is to analyse the problems and role of the agri-
cultural sector in this phase of economic development, the increase in agricultural pro-
ductivity will be more thoroughly discussed in the next chapter. Therefore, in the rest 
of this chapter, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the role of the industrial sec-
tor in attaining high rates of growth of total output and in absorbing the reallocated 
agricultural labour force. Of course, during this period, if agricultural productivity in-
creases substantially, an increasing proportion of the redundant agricultural labour 
force could well be absorbed within the agricultural sector itself. But again this rapid 
increase in agricultural productivity will to a large extent depend on the rate of growth 
of industrial output and the speed with which the redundant agricultural labour force 
could be given productive employment, which in itself will help to increase the over all 
output of the economy. 
1.6.2 The Expansion of the Industrial Sector and the Critical Minimum 
Effort Criterion 
The expansion of the industrial sector, with initially high rates of growth of output and 
employment of labour, depends largely on the interaction of the strength of capital 
accumulation and technical progress, and the rate of population growth. This means 
that the greater the combined effect of the rates of capital accumulation and technical 
progress, the faster can be the transformation process, or the more rapidly the take-off 
will result into self-sustained growth. But, since during this initial period the rate of 
population growth may assume unprecedented levels, it is necessary to increase very 
rapidly the output per capita. 
Thus it is rightly suggested that the increase in the total output must be made with a 
certain nrinimum effort which is also capable of sustaining further these initial increas-
es. In other words, 'it is necessary... to make a large initial effort to increase output and 
do so early in the development attempt. If the initial or early effort does not reach a 
critical minimum, then it is likely that the country will revert back to its former under-
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developed stage'. 3 5 The 'critical minimum effort criterion' is embodied in the proposi-
tion that the combined effect of capital accumulation and technical progress must be 
able to yield in the industrial sector a rate of absorption of the labour force in excess of 
the rate of population growth. 3 6 In as much as this condition is more or less consistent-
ly maintained during the transformation process, the critical minimum effort is regard-
ed as successful. Therefore, to establish this criterion more formally, population growth 
can be regarded as neither autonomous nor exogenous. This is the more so when the 
population explosion is alleged to occur more or less simultaneously. 
The population 'explodes' as a consequence of a rapid decline in mortality (espe-
cially the infant mortality), chiefly as a result of improved medical care, 3 7 whereas 
fertility remains constant or declines only at a very slow pace. This development has to 
be considered as a part of the period of accelerated economic development.38 
The rate of expansion of the industrial sector will thus depend, inter alia, upon the 
result of the competition of twin forces: the rates of capital accumulation and technical 
progress on the one hand, and the rate of population growth on the other. Industriali-
sation means not only that the aggregate output be expanded at successively increasing 
rates but also that the product-mix of the economy be diversified. It has rightly been 
pointed out that the mechanism of industrial expansion, at least in the initial phase of 
economic development, rests on the phenomenon of increasing returns: that with the 
increasing volume and scale of industrial output each successive increase in the total 
output will proceed with the increase in the marginal productivity of capital. The spe-
cific elements which are responsible for increasing returns to scale are embodied in 
changes in the following set of four parameters: 3 9 
a. organisation of industry; 
b. supplies of complementary factors; 
c. the structure of demand; 
d. the'state of the arts'. 
In fact, it is in these changes that the key to external economies, which are not only 
cost-reducing types (technological) but also of the investment-inducing types (pecu-
M W . GALENSON and H. LHBENSTEIN, "Investment Criteria, Productivity, and Economic Develop-
ment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1955, p. 366. 
8 8 F E I and RANIS, op. tit., pp. 120-24. (Jh. 3) 
8 7 For some empirical evidence, see: K . DAVIS, "The Amazing Decline of Mortality in Underdeveloped 
Areas," The American Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 2,1956, pp. 306-14, and A. J. COALE and E. M. 
HOOVER, Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries, (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 14. 
3 8 F . W . NOTESTETN, "Population - The Long View," in: T. W . SCHULTZ (ed.), Food for World, 
(Chicago, 1945), pp. 40-41. 
3 9 M . ABRAMOVTTZ, "Economics of Growth," in: B. F. HALEY (ed.), A Survey of Contemporary 
Economics, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), Vol .2, pp. 154-56. The effect of 
these changes is elaborated further by H. W . ARNDT, "External Economies in Economic Growth," 
The Economic Record, Vol. 31, No. 61, 1955, pp. 198-209. 
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niary), is to be found. 4 0 But external economies, which bring about increasing returns, 
cannot very well be accrued without the expansion of the industrial sector. 
The external economy effect in the development effort is closely linked with at least 
three kinds of 'indivisibilities': in fact it is the extent of these indivisibilities that deter-
mines the initial 'minimum effort' to fulfil the criterion of success. They are: 4 1 
a. Indivisibility in the production function, especially the lumpiness of capital with 
regard to the supply of social overhead capital. 
b. Indivisibility of demand, or the complementarity of demand. 
c. Indivisibility of the supply of saving. 
The above three sets of indivisibilities, giving rise to external economies (hence in-
creasing returns), demand that for the expansion of the industrial sector in the early 
period of the process of economic development there should be a 'big push': a large 
enough initial nfinimum effort which helps in generating those development-inducing 
forces (investment and technical progress) which override the development-depressing 
forces (population growth).4 8 Of course this strategy of the big push implies that once 
the vicious circle of low production-low saving capacity-low investment-low produc-
tion is broken initially by raising the level of marginal savings (being higher than aver-
age savings) the process of industrial expansion will become self-sustained. 
The magnitude of this required effort seems to outstrip the most imaginative capacity 
of most underdeveloped economies, especially if it is also assumed that they are closed 
economies. However, one redeeming feature of the criterion of critical minimum effort 
is that the choice of techniques in these economics, characterised as they are by the 
relative 'elastic' supplies of labour, could be one which is biased towards capital saving. 
Thus the exponents of this criterion contend that the nature of technical progress in 
these economies could be one which, on the one hand, utilises rather liberally the re-
dundant factor labour and, on the other, increases the marginal productivity of capi-
tal. The latter means that, at least in the initial phase of development, the rate of 
growth of industrial output could be maximised simultaneously with the maximisation 
of the rate of labour employment in the industrial sector, which rate should in general 
exceed the rate of growth of the total population. 4 3 
However, it seems quite fair to adjudge this contention with some scepticism, be-
cause the intensity with which labour could be substituted for capital in the industrial 
sector depends, among other things, largely on the continuity of the production func-
tion. Furthermore, it is not always justified, even in those economics where a signifi-
cant proportion of the labour force in the agricultural sector is supposedly in surplus, 
^ A . A . YOUNG, "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress," The Economic Journal, Vol. 3 8 , No. 
1 5 2 , 1 9 2 8 , pp. 5 2 7 - 4 2 , and P. N. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, "Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe," The Economic Journal, Vol. 5 3 , Nos. 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 9 4 3 , pp. 2 0 6 - 9 . 
"P. N. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, "Notes on the Theory of 'Big Push'," (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
M.I.T., 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 5 - 1 4 . (Mimeographed) 
4 a THs criterion is also referred to in the writings of H . LETBENSTETN, Economic Backwardness and 
Economic Growth, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957 ) . 
M F E I and RANIS, op. cit., pp. 1 2 0 - 2 4 . (fn. 3 ) 
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to say that it is cheaply available. Therefore, it would be more fruitful to emphasise the 
role of capital accumulation and techical progress independently of the inevitabihty of 
an 'unlimited' supply of labour. In other words, the validity of the criterion of critical 
minimum effort should rest on the creation of external economies and increasing re-
turns as the new sectors of industry emerge to take hold. 
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2 The Expansion of Agricultural Production and the Transfor-
mation of the Agricultural Sector 
2.1 Introduction 
The process of economic development, as conceived within the frame-work outlined in 
the foregoing chapter, entails the simultaneous expansion of the agricultural and non-
agricultural (industrial) sectors. Even when in the long run this process involves gradu-
al yet distinct structural changes in the economic system, the fact remains that before 
sustained growth becomes a built-in characteristic of the erstwhile underdeveloped 
economy, the industrial sector is more heavily dependant on the prospects of the 
development of the agricultural sector. 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to present a general strategy for the expan-
sion of agricultural production, or for increasing agricultural factor productivity, 
during the take-off stage, of course giving full consideration to the initial conditions 
obtaining in the agricultural sector of an underdeveloped economy. However, it will 
not be out of place to start with a few introductory remarks about the significance of 
the interdependence of the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
2.2 The Interdependence of the Agricultural and Industrial 
Sectors 
As soon as an underdeveloped economy begins to experience industrial expansion of a 
significant magnitude, it tends to feel the following effects almost immediately: 
a. The process of industrialisation increases the demand for wage goods, especially 
the food commodities. Hence, with population growth, it generates a heavy pressure 
on food supply, and this pressure tends to create a more favourable market situation 
which might eventually break down the vicious circle of subsistence agricultural pro-
duction, thus stimulating diversification and specialisation in agriculture. 
b. Industrialisation offers to the agricultural population a wider range of consumer 
goods, besides contributing capital goods for further agricultural production. 
c. The expansion of the non-agricultural sectors creates more productive employment 
opportunities, thus giving a pull effect to the redundant agricultural labour force 
which is undoubtedly beneficial both to those who leave the agricultural sector and 
those who are left behind. In this way, industrial development creates those conditions 
in the economy which encourage reorganisation of the agricultural sector. 
d. The industrial-urban development tends to create an intellectual atmosphere - the 
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urban milieu being less tradition-bound - which, on the one hand, permits a faster 
growth of technology, entrepreneurial skills and capital formation, and on the other, 
tends to break down traditional attitudes to life. Therefore, such a development is 
likely, sooner or later, to contribute directly and/or indirectly to the transformation 
of the agricultural sector. 
From the foregoing it follows that for sustained industrial progress, the transforma-
tion of agriculture - manifest in increasing agricultural productivity- is a conditio sine 
quanon. 
Rising agricultural productivity supports industrialisation in several ways: 
a. It enables the increasing food requirements of the non-agricultural population to 
be met, besides also fulfilling the needs of its own increasing population. In other 
words, it is able to achieve an equihbrium between supply and demand while avoid-
ing inflationary pressures on the economic system and adverse terms of trade against 
the bourgeoning industrial sector. Further, it lays the foundation of steady indus-
trialisation by also providing the raw materials needed by new industries. 
b. It allows the agricultural sector to release an increasing proportion of its labour 
force for industrial employment, especially during the early period when a substan-
tial percentage of the agricultural labour force might be disguisedly unemployed or 
underemployed. This also helps, indirectly, the efforts to meet the criterion of critical 
minimum effort in the non-agricultural sectors. This is especially true when some of 
the redundant workers can create capital at almost no cost by helping in the infra-
structural activities. 
c. By raising agricultural incomes, on the one hand, rural purchasing power is ex-
panded thus stimulating industrial production and, on the other, since most of the 
national product originates in agriculture, attention has inevitably to be focussed on 
this sector as the main lender of capital needed for the development of the rest of the 
economy. At the same time capital formation is required for the improvement of the 
productive capacity of the agricultural sector itself. A considerable share of the gains 
accruing to the farmers, through rising agricultural output and productivity, has to be 
transferred to the non-agricultural sectors. In fact, in the initial stage of economic 
development, the surplus value derived from the agricultural sector is often consider-
ed as one of the major sources of capital for the entire economy.4 4 
2.3 The Main Attributes of Traditional Agriculture and Its 
Transformation 
In order that economic development may begin, the moot question is how to induce 
'traditional agriculture' to produce more. Obviously there is no clear-cut formula for 
M O n the role of the agricultural sector in the transformation of a dual economy, see: W. H. NICHOLLS, 
"The Place of Agriculture in Economic Development," in: K. BERRILL (ed.), Economic Development: 
With Special Reference to East Asia, (London: Macmillanand Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 336-71, andFAO, 
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Vol. 13, No. 2,1964, pp. 1-14. 
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attaining this objective. Many factors must be considered. Perhaps the most fundamen-
tal one is related to the type of the underdeveloped economy under consideration. In 
other words, a more precise characterisation of an individual economy is required. 
While in reality no economy, however primitive in its economic and social organisa-
tion, can possibly be characterised categorically, it is nevertheless necessary to identify 
a few basic features. In so doing some simplified abstractions cannot be avoided, hence 
the caution here. Since, initially at least, most underdeveloped economies are predo-
minantly agricultural, the present discussion will be restricted to the basic attributes 
obtaining in this sector alone. 
If the agricultural sector were to be described in one word, it would be called traditi-
onal in the sense that almost all farming practices are based predominantly (if not 
wholly) on a few production factors which have been employed by the farmers in 
these areas for generations without substantial change.4 5 
In economic terminology, and following SCHULTZ, traditional agriculture must be 
viewed as a particular type of'equilibrium', in which (a) 'the state of the arts remains con-
stant', (b) 'the state of preference and motives for holding and acquiring sources of in-
come remains constant', and (c) 'both of these states remain constant long enough for 
marginal preferences and motives for acquiring agricultural factors as sources of in-
come to arrive at an equilibrium with the marginal productivity of these sources 
viewedasan investment in permanent income streams and with net savings approaching 
zero'. 4 6 
Underlying this economic concept of traditional agriculture, besides the change in 
time, there are two basic variables, namely, the stock of material factors of production 
(reproducible and nonreproducible) and the total labour force. In many of the under-
developed economies this equilibrium of traditional agriculture embodies in itself a 
structural disequffibrium among the stock of material factors and the labour force, 
thus giving rise to the much discussed concepts of disguised unemployment and under-
employment of the labour force. Thus, before resuming the discussion of the above-
mentioned three critical conditions of equilibrium, it is essential to analyse the impli-
cations of the 'structural disequilibrium at the factor level' with resultant phenomena 
of disguised unemployment and underemployment in the agricultural sector.4 7 
2.4 The Phenomenon of Disguised Unemployment in the 
Agricultural Sector 
In many of the contemporary underdeveloped peasant economies, it is believed that 
the factor labour is engaged rather superfluously, largely because of the critical short-
4 8 T . W . SCHULTZ, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 1964), pp. 3-4. 
"Ibid., p. 30. 
4 7 To these problems a reference has also been made in the works of LEWIS and F H - R A N B . In fact, 
these two models are fundamentally based on the assumption of surplus labour in agriculture, (fn. 3) 
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age of a set of such crucial production factors as capital and entrepreneurial skills and 
the increasing pressure of population on the existing land resources. This is the more 
so when in such economies there are not many alternative employment opportunities 
and, even when they do exist, either they are very limited by the fact that the non-agri-
cultural sectors are just bourgeoning or the mobility of labour is negligible because of 
economic and social forces inherent in a rural milieu. In recent economic literature, this 
particular situation has been described under such terms as 'disguised unemployment' 
and 'underemployment'. 
Since in this study the subject of the analysis is just such an economy, it is essential 
to discuss the nature of this phenomenon, its causes and, in case its presence results in 
what is popularly known as 'surplus labour', its measurement as well. 
As to the nature of the phenomenon of disguised unemployment, there is a general 
agreement among economists on two issues which are basic to identifying it. The first 
refers to its chronic nature, as distinguished from such types of unemployment as oc-
curring in most types of economies: (a) seasonal, in almost every agricultural sector, 
(b) frictional, in shifting from a superior to an inferior occupation, and (c) technologic-
al, resulting from a change in techniques. The nature of the disguised unemployment 
under discussion is chronic; it does not result from the lack of effective demand but 
from a 'structural disequilibrium at the factor level'.48 
Nevertheless some points of disagreement remain, mainly caused by the variation in 
definition of disguised unemployment. Most protagonists of this term follow more or 
less this line of argument: That in many peasant economies, at the given level of their 
techniques of agricultural production, it is possible to discern the presence of a sub-
stantial number of economically active members of the agricultural population who, 
though ostensibly engaged in the production process, can in fact be removed without 
affecting the current level of total agricultural output. In other words, the marginal 
productivity of these workers, ceteris paribus, is zero.iB But it is often hastily added 
that these disguisedly unemployed workers can only be withdrawn (while keeping the 
volume of total output constant) when some reorganisation in the agricultural sector is 
allowed for. What must be the true nature of this reorganisation is not always clearly 
put forward.6 0 
The situation, at least prima facie, is indeed anomalous: some workers, though 
superficially employed, are contributing nothing and yet their personal wage is posi-
tive. If, however, the strict assumption of zero marginal productivity is dropped and 
instead it is assumed that over a wide range the productivity of some workers in agri-
^The concept, as originally posited by KINDLEBERGER and DESPRES, is explained in the following 
terms: "Disequilibrium at the factor level may arise either because a single factor receives different 
returns in different uses or because the price relationships among factors are out of line with factor 
availabilities." C. P. KINDLEBERGER and E. DESPRES, "The Mechanism for Adjustment in Internatio-
nal Payments - The Lessons of Postwar Experience," The American Economic Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 
1952, p. 338. 
MTMs is a recurring theme in recent discussions. 
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culture is very low, then the contradiction seems to be resolved by the fact that the in-
dividual earnings of these workers are also abysmally low. But, then, once it is conced-
ed that the marginal productivity of some workers is not zero (while at the same time 
they earn a positive wage), the charm of those theories which are built around the con-
cept of surplus labour would certainly be debased without any further argument.5 1 
Thus the heat of the whole controversy resides in the supposition that while some 
workers' marginal productivity in the agricultural sector is zero, their individual remu-
neration is positive. To resolve this apparent contradiction, it is essential to know first-
ly the conditions which may justify the existence of disguised unemployment. But to do 
this is to search for the causes. Postponing the explanation of these causes to the follo-
wing section, here the concept of disguised unemployment will first of all be established 
definitionally. 
Strictly speaking, the definition of disguised unemployment is that the marginal pro-
ductivity of labour, over a wide range, is zero, with the result that a substantial part of 
this labour can be withdrawn without a loss of output even if no change in the techni-
ques of production or use of other productive resources occurs. Following SEN, it is 
essential to distinguish between the terms, labour and labourer: according to him, the 
right answer is 'not that too much labour is being spent in the production process, but 
that too many labourers are spending it ' . 6 2 
Thus, it is labourers who are abundant and not the labour-time. Figure 1 helps to 
bring out this difference quite clearly. In this figure, while keeping capital, land area 
""Those who consider that some measure of reorganisation is necessary are led by NURKSE who 
maintained that: "We may have to allow for changes (excluding technological advance, more equip-
ment, mechanisation, better seeds, improvements in irrigation and drainage, etc.) in the manner and 
organization of work, including possibly a consolidation of scattered strips and plots of land." 
NURSKE, op. cit., p. 3 3 . (fit. 4 ) Brackets in this quotation are not original. 
The same point has been stressed by B. KENADJIAN, "Disguised Unemployment in Underdeveloped 
Countries" (unpublished Fh.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1957) , pp. 5 - 6 , and by N. A. 
MAJUMDAR, Some Problems of Underemployment, (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961) , p. 39 . While 
these two authors, following NURKSE, refer to such terms as "routine reorganisation" and "a measure 
of reorganisation", they do not explain their contents. 
But, in a more recent study, PEPELASIS and YOTOPOULOS clearly assert that a strict specification of 
the term ceteris paribus should accompany any definition of disguised unemployment. Therefore, they 
maintain that under static conditions "output could be maintained only if the workers worked harder 
for a part of the season." A. A. PEPELASIS and P. A. YOTOPOULOS, Surplus Labor in Greek Agricul-
ture, 1953-60, Research Monograph Series 2 , (Athens: The Center of Economic Research, 1962) , 
pp. 2 9 - 3 1 . 
It may not be out of place to mention that in one of the earliest studies dealing with disguised 
unemployment in underdeveloped countries there is no place for an ex poste reorganisation as has 
been allowed for by the above-mentioned authors. United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 
Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries, (New York, 1951) . 
s l See, for instance, the discussion on capital formation by NURKSE, and on industrialisation by M A N -
DELBAUM. NURKSE, op. cit. (fit. 4 ) , and K . MANDELBAUM, The Industrialisation of Backward Areas, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955 ) . 
6 2 S E N , op. cit., pp. 1 4 - 1 5 . (fit. 6 ) 
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and production techniques constant, the total agricultural output curve, NN', is shown 
as a function of labour input in terms of labour-time. The number of labourers is 
shown on the vertical axis due south from O. The marginal product of labour becomes 
zero at labour-time OL, hence, ceteris paribus, labour cannot be used after this point. 
Now, assuming that with the given population of workers, OW x, tan a represents nor-
OL 
mal working hours per worker (tan a = ^^r)> a n v addition of workers after this point 
will result only in reducing the number of hours per worker. 5 3 Thus, if in the present 
situation, the working population in agriculture is OW2, each of these workers puts in 
less than normal working hours (tan (3 < tan a). In other words, WYWg range of wor-
kers could only be described as surplus. Or, while the marginal product of labour is 
zero at point L only, that of the workers is zero in the range of WjWg. 
From the point of view of agricultural production, if each of the workers, between 
W x and W 2, puts less than normal labour-time (as represented by tan «), then the same 
total product can be produced by fewer workers working normal hours. This means 
that, although each worker will have to work more hours if the smaller number of 
workers is to keep the level of total product constant, this does not entail a reorganisa-
tion of production through a change in production techniques or an increased supply 





Figure 1. The phenomenon of disguised unemployment. 
6 8 The term "normal working hours" should in fact be defined according to the given agricultural pro-
duction system. In most underdeveloped countries such norms are very difficult to define precisely. 
However, for empirical work, a certain number of work-hours during one man-year will have to be 
assumed, if not actually worked out in detail. 
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The causes of disguised unemployment can be grouped into two classes, namely, the 
social or institutional causes, and the economic causes. 
In most underdeveloped agrarian economies, there are usually two types of land 
tenure systems: the owner-operator system, and the landlord-tenant system. 
In the owner-operator system, peasant agriculture is usually family-based and the 
total output contains both wages and rents. The head of the family takes the maximisa-
tion of the total output as his ultimate objective, especially when almost all the output 
is consumed in situ. Under such a system, in the absence of alternative employment op-
portunities, with all the economically active population working together on the given 
piece(s) of land, the total output is divided among all the members of the family, irres-
pective of work performance. Consequently, with hmited means of production and 
often fragmented economic holdings, additional workers - resulting from population 
growth - do not contribute any extra labour; they can only share in the total labour-
time which can maximally be put into the work. The phenomenon of disguised unem-
ployment is thus characteristically present in such an institutional arrangement. 
In the landlord-tenant system, as it exists in many of these agrarian economies, its 
effect is the same. Within the tenant families, after giving away the traditionally deter-
mined share to the landlord, the share of output is similarly distributed among all 
working members. 
Irrespective of the above-mentioned institutional arrangements, the following are 
the main economic factors responsible for the existence of disguised unemployment:5 4 
(a) inappropriate factor endowment; (b) limited opportunities for technical substitu-
tion of factors or, in the words of ECKAUS, there are several technological restraints; 
and (c) market imperfections both for factors of production and output in the agricul-
tural sector. Since these three sets of economic causes have been thoroughly discussed 
in recent literature, there is no need to elaborate their effects any further. 
As to the measurement of surplus labour, it is often unclear what is being measured. Is it 
the number of those agricultural labourers which could be withdrawn from the produc-
tion process permanently without at the same time affecting the current volume of the 
agricultural output, given the exact specification of ceteris paribus! Or is it merely the 
computation of the number of (gross or net) man-days or man-hours in which a part 
of the agricultural labour force remains idle? 
To answer this question, the basic consideration in the measurement of surplus lab-
our is the determination of the time unit involved. Thus, to begin with, surplus labour 
could be approached in the following three ways : m 
a. A crude estimate supplies the difference of labour available and labour required in 
terms of a full year; this could be defined as average annual surplus labour. Obviously 
"Since the economic causes of structural disequilibrium have been quite thoroughly discussed by 
ECKAUS, they may only be mentioned here. R. S. ECKAUS, "The Factor Proportions Problem in 
Underdeveloped Areas," The American Economic Review, Vol. 4 5 , No. 4 , 1 9 5 5 , pp. 5 3 - 6 5 . 
MPEPELASIS and YOTOPOULOS, op. tit., pp. 2 7 - 2 9 . (fit. 5 0 ) 
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this measurement does not lend itself to an appropriate assessment of the actual num-
ber of agricultural labourers which could be withdrawn without diminishing the 
annual agricultural output. In fact, it conceals a large proportion of the unemployed 
(or underemployed) labour-time due to the seasonal nature of agriculture, because it 
does not take into account the peaks and troughs of the annual production cycle. 
b. The second approach would be to distribute the labour available and labour requir-
ed over the various seasons (the number of which depends upon the agricultural 
cycle in a particular place or region) during the year. This will result in what has been 
termed as the seasonal surplus labour. Since, by definition, this surplus contributes to 
the output for a part of the year, it can be withdrawn from this sector only intermit-
tently. 
c. The third approach, which is better adapted to the central problem of the perma-
nent withdrawal of a part of the agricultural labour force without affecting the volu-
me of a year's output, would be to compute the difference between the peak season 
actual employment and the full employment level. The resultant difference is referred 
to as the chronic surplus labour. 
The foregoing three types of surplus labour could be measured by two broad methods 
as suggested by ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, as the direct method and the indirect method. 5 6 
The direct method is essentially a micro-approach based on samples covering areas, 
taking into account different types of cultivation, different sizes and forms of farming, 
the age and sex composition of the labour force, and the utilisation of the labour-
time as supplied and required. This type of detailed inquiry can provide a reliable esti-
mate of the true permanently withdrawable surplus as well as the volume of tempora-
rily removable surplus. In other words, it can answer the questions about disguised un-
employment and underemployment rather precisely. 
In the indirect method, three variants have been suggested, namely: 5 7 
a. According to some time norm the labour-hours required to produce a given output 
are substracted from the number of labour-hours available to the active agricultural 
population. 
b. The density of population which is thought to be desirable for a given type of culti-
vation is subtracted from the actual density in the given area. Sometimes, in order to 
take into account the different grades of soils, conversion coefficients of arable equiva-
lents are applied. 
c. The last method is based on a concept either of standard income or of standard hol-
ding. In the first, the number of acres of land required under a given system of culti-
vation to provide one person with a standard income is contrasted with the number of 
acres per head actually available. The difference thus computed may represent those 
6 8 P. N. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, ' 'Disguised Unemployment and Underemployment in Agriculture,"FAO, 
Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Vol. 6, Nos. 7/8,1957, pp. 2-5. 
"'The indirect methods have been the most commonly used ones in determining the volume of surplus 
labour in many parts of the world, of which a good survey is given by KENADJIAN, op. cit., Part 2. 
(fit. 50) 
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people for whom there is no land available and who are, therefore, to be regarded as 
surplus. The other way could be by deterrnining the work norm of the agricultural 
labour force with the help of a standard holding which is sufficient to absorb, with 
given conditions of technique and type of farming, the labour of an average farm 
family working with such assistance as is customary in agricultural operations. 
Comparing the underlying assumptions in the direct and indirect methods, the for-
mer method is preferable in so far as such terms as 'labour required' and 'labour avail-
able' are clearly stated. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN explains in detail the frame-work of 
assumptions required for the measurement of surplus labour with the help of the 
direct method. 5 8 However the micro-disaggregative method gives rise to many tedious 
and elaborate calculations of labour available and labour required. But this method 
can be used to test the validity of the results so often adduced from global estimates of 
removable and non-removable surplus labour in a given underdeveloped economy. 
So far in most areas of the world where attempts have been made to estimate surplus 
labour, they have relied entirely upon one of the variants of the indirect method. It is 
only very recently that a few steps have been taken to measure the volume of surplus 
labour with the help of disaggregative methods. 5 9 Even in areas where elaborate sur-
veys of the rural employment situation have been available, the problem of the measu-
rement of surplus labour is not tackled by using the rigorous tools as indicated in the 
direct method, thus leaving many questions about the state of disguised unemployment 
and underemployment at best unanswered or at worst in greater confusion.80 
2.5 The Analysis of the Three Critical Conditions of Equili-
brium in Traditional Agriculture 
The classical assumption that the state of the arts remains constant over a fairly long 
period of time seems quite valid because the farmers continually apply those agricul-
tural techniques and factors which have been passed on to them by their predecessors. 
The knowledge embodied in these factors and methods is taken as authentic, hence no 
need is felt for change. And, since there is hardly any change, no new elements of 
risk and uncertainty come into the picture. In this situation, when techniques are well 
established by custom, the motives and preferences of farmers are also constant 
during the same period, and thus the marginal productivity of investment in additional 
factors continues to decline. In fact, a point is reached, during this equilibrium process, 
when the rate of return on all agricultural factors is so low that there is hardly any in-
centive to make additional savings and investment. 
That an equilibrium seems to exist, in so far as the demand for and supply of agricul-
MRosENSTBrN-RoDAN, op. cit., pp. 2 - 5 . (fit. 5 6 ) 
M T o cite only two examples, the surveys in Italy and Greece, as reported by ROSENSTEIN-RODAN and 
PEPELASIS and YOTOPOULOS respectively, are based on direct method. 
6 0 A good example of such an analysis is the study by MAJUMDAR, op. cit. (Jn. 5 0 ) 
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tural factors are concerned, indicates also the stability in preferences and motives of 
the farmers underlying their demand for additional sources of income. SCHULTZ thus 
summarises the vicious circle of traditional agriculture as follows: 
'There is at best little opportunity for growth from traditional agriculture because farmers have 
exhausted the profitable production possibilities of the state of the arts at their disposal. Better 
resource allocation and more savings and investment restricted to the factors of production they are 
employing will not do much for growth. Despite all that has been written on how to improve the mix 
of factors in poor communities, the increases in real income to be had from better allocation of the 
existing factors are small... 
They are high-priced sources of additional income, and for this reason they provide little opportunity 
for growth. What this means is that agriculture will remain niggardly under such circumstances... 
The relation between costs and return to investment in the factors of production is the basic reason 
why there is not sufficient inducement for people in these communities to save larger proportion of 
their income to invest in such factors. The rate of return simply does not warrant the additional 
investment.'8 1 
From this description of the state of traditional agriculture it can easily be deduced 
that, to initiate economic growth, it is essential to transform the existing situation. The 
key to this transformation must be sought in a change in the state of the arts. This 
means that modern agriculture can best be initiated by technological changes: the in-
troduction of new methods of production and improved inputs at relatively 'low pri-
ces'. 
In fact, technological change is a generic term, in which some specific elements are 
responsible for the qualitative transformation of the traditional organisation of pro-
duction and at the same time of the change in the quantitative combination of the fac-
tors of production. In order to understand this transformation more precisely, each 
of these elements must be sorted out and ways found to making them available and 
acceptable to farmers who are tradition-bound in their farming methods. 'Once this 
has been done, it will be clear that the suppliers of these particular factors of produc-
tion, and farmers in their role as demanders of them, hold the center of the stage'. 6 2 
This supply and demand approach to the 'low-priced' sources of additional income 
for traditional farmers must be examined a little further. Thus the first task is to ana-
lyse the term technological change itself. It is a mistake to treat it as a factor in itself 
other than one embodied in the traditionally known factors of production. On the 
contrary, as SCHULTZ rightly asserts, 'technology is always embodied in particular 
factors and, therefore, in order to introduce a new technology it is necessary to employ 
a set of factors of production that differs from the set formerly employed'.8 3 
In current aggregate economic growth models the use of the term technological 
change as a 'residual', which is intended to explain the major part of the story of mo-
dern economic growth, does not quite come to grips with its exact specification: what 
is it which is still the measure of our ignorance? Is it only because mathematically-
8 1SCHULTZ, op. cit., pp. 1 3 1 - 3 2 . (fit. 4 5 ) 
"Ibid., p. 1 0 4 . 
""Ibid., p. 1 3 2 . 
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oriented economics can explain economic growth, as a shift in the production curve 
from one position to another higher position? Even for theoretical discussions it does 
not seem to provide an analytical tool. What is even more important is the fact that, 
for empirical investigations, it is not at all adequate to lump all output increases, other-
wise not explained by additional inputs of land, labour and capital goods, as accruing 
to technological change. Once it is accepted that each new technology is embodied in 
the traditional factors of production in agriculture, the measurement of each factor's 
contribution to additional output is often underestimated. Thus, once it is recognised 
that technological change is a major variable in explaining modern economic growth, 
ij is essential to decompose, however arbitrarily, this compound. 
From the foregoing discussion the following can be readily deduced: That in order 
to generate economic growth, the dependency of farmers on traditional agriculture 
should be broken by somehow making farmers learn, accept and adopt effectively the 
new set of profitable factors, the more detailed explanation of which implies the exa-
mination of a strategy for agricultural development. 
2.6 A Brief Outline of the General Strategy for Increasing 
Agricultural Output and Productivity 
2.6.1 General Remarks 
While there is a great degree of agreement about the crucial role of agriculture in the 
early stages of economic development, there is hardly any concensus on the most 
appropriate strategy for securing increased agricultural output and productivity of 
factors employed. Obviously there cannot be one formula; the strategy will depend on 
a host of factors. On one point, however, there cannot be two opinions: the desired 
increase must be achieved at minimum cost. 
Following the demand and supply approach to agricultural transformation, the 
rates of increase of agricultural output and factor productivity seem to be influenced 
by the interaction of many forces on each side. 
On the demand side, there are those factors which indicate the many productive de-
cisions by an individual farm-operator regarding the acceptance and adoption of new 
productive agents. These factors are collectively termed: 'proximate factors'. On the 
supply side, there is another set of factors which are mainly socially determined; they 
are termed: 'conditioning factors'. 6 4 Before some of these factors are more systematic-
ally presented, it will not be out of place to say a few words about the demanders and 
suppliers of non-traditional factors of agricultural production. 
In traditional agriculture it is meaningless to suggest that the farmers would by them-
selves be the demanders of the new and non-traditional factors. They have to be convin-
8 4 B . F. JOHNSTON, "The Choice of Measures for Increasing Agricultural Productivity: A Survey of 
Possibilities in East Africa," Tropical Agriculture, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1964, p. 92. 
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ced by the suppliers to adopt new techniques and other productive agents. What is pro-
bably even more important, however, is the effectiveness with which these factors can 
be provided with a calculation of cost and return which the farmers can understand. 
Therefore, besides of course the farmers' socio-cultural milieu, the most relevant ele-
ment within the economic frame-work is the margin of absolute profitability in accept-
ing each new technique or a new factor. In fact, in many tradition-bound agricultural 
communities, the lag in acceptance can be satisfactorily explained by this element. 
Profitability, however, cannot be shown by merely demonstrating other cases; it will 
depend on the farmer's own calculation of each new factor's price and yield.6 5 
The learning may in itself depend on the way it is obtained: by trial and error, on-
the-job training, and schooling. If the farmers are left to learn by brute experience 
alone, traditional agriculture can hardly be transformed in a generation or two. It 
cannot be avoided in many cases, but the major role in this respect has to be played by 
on-the-job training, especially in the immediate future, until the right type of schooling 
can be substantially imparted to the new generation. Whatever the most appropriate 
combination of these three, imparting new skills to the farmers must be regarded as 
one of the basic investments in any programme of agricultural development.66 
Now turning to the supply side, since agricultural transformation depends predo-
minantly upon the availability and price of non-traditional agricultural factors, the 
suppliers of these factors are obviously central to the present discussion. As SCHULTZ 
puts it: 'When they succeed in producing and distributing these factors cheaply, in-
vestment in agriculture becomes profitable, and this then sets the stage for farmers to 
accept modern factors and learn how best to use them'. 6 7 Therefore, two leading ques-
tions must be investigated: (a) Who are these suppliers? (b) What do they supply? The 
second question must be answered first. 
As already noted before, the main sources of higher productivity in agriculture are 
in fact reproducible ones. They can be grouped into two classes: material inputs, and 
skills and capabilities for utilising these inputs in the most appropriate manner. 
The material inputs are not invariably readily available in the form best suited to all 
farming conditions. They must, therefore, be adapted to (if they have been produced 
elsewhere) or produced for particular conditions. For instance, in the realm of biolo-
gical sciences, new varieties of seeds and crops, new breeds of cattle, etc.; in physical 
and chemical sciences the same is true of fertilisers, insecticides, pesticides, certain 
types of farm machinery and hand tools, etc. What is, however, more readily accessible 
is the stock of knowledge about the principles underlying almost all these new inputs. 
Given then this store of basic techno-scientific knowledge, most new agricultural fac-
tors must be so evolved and produced as to suit a particular situation in traditional 
agriculture. 
Since in this production and development process the producer (or more appropria-
""SCHULTZ quotes the study of hybrid corn by Zvi GRILICHES. Op. cit., p. 1 6 3 . 
""SCHULTZ, op. cit., p. 1 7 4 . (Jh. 4 5 ) 
"'Ibid., p. 145 . 
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tely SCHUMPETER'S celebrated entrepreneur) cannot always reap all the benefits gener-
ated by immediate increases in income flows, most fundamental and applied research 
and production have to be socialised. For one thing, since the profit-seeking entrepre-
neurs cannot get substantial margins, in fact none in most cases, there is hardly any 
obvious reason which should induce them to invest in this huge venture. The other, 
and perhaps the more important, consideration in most underdeveloped agrarian socie-
ties is the almost complete absence of individual entrepreneurship. 
There is yet another factor which tends to favour the case for the socialisation of the 
supply of modern agricultural inputs: the many indivisibilities inherent in the applica-
tion of scientific knowledge. For any system of production to be efficient, the scale of 
organisation has to have a certain optimal size, of course depending upon the particu-
lar obstacles and needs of a given community. Thus it seems that in this field, as in 
many others, the leading role has to be played by public, and usually nonprofit-making, 
agencies. In most underdeveloped countries this can best be done within the organisa-
tional frame-work of the State. (It must, however, be added that in certain cases where 
private entrepreneurship of any consequence does already exist, it should be so utilised 
as to result in maximum returns to the community). 
Besides this production aspect on the supply side, the distribution has also to be con-
sidered. This function could be performed both by private profit-making and public 
agencies. While it is a theoretical possibility that private firms could enter into perform-
ing this function, their profits in practice are restricted by two simple considerations: 
one, the costs of entry and, two, the size of the market. Distribution of the new factors 
in traditional agriculture has the disadvantages both of involving considerable costs of 
entry (adaptation, information, demonstration and education) and the restricted 
market. Thus, once again, it could be argued that, at least in the initial stages of agri-
cultural transformation, public nonprofit-making agencies must be the torch bearers. 
All extension-education activities must, in fact, be regarded as an investment which 
does not always result in immediate profits to the distributing agency. Therefore, con-
sidering the fact that there is a great dearth of all such strategic elements as reprodu-
cible inputs, entrepreneurial skills, organised markets, etc., the oft-repeated argument 
for planning is all the more strengthened. 
From the foregoing discussion one thing becomes very clear: the forces, both of 
demand and supply, underlying the process of agricultural transformation in an under-
developed country are extremely intricate. Hence to formulate a comprehensive yet 
precise programme is out of question, unless each given situation is understood in all 
its details. However, accepting the general approach as proposed above, some strategic 
elements can further be examined.6 8 
6 8JOHNSTON, op. cit., p. 9 8 . (Jh. 6 4 ) These factors have also been discussed by B . F. JOHNSTON and 
J. W . MEIXOR in an earlier article: "The Nature of Agriculture's Contribution to Economic Develop-
ment," The American Economic Review, Vol. 5 1 , No. 4 , 1 9 6 1 , pp. 5 6 6 - 9 3 . 
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2.6.2 The Proximate Factors for Agricultural Development 
It has been argued that, given the state of traditional agriculture, additional incomes 
can be generated only at a very high cost. This, for one thing, is because the already 
employed factors of production have in general very low marginal productivity. In 
order to increase the rate of return on each of these factors, the 'state of the arts' must 
be changed once and for all. To achieve this, the farmers must be able to see the profi-
tability through price-yield calculus of the non-traditional factors. 
While this task, as has already been pointed out, has to be performed by the suppliers 
of new factor inputs, the ultimate result will depend mainly upon the decisions taken 
by the farmers themselves. These decisions can be categorised as follows: 
acceptance and use of new and/or improved farm inputs 
adoption of new and improved farm practices 
introduction and assimilation of managerial innovations 
In practice all these are interdependent, and quite often overlapping. However, when 
they are further broken into finer components, their interdependence can be seen clear-
ly. As a word of introduction it must be said, that underlying the acceptance and adop-
tion of each element in these three major categories, each farmer's own capability of 
understanding is a major variable. Of course, this will be to a large extent be influenc-
ed by the socially determined factors on the supply side. 
2.6.2.1 Acceptance and Use of New and/or Improved Farm Inputs 
In principle under this category the existing inputs such as land, capital (fixed and 
current) and labour should be included in so far as their qualitative differentiation is 
specified. 
a. The increase in land input is not always possible for several social and technical 
reasons. However, wherever possible, the expansion of the cultivated area can be 
had not only by bringing under plough the culturable waste lands but also by 
intensifying efforts on the under-utilised patches of land which each farmer owns. 
This effort will need, of course, complementary inputs and practices like irrigation, 
fertilisers, crop rotation, mixed cropping, etc. 
b. The increase in capital input does not result solely from the application of larger 
quantities of capital goods than those existing (machinery, fertilisers, etc.), but also 
from an improvement in their quality. Among these changes, the following may be 
noted: 
(i) The use of chemical fertilisers is perhaps one of the most land-saving and 
yield-increasing forms of capital. Yield response to fertilisers is not always well 
established. Therefore, the farmers do not adopt the use of commercial fertilisers 
easily. It is often observed that, even in those places where farmers have begun 
using them in substantial quantities, usually the application is restricted to cash 
crops. Application to food crops is equally important. 
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(ii) The use of pesticides and insecticides is another valuable investment which 
must go with other new capital inputs. 
(iii) Such improved seeds, plant varieties and livestock breeds must be adopted 
which, besides being resistant to many local diseases, should be capable of giving 
more yield per unit. 
(iv) Improved farm machinery and other implements are not always capital-
intensive; in fact, many a time, a slight readjustment in the existing tools can 
affect the efficiency of work very substantially. For instance, the attachment of a 
seed drill to the existing plough or a new type of mouldboard plough itself are 
improvements which can greatly increase the effectiveness of farm investment. 
c. The increase in labour input, or more exactly the increase in the use of available 
effective man-hours, can contribute to increase farm income. This addition in labour 
input can in fact be more appropriately utilised if work programmes are so designed 
which, on the one hand, can save much waste of labour and, on the other, increase the 
skills of those directly engaged in farming. 
2.6.2.2 Adoption of New and Improved Farm Practices 
It is not so much the additional input, or the change in the quality of the existing one, 
which would help increasing farm output and factor productivity, but farm yields can 
be increased manifold by improved farm practices. These practices form those essential 
complementary elements without which the farmer cannot utilise economically his 
factor inputs. They, in fact, increase the transformation rates of each individual input 
to output. The following may be mentioned: 
a. Seed-bed preparation: This requires deeper ploughing, better levelling and dressing 
of each unit of land to be cultivated. 
b. Planting time: Crop calendars should be so prepared as to allow more appropriate 
use of rainfall, irrigation facilities, the susceptility of a crop to disease, the sowing and 
harvesting times of other crops, etc. 
c. Row planting: Instead of the simple broadcasting method of sowing, row planting 
permits proper spacing, hence optimum plant growth. It also helps to save labour 
from unnecessary and often difficult weeding and other cultural practices. 
d. Change in irrigation methods: In many places, where flooding of fields is a common 
practice, there is an obvious need to economise on water, which also prevents damage 
to a crop, especially in its early period of growth. To utilise water optimally, careful 
preparation of the land is often a prerequisite. For instance, in the case of several 
crops, mainly because of their root systems and the soil conditions they require, ridg-
ing helps to conserve water. In areas where seasonal rainfall is the only source of 
water to crops such practices are all the more useful. 
e. Double cropping and appropriate rotations: Where a single crop is as yet the rule, 
in many cases double cropping could be introduced. A good combination of different 
crops is often complementary, though in other cases the two crops sown together may 
prove to be competitive both for soil nutrients and other reproducible inputs like 
3 7 
capital and labour. Double cropping also lessens the risks and uncertainties inherent 
in the cultivation of one crop. Furthermore, a rotation of two to four crops, depending 
upon soil and climatic conditions, helps to retain soil fertility and increase the crop 
yield per acre. 
2.6.2.3 Introduction and Assimilation of Managerial Innovations 
While the adoption of new farm practices represent an entrepreneurial function, the 
fact remains that rational programming of individual farm plans and management by 
some expert in this field offer to the farmer great opportunities to increase farm produce 
and factor productivity. 
Managerial innovations include, among other things, the substitution of lower-value 
farm enterprises by higher-value ones. For instance, in cases where the farmers depend 
solely upon the cultivation of subsistence food crops, it is better if they add cash crops, 
or combine the food crops with livestock enterprises. The resulting market-oriented 
behaviour of the farmers will induce them to adopt new and improved farm practices. 
In many instances, by the mere substitution of crops and other such farm enterprises, 
the farmers are able to increase the transformation rates of new factor inputs. This 
then leads to specialisation. 
Perhaps yet another field of managerial innovations lies in the mutual co-operation 
which the farmers can lend to each other. Eventually this may lead to production co-
operatives, be they for the purpose of land consolidation, or for the provision of extra 
and improved factor inputs, or for the demonstration of better farm practices. 
While the foregoing proximate factors are essential, they are not in themselves a 
sufficient condition for increasing farm output. In many agrarian societies, it is hard to 
see if individual entrepreneurship can develop by itself in such a short space of time as 
would be required for economic development. This may be precluded by the existence 
of such institutional arrangements which do not provide incentives for individual 
peasants to undertake new farm enterprises. Thus, to generate self-sustaining economic 
growth within agriculture, a congenial frame-work of socially determined factors is 
indeed crucial. 
2.6.3 The Socially Determined Factors for Agricultural Development 
The following broad categories of conditioning factors seem to hold the key not only 
to supply the various factor inputs but also to determine the general socio-economic 
environment of an underdeveloped country. 6 9 
a. The institutional arrangements include: (i) the land tenure system; (ii) the agricul-
tural infrastructure, which includes roads, transport facilities, markets, irrigation pro-
jects, etc.; and (iii) the supply of such improved factor inputs as fertilisers, seeds, in-
secticides, etc. 
8 8See also: JOHNSTON, op. cit. 
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b. The agricultural research and extension programme includes: (i) research on the 
development and adaptation of improved production techniques and other possibili-
ties ; (ii) extension services which carry the knowledge and understanding of improved 
techniques and inputs to the doorstep of the farmer; it also includes the feeding-back 
of farmers' problems to research agencies; and (hi) general education and other such 
programmes which help develop human resources and create attitudes favourable to 
rural progress. 
c. The financial incentives and other measures include: (i) the availability of credit fa-
cilities; (ii) subsidies on the cost of factor inputs; and (iii) the level of prices of far-
mers' produce. 
In a preceding section the influence of some of these factors, especially of the land te-
nure system and other complementary measures, was mentioned in passing. In the 
same context, it was also pointed out that most of these conditioning factors cannot be 
supplied by any existing agency other than the State itself. While it seems that to narra-
te the role of each of these factors and the problems involved in the effective execution 
of these measures would amount to needless repetition, for so much has lately been 
written by others on this subject, it must nevertheless be asserted that there are two 
essential functions embodied in this approach: 7 0 firstly, to convince the farmers of the 
value of new inputs and improved techniques and, secondly, to provide the incentive 
system which can stimulate them to undertake new methods of agricultural production 
even though in so doing the farmers have to take greater risks than before. The role of 
incentives can hardly be overemphasised. Two instances can be given to illustrate this 
point. 
The first example is of a change in land tenure arrangements. It has been said that 
'the tenure arrangements under which productive resources are held and used will 
affect farm firm and farm family patterns of expenditures, savings, and investment in 
the following ways : ' 7 1 
a. By their influence upon the operator's time preference for money income. 
b. By their influence, over time, upon allocation of expenditures between the farm firm and the 
farm household. 
c. By their influence upon the allocation of expenditures within the farm household as between 
goods and services for direct consumption and expenditures upon the family residence. 
d. By their influence upon disposition of the total available labour time of the farm family. 
e. By their influence upon attitudes toward and uses made of credit. 
The second example is of marketing. In many areas the opening up of a new road 
system, where none existed before, or the provision of an organised'market - providing 
'"Some specific points have been described in detail in the following studies: FAO, The State of Food 
and Agriculture, 1963, (Rome, 1964), pp. 95-125; P. RAUP, "The Contribution of Land Reforms to 
Agricultural Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1963, pp. 
1-21; and I. ARNON, "The Role of Agricultural Research in Developing Countries," World Crops, 
Vol. 16, No. 3, 1964, pp. 20-23. 
" R A U P , op. tit., pp. 8-9. 
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cash exchange - can eventually break the circle of a subsistence economy. Introduc-
tion of money may prove to be a singular cause of rural progress in terms of economic 
development, for it may succeed in changing the 'state of motives and preferences'. 
Seepage of industrial commodities, especially consumer goods, from outside the village 
economy may exert a great pull effect on increasing the agricultural production and its 
eventual commercialisation. 
These two examples do not in any way exhaust the discussion about incentives; they 
do, however, indicate their importance. Hence, in formulating any agricultural devel-
opment programme, the role of incentives and profitability of the adoption of new fac-
tor inputs and improved production techniques must evidently be illustrated to the 
farmers. In the final analysis, perhaps, it is to these forces that traditional agriculture 
will succumb. 
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3 General Features of the Economy of Pakistan 
3.1 Introduction 
No study of the Pakistan economy could be regarded as adequate without taking into 
consideration the division of the country into two economically almost independent 
units, East and West Pakistan. While both supply an example of the contemporary 
underdeveloped economies of Asia, the inter-regional differences between them give 
the country in many respects a unique place in to-day's world. These differences are 
not confined to one or a few aspects, nor are they entirely of degree: they range in kind 
between climate, vegetation, physical conditions of land and other resources, land uti-
lisation, cropping patterns, consumption habits, etc. The differences of degree can be 
found, for instance, in the extent and pattern of industrialisation, capital forma-
tion, role of private and pubMcentrepreneurship,Uteracy levels and educational achieve-
ments, rural-urban distribution of the population, labour force participation both by 
age groups and sex in various occupations, etc. 
While it is true that in some other countries, especially those larger in area, such 
regional differences have existed in the past, as they do even at present, the case of 
Pakistan is without a parallel. With East and West Pakistan separated physically by a 
not very friendly territory, both resource and factor mobility between the two units is 
very limited. In fact, the only transfer of output and production factors taking place 
between the two, as incorporated in their inter-zonal trade, is either by sea or by air. 
At present, East Pakistan is the less fortunate partner as far as Pakistan's economic 
achievements are concerned.72 
From the foregoing it is clear that the problems of the economic development of 
Pakistan have to be viewed from two angles. The major problem both in East and 
West Pakistan is one of transforming a predominantly agricultural and archaic eco-
nomic structure into an increasingly diversified yet integrated whole. The other is the 
problem of regional disparities, which is further accentuated by the Umited factor 
mobility between the two units. Thus, while in itself the problem of the economic deve-
"Of late the problem of economic disparities between East and West Pakistan has become a subject 
of serious study. To give but few examples, see: M. N. HUDA, "Development of Underdeveloped 
Regions of Pakistan," in: A. M. GHOUSB (ed.), Studies in Economic Development: With Special 
Reference to Pakistan, (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1962) , pp. 1 7 3 - 7 9 ; M. HAQ, Strategy of Economic 
Planning: A Case Study of Pakistan, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 3 ) ; and Pakistan, Planning 
Commission, The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), (Karachi, 1965 ) . (Mimeographed). In fact, HUDA 
even uses the terms "under-developed East Pakistan" and "developed West Pakistan", (p. 176) 
41 
lopment of Pakistan is very difficult, the inter-wing economic disparities face the stu-
dent with an even more complex and arduous task. Furthermore, in an infant State like 
Pakistan, where national cohesion is far from complete, a problem such as that of eco-
nomic disparities tends not only to be politically charged but also potentially capable 
of endangering the very existence of the State itself. 
Keeping in view the two basic considerations mentioned above, this chapter pre-
sents some leading economic indicators reflecting the general nature of the economy of 
Pakistan, the demographic features, the extent and direction of industrialisation in re-
cent years, the general state of agricultural production, and rural food consumption. 
3.2 Some Leading Economic Indicators 
The fact that Pakistan economy is still basically agricultural can well be gauged by the 
contribution of the agricultural sector to the national income and the employment of 
the labour force. Table 1 shows the share of the agricultural sector (including major 
and minor crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry) in Pakistan's national income: 
53.5 % in 1960-61 as against 60.4% in 1950-51.7 3 In Table 2, the percentage of the to-
tal labour force engaged in agriculture was estimated to be 64.9 in 1960 as against 73.5 
Table 1. Absolute and percentage shares of the major sectors in the national income of Pakistan at fac-
tor cost of 1959-60 (in million Rupees) 
Sector 1950-51 1955-56 1960-61 
Agriculture1 14,357 (60.4) 14,379 (55.3) 16,420 (53.5) 
Manufacturing2 1,440 (6.1) 2,258 (8.7) 2,921 (9.5) 
Trade8 2,960 (12.4) 3,186 (12.3) 3,815 (12.4) 
Services4 2,927 (12.3) 3,770 (14.5) 4,844 (15.8) 
Ownership of dwellings 1,048 (4.4) 1,183 (4.5) 1,334 (4.3) 
Public administration and defence 1,052 (4.4) 1,222 (4.7) 1,298 (4.2) 
Mining and quarrying 35 (-) 48 (-) 79 (0.3) 
National income (net national pro-
duct) at factor cost, 1959-60 23,819(100.0) 26,046(100.0) 30,711(100.0) 
Source: Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1965, Table 27, 
pp. 936-37 
The agricultural sector includes major and minor crops, livestock, fishing and forestry. 
'The manufacturing sector includes both large and small-scale industries. 
Trade includes wholesaling and retailing. 
'Services include construction, electricity, gas, water, and sanitary services, transportation and 
communications, banking and insurance and all other services. 
"According to the latest estimates, the share of agriculture in the national income was 49.1 % in 
1964-65. The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., Table 3, p. 1-4. 
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Table 2. Percentage of labour force employment by major sectors in Pakistan and its two Provinces 
Sector 
1 9 5 0 1955 1 9 6 0 
East West Pakistan East West Pakistan East West Pakistan 
Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. 
Agriculture 7 9 . 2 67 .1 7 3 . 5 77 .1 6 2 . 6 7 0 . 1 72 .9 5 6 . 4 6 4 . 9 
Manufacturing 4 . 3 8 . 9 6 .5 5 .6 1 2 . 4 8 .9 7.1 14 .7 10.8 
Trade 4 . 3 7 . 2 5.7 4 . 4 7 . 4 5 .9 5.1 7.7 6.3 
Construction 4 . 2 5.3 4 . 8 4 . 5 5.7 5.1 5.1 6 .9 6 .0 
Transport 3.5 2 . 6 3.1 3 .5 2 .7 3.1 4 . 3 3.1 3 . 4 
Other services 4 . 3 9 . 2 6 . 6 4 .8 9.1 6 .9 6 .2 11.1 8 .6 
Mining - - - - - - - - -
All sectors 100 .0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 100 .0 1 0 0 . 0 
Source: Pakistan, Planning Commission, Harvard Advisory Group, Long-Term Perspectives 
for the Pakistan Economy, 1965-1985: A First Approach, (Karachi, 1964), Annex. 4, 
Table 1. (Mimeographed). 
All these percentages have been derived from absolute figures of the 'active labour force' as 
divided amongst different sectors. The figures for the labour force in the agricultural sector 
exclude those who are considered as 'underemployed'. The non-agricultural labour force ex-
cludes those who reported 'unemployed'. 
in 1950. Here again there were great differences between East and West Pakistan: for 
according to one estimate, of the regional income of East Pakistan in 1959-60, 
65.8% was contributed by the agricultural sector as compared with 45.1 % in West 
Pakistan. 7 4 As to the percentage of the labour force working in agriculture, 72.9 % was 
reported to be engaged in this sector in 1960 in East Pakistan as against 56.4 % in West 
Pakistan. 
As is evident from Table 3, agriculture also continues to be the dominant compo-
nent in Pakistan's exports, notwithstanding the fact that, during the decade 1951-61, 
the composition of its exports altered considerably. Thus, while in 1951 primary pro-
ducts (mainly agricultural raw material and food commodities) formed about 91 % 
of the total exports, their proportion had diminished to less than 71 % by 1961.7 5 Most 
of this change can be attributed to the expansion of jute and cotton manufactures, and 
to severe shortages of food (especially foodgrains) at home. On the side of imports, the 
change in the composition has been even more striking, demonstrating in general the 
pattern of the needs of a developing economy. Therefore, in Table 4, in 1951 most im-
ports consisted of consumer goods (thanks largely to the lavish import policy of the 
government in the wake of the Korean economic boom), raw materials and fuels: 
more than 63 % of these imports were consumer goods as against about 9 % and 28 % 
, 4 H A Q , op. cit., Table B-I, pp. 2 5 2 - 5 3 . (Jh. 7 2 ) 
^Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1961-62, (Rawalpindi, 1962) , p. 8 8 . 
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Table 3. Exports and imports in relation to the national income of Pakistan for selected years 
Year National income Exports Percentage of Imports Percentage of 
(million Rupees) (million Rupees) national income (million Rupees) national income 
1950-51 18,575 2,554 13.7 1,620 8.7 
1955-56 19,586 1,784 9.1 1,325 6.8 
1960-61 22,943 1,799 7.8 3,188 13.9 
Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1961-62, (Rawalpindi, 
1962), p. 88. 
capital goods and industrial raw material, respectively. But in 1961 the proportion of 
capital goods in the total imports had increased to over 20%; of industrial raw ma-
terial to 40%; the proportion of consumer goods had slided down to about 40%. Of 
course, import substitution has been a determining factor in the diminished proportion 
of consumer goods in the total imports of Pakistan. 
Table 4. The composition of imports into Pakistan in 1951 and 1961 
1951 1961 
Class of 
goods Imports Percentage Imports Percentage 
(million Rupees) of total (million Rupees) of total 
Capital goods 140.8 8.98 631.0 20.65 
Industrial raw material 436.0 27.80 1,217.6 39.83 
Consumer goods 991.8 63.22 1,207.7 39.52 
All goods 1,568.6 100.00 3,056.3 100.00 
Source: See Table 3; op. cit., p. 88. 
Returning to the domestic scene, the growth of the national income in Pakistan has 
not been spectacular. Largely because of a decade or more of almost stagnant agricul-
ture (despite the rapidly bourgeoning industrial sector), the rate of growth of national 
income per annum has been fluctuating just above the rate of growth of population by 
a narrow margin. However, of late (since 1960-61) the position has improved quite 
considerably. Thus, while the rate of population growth in Pakistan increased from 
about 1.8 % in 1948^-9 to about 2.3 % in 1960-61, the rates of growth of national in-
come were estimated to be4.0%in 1958-59, 3.6%in 1959-60and5.0%in 1960-61. 7 6 
'"Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 8, 1964, Table 25, pp. 1654-
55. In fact, the growth rate of the GNP during 1960-65 has been estimated to be 5.2 % per annum. 
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As for the income per capita in the country, the following figures have been disclosed 
1949-50: Rs.311 1959-60: Rs.318 1964-65: Rs.360 
But it has been pointed out that the income per capita in East Pakistan in 1960 was 
60 % less than that in West Pakistan. 7 8 
From these income figures, which by any standard are very low, it is obvious that the 
saving capacity of the people must also be very limited. Nevertheless, the average 
saving has been increasing rather impressively, especially over the last few years. 7 9 As 
to the marginal savings rate, it reached 12.4% in 1961 and 19 % in 1964-65. Of course 
this increase conceals the contribution of the public sector and foreign aid, which two 
have been of growing importance to the economy of Pakistan. 
As in their incomes per capita, East and West Pakistan show differences in their 
saving and investment rates. For instance, East Pakistan had a gross domestic saving 
rate of 8 % in 1959-60 as compared with less than 5 % in West Pakistan; but in gross 
investment the rate was higher in West Pakistan during the same year. 8 0 The fact that 
West Pakistan should have a higher investment rate can be explained by (a) its bigger 
industrial sector, with small- and large-scale industries more diffused, (b) its higher 
income per capita, and (c) the greater range of income distribution. But it is surprising, 
at least prima facie, that the western wing should have a lower rate of marginal savings 
than its eastern counterpart. It can be argued with some confidence that this is certain-
ly not because of some basic institutional differences between the two wings. 
3.3 The Demographic Features 
In the context of this study, the total population and its distribution according to age 
and sex groups with the vital rates (fertility and mortality) are of major importance to 
the economy of Pakistan. Moreover, the rural-urban distribution of the labour force 
and its participation in the production process according to age, sex and professions 
play an important role. These four factors will be treated below in separate sections. 
3.3.1 The Total Population and Its Distribution According to Age and Sex 
Groups 
The total population of Pakistan was 98.66 million in 1961: 55.21 million in East Pa-
kistan and 43.45 million in West Pakistan. 8 1 This amounts to an average density in 
Pakistan of 104 persons per square kilometer, in East and West Pakistan it is 387 and 
•"The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., Table 12 , p. 1 - 1 4 . (fit. 7 2 ) 
7 8 H A Q , op. cit., p. 94.C/B. 7 2 ) 
'"For the period 1 9 4 9 - 5 0 to 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 , the average savings rate increased from the very low figure of 
4 . 6 % to 9 .7 %. The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., Table 7, p. IS.(Jh. 7 2 ) 
8 0 H A Q , op. cit., p. 112.0%!. 7 2 ) 
8 1 See next page. 
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54 persons, respectively. However, within each wing, the range of population density 
in West Pakistan is much larger than in East Pakistan. Table 5 shows some more detail-
ed data. 8 2 
Table 5. Man/land ratios in East and West Pakistan in 1961 
Ratio E. Pakistan W. Pakistan 
Persons per acre of available land 1.564 0.218 
Persons per acre of farm area 2.539 0.887 
Persons per acre of cultivated area 2.882 1.165 
The age structure of a given population is a function of fertility, mortality and mi-
gration trends in the preceding periods. Of these three factors, fertility is the most im-
portant one. These demographic elements are, in turn, influenced by various socio-
economic circumstances. 
Since, for the purpose of this study, some adjustments had to be made in the popula-
tion statistics as revealed by the 1961 Census, Table 6 gives entirely new estimates.8 3 
From Chart 1 (see p. 48), one can deduce the most striking feature: that the age pyra-
mid has a distinctly flat base. In other words, the population of Pakistan is very young. 
The percentage of children under 15 years is 46.02 for both sexes (44.74 for males, 
47.37 for females). These are claimed to be one of the highest in the world. 8 4 It is even 
more interesting to note that, between East and West Pakistan, the percentage of 
children under 15 years is relatively higher in the former province. But in both cases the 
percentage of the females is higher than that of the males. 
It may also be mentioned that, over the inter-censal period 1951-61, the proportion 
of all children under 15 (and especially of the 0-4 age group) has increased quite mar-
kedly. Although many irregularities in age reporting have been found in both censuses, 
especially among the younger age groups, the enlargement of the base during this 
period, which has been more marked in West Pakistan, is due largely to the past trend 
of fertility. Unless these enlargements were highly age-selective, mortality would ac-
8 1The difference between these figures and those revealed by the 1961 Population Census of Pakistan 
is explained by the fact that, in the first place, these figures do not include the tribal population of 
North-West Pakistan and the non-Pakistanis and that, secondly, they have been adjusted according 
to the suggestions of KROTKI. See: K. J. KROTKI, "Population Size, Growth and Age Distribution: 
Fourth Release from the 1961 Census of Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
1963, pp. 279-305. 
"These ratios have been derived from the population figures given in Table 6 and the acreage figures 
given in Table 21. 
8 8See footnote 81. 
8 4 S . S. HASHM, Main Features of the Demographic Conditions in Pakistan, Pakistan, Central Statistical 
Office, (Karachi, 1963), p. 32. (Mimeographed) 
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Table 6. Absolute (in millions) andpercentage distribution of population by sex in 1961 
Age group 
Males Females 
East West Pakistan East West Pakistan 
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan 
All ages 28.28 22.52 50.80 26.93 20.93 47.86 
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) 
0-9 10.28 7.51 17.79 10.25 7.48 17.73 
(36.38) (33.41) (35.06) (38.04) (35.74) (37.03) 
10-59 16.54 13.45 29.99 15.49 12.29 27.78 
(58.46) (59.65) (58.99) (57.53) (58.72) (58.05) 
60 and over 1.46 1.56 3.02 1.19 1.16 2.35 
(5.16) (6.94) (5.95) (4.43) (5.54) (4.92) 
0-9 + 60 and over 11.74 9.07 20.81 11.44 8.64 20.08 
(41.54) (40.35) (41.01) (42.47) (41.28) (41.95) 
Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Population Census of Pakistan, 
1961, Census Bulletin No. 3, (Karachi, 1962), Table 1. 
count for very little in these drastic changes.8 5 However, it seems quite probable that 
for these younger age groups, the enlargement differential between East and West 
Pakistan, being greater in the latter province, has been due to a high but constant fer-
tility rate in both the provinces but a more rapidly declining infant mortality in West 
Pakistan. This can also be deduced from the higher survival ratios as documented by 
HASHMI in a recent study. 8 8 
During the same inter-censal period two other changes in the age structure of Pakis-
tan's population are equally important. Firstly, among the 10-59 age group, from 
which most of the working population is drawn, there was a corresponding decrease: 
for both sexes in Pakistan this age group declined from 66.67 % to 58.53 % of the total 
population. In both the provinces the decline in the percentages has been more or less 
of the same magnitude. Secondly, there was an increase in the proportion of the popu-
lation of 60 years and over: from 4.97 % in 1951 to 5.45 % in 1961 for the entire coun-
try. Again in both the provinces the increase in the proportion was more or less the 
same. 8 7 Thus, as will be discussed later in this section, the increased proportion of 
children under 15 and the decreased proportion of 10-59 age groups and an increased 
percentage of persons over 60 have definitely affected, on the one hand, the composition 
of the economically productive age groups and, on the other, the burden of depend-
ency. 
• » M . , p. 47. 
™Ibid. 
"'For 1951 percentages, see: Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1963-64, 
(Rawalpindi, 1964), Table 4, p. 7. 
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P A K I S T A N 
1 0 9 8 7 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Population in Million 
W E S T PAKISTAN E A S T P A K I S T A N 
Age group 
2 1 0 0 1 2 
Population in Million 
2 1 0 0 1 2 
Population In Million 
Chart 1. Population distribution by sex and age, 1961. 
Now turning to the sex distribution of the population of Pakistan, according to the 
1961 Census figures, the masculinity ratio could be regarded as one of the highest in 
the world. But when the 1961 Census figures are adjusted, as has been done in Table 6, 
the masculinity ratios do not appear to show any exceptional feature. However, as can 
be seen in Table 7, there are two noteworthy features: that over the decade 1951-61 
the masculinity ratios have declined in both the provinces, and that they are higher in 
West Pakistan. 
For the exceptionally high masculinity ratios, especially in West Pakistan, as re-
vealed by the 1961 Census, several reasons could be held responsible, e.g., (a) females 
have a somewhat higher mortality level than males, (b) females are likely to be under-
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Table 7. Masculinity ratios in Pakistan and its two provinces 
Area 1951 
Census ( 1 ) 
1961 
Census ( 1 ) 
Adjusted 




1 1 0 
1 1 7 
1 1 3 
1 0 8 
1 1 6 
111 
1 0 5 
1 0 7 
1 0 6 
Source: 1. S. S. HASHMI, Main Features of the Demographic Conditions in Pakistan, Pakistan 
Central Statistical Office. (Karachi. 1963). Table III. 8, p. 48. 
2 . These figures are from Table 6. 
enumerated, especially in the predominantly /w<M-observing society of West Pakis-
tan, (c) males have been over-enumerated, and (d) higher masculinity ratio at birth. 8 8 
After discussing in some detail the effect of these probable causes, HASHMI concludes 
that 'the over-all high masculinity ratio in Pakistan stems not from one but several 
factors and some of the main ones are higher mortality level of females and higher 
under-enumeration of females than those of males'. 8 9 Thus, considering these two fac-
tors and also the anomalies in age reported in both the 1951 and 1961 Censuses in 
Pakistan, the masculinity ratios revealed by the adjusted 1961 figures seem to be nearer 
to reality. 
3.3.2 The Vital Rates: Fertility and Mortality 
In Pakistan neither the two Censuses of 1951 and 1961 nor the available vital-registra-
tion system have given reliable information about the birth and death rates. More re-
cently, however, some more information has been made available through the analysis 
of intercensal differences in age distribution and the Cross-sectional Survey and Longi-
tudinal Registration.9 0 In this study the discussion on these two vital events is based 
mainly on these sources. 
While birth rates determine the age distribution in a given population, they them-
selves are largely influenced by the number of females in the child-bearing age groups 
(15-44) in the total population and the marital status of the population. In Table 8, re-
cently estimated crude birth rates for Pakistan and its two provinces are given as based 
on different sources. 
For Pakistan and its two provinces the crude death rates, as given in Table 9, have 
been suggested, depending upon the source of estimation. There are two important 
•""HASHMI, op. cit., p. 4 9 . (fit. 8 4 ) 
*»Ibid., p. 5 4 . 
"The first source is KROTKI, op. cit. (fn. 81 ) , and the second one is HASHM, op. cit. (Jh. 8 4 ) 
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Table 8. Average birth rates of the population of Pakistan and its two provinces 
1962 population KROTKI 1961(1) 
Area growth estimation 1961 (2) 
adjusted (1) 
East Pakistan 44.9 53-60 46.3 
(58) 
West Pakistan 43.6 47-54 44.8 
(51) 
Pakistan 44.3 - 45.7 
Source: 1. See Table 7; op. cit.. Table V. 1, p. 121. (fit. 1) 
2. K . J. KROTKI, 'Population Size, Growth and Age Distribution: Fourth Release from 
the 1961 Census of Pakistan.' The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1963, 
p. 302. 
features to note in this table. First, KROTKI'S estimates of the crude death rates in East 
and West Pakistan are much higher than those of the 'Population Growth Estimation'. 
Second, while KROTKI'S estimates show a wide difference between the two provinces 
(higher in East Pakistan), those of the PGE show a slightly higher rate for West Pa-
kistan. Both of these points are puzzling. Further, HASHMI, after computing the age-
specific death rates from the PGE data, gives the standardised death rates for East and 
West Pakistan males and females separately and jointly (Table 10). 














Source: See Table 7: op. cit.. Table V. 4, p. 129. (fn. 1) 
Table 10. Adjusted standardised death rates of East and West Pakistan populations 









Source: See Table 7; op. cit., p. 137. (fit. 1) 
5 0 
In this table it is clear that for both sexes the mortality rate in East Pakistan and 
West Pakistan is almost the same, but in the case of females of West Pakistan it is 
higher. HASHMI thinks that the PGE data, from which he has derived the standardised 
death rates, depict the real situation. He posits the first general argument in the follow-
ing terms: 
'In the highly dense East Pakistan, more persons are likely to be served by health facilities than in 
sparsely populated West Pakistan. Thus, it seems that the effectiveness of health facilities in East 
Pakistan is levelling off the mortality differences.'91 
Proceeding further, he concludes that, from the age-specific death rates given in 
Table 10, infant mortality in both provinces is quite high, but it is higher in West Pakis-
tan when compared with East Pakistan; and as between sexes, the infant mortality in 
males is higher than in females in both provinces. Finally, HASHMI presents the follow-
ing three reasons to justify the death rates computed by him. 9 2 
a. Males of West Pakistan are in general experiencing lower mortality than those of 
East Pakistan. 
b. Females of West Pakistan are experiencing higher mortality than those of East 
Pakistan. 
c. Males in both the provinces have lower mortality than females. 
KROTKI, on the other hand, defends his high estimates of crude death rates in East 
Pakistan in the following words: 
"There are strong reasons why mortality in East Pakistan should still be higher than in the western 
province: lower standard of living, greater humidity, higher morbidity, slower progress of health 
campaigns, fewer public health measures.'93 
While at this juncture it is very difficult to support either of these two authors, a brief 
discussion on the two vital rates will be given in the last chapter, in which the future 
trends of the population of Pakistan will be presented. For the present it is interesting 
to note that, despite the wide differences in the above two estimates regarding fertility 
and mortality rates, the rate of natural increase of population in the two provinces of 
Pakistan does not differ very greatly, as can be seen in Table 1 1 . 
Table 11. Average annual rates of growth ofpopulation in East and West Pakistan, in percentages 
Area HASHMI KROTKI 
East Pakistan 
West Pakistan 
2 . 8 2 
2 . 7 6 
2 . 6 0 
2 . 6 0 
"HASHMI, op. cit., p. 133 . 
»*Ibid.,p. 139 . 
8 3KROTKI, op. cit., p. 3 0 2 . {fit. 8 1 ) 
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If the two rates of population growth per annum given in this table are taken to be 
close to the real situation, then the population of the country as a whole will double it-
self in 25 to 30 years. Further, it can be safely asserted that, if current fertility rates do 
not decline in the near future and mortality rates continue to decrease progressively, 
the average annual rate of growth of population may reach a level somewhere between 
3.0 to 3.5 %, which obviously has serious implications for the prospects of the econom-
ic and social development of Pakistan. 
3.3.3 Rural-urban Distribution 
In Table 12, a general picture of the rural-urban distribution of the population of East 
and West Pakistan is given. From this table, it is clear that East Pakistan, besides being 
more densely populated, is less urbanised than West Pakistan, or in other words: East 
Pakistan is more dependent on agriculture. 
Table 12. Rural and urban distribution of both sexes in Pakistan and its two Provinces 
Rural Urban Total 
Area in millions 
number % number % 
in millions in millions 
East Pakistan 5 2 . 2 1 9 4 . 6 2 . 9 7 5 . 4 5 5 . 1 8 
West Pakistan 3 2 . 2 8 7 4 . 4 1 1 . 1 3 2 5 . 6 4 3 . 4 1 
Pakistan 8 4 . 4 9 85 .7 1 4 . 1 0 14.3 9 8 . 5 9 
Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Census of Pakistan Population, 1961, 
Vol. 1, (Karachi, 1963), Statement 2.14, p. 11-16. 
The difference between the figures given in this table and those in the above publication are only 
slight, notwithstanding the adjustments. 
Although it is difficult to make any precise comparison between the rural-ruban 
figures of the 1951 and 1961 Censuses, thanks to the difference in the definitions of the 
terms in them, it has been estimated that the decennial increase in the urban population 
of Pakistan has been 54.3 %, which seems to have no precedence in the past decades.9 4 
It has also been estimated that during the same decade the growth of the urban popu-
lation of Pakistan was thrice that of the rural population. 
There have been two main sources for the increase of urban population in Pakistan: 
(a) the increase in the number of urban places (either due to the change of status or net 
immigration from the rural areas), and (b) the reproductive change in the urban areas. 
M HASHMI, op. tit., Table II.4, p. 16. (Jh. 8 4 ) 
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As to the first cause, it has been estimated that during 1951-61 the 'net gain through 
addition of new areas which became urban during the decade accounted for 26.5 per 
cent of the total growth of the urban population for Pakistan'. 9 8 However, although 
the percentage growth of urban areas due to changes in status (of rural areas to urban 
places) in both the provinces is almost the same, the absolute addition due to this 
change is about five times higher in West Pakistan. 9 6 Also during this period the move-
ment of population towards large cities in both provinces has been quite significant, 
but again this has been greater in West Pakistan. Further, it is probably most interest-
ing to note that, while over a quarter of the growth of urban population during 1951-
61 has been due to the addition of new areas (not classified as urban in 1951), about 
three-fourths of this growth is due to the net migration of people from rural to urban 
areas and reproductive change within the urban areas themselves.97 
3.3.4 Labour Force Participation According to Age, Sex and Professions 
In the three broad age groups (0-14, 15-64, 65 and over) the 'potential dependency 
burden' is constituted by children below 15 years and persons of 65 and over. It is the 
15-64 age groups which have to carry this load. However, in reality, the numerator 
and the denominator are not necessarily the actual dependents and supporters, for 
there are always some children below 15 and persons above 65 who are not dependents, 
and likewise among the working-age groups of 15-64 there are always some who are 
not supporters. 
In Pakistan, the 'potential dependency rate', was found to be 99 in 1961. This burden 
was higher in East Pakistan (102) than that in West Pakistan (94). As to the 'actual de-
pendency rate', defined as the ratio of all non-working persons plus dependents under 
10 years of age to the total civilian labour force, it was found to be 187 for Pakistan, 
but it was higher in West Pakistan (225) than in East Pakistan (197). The large discre-
pancy between these two ratios is indicative of the existence of surplus labour, especial-
ly in East Pakistan where child and old-age labour forms a significant proportion of 
the total civilian labour force. 
Now, coming to the 'economically active persons', or the civilian labour force, the 
greatest problem in a rural economy, such as that of Pakistan, is of correct identifica-
tion. While taking into consideration the Umitations of enumeration, the Census of 
1961 includes all persons aged 10 years and over, who work (or are looking for work) 
for profits, wages or salary or help any member of the family in agriculture, trade or 
any other profession. The persons thus excluded from this class are students, house-
wives, pensioners and rent receivers, inmates of jails, mental asylums and beggars. 9 8 
9 5ftfcf.,p.20. 
°«Ibid. 
mIbid., p. 23. 
""See: Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Population Census of Pakistan 1961, Census 
Bulletin No. 5, (Karachi, 1963). 
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In Tables 13 and 14, general and specific labour force participation rates, based on 
age and sex, for Pakistan and its two provinces are given. In Table 13, the overall 
labour participation rates can be seen. For Pakistan as a whole, 32.34% of the popula-
tion (54.77 per cent of the males and 8.55 of the females) was found to be in the civilian 
labour force in 1961. However, it is important to note that both the male and female 
participation rates were higher in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. 
Table 13. Economic characteristics of the population of East and West Pakistan, 1961, in percentages 
All areas Rural areas 
Particulars males females males females 
East West East West East West East West 
Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. 
Population over 10 
years 63.62 66.59 61.96 64.26 63.35 66.53 61.85 65.22 
Civilian Labour 
Force 55.52 53.83 10.66 5.83 55.72 55.84 10.92 6.99 
Dependents below 10 
years 36.38 33.41 38.04 35.74 36.65 33.47 38.15 34.78 
Source: See Table 12; op. cit.. Statement 6.2, p. V-9. 
Since in the 1961 Census it is the 10 years and over age groups from which the civilian 
labour force is drawn, it is more interesting to note the age- and sex-specific partici-
pation rates among these ages. Thus, in Table 14, the percentage of population in the 
age groups of 10 years and over in Pakistan is 63.98 for both sexes (64.94% among 
males and 62.97 % among females). However, between East and West Pakistan, the 
percentage of these age groups in the total population of each province is greater in the 
latter. While the percentage of persons in the age groups of 10 years and over is higher 
in West Pakistan, the proportion of the civilian labour force is higher in East Pakistan. 
As for the age-specific participation rates, there are two striking characteristics in 
Pakistan. Firstly, the proportion of children (10-14 years) registered in the labour force 
is relatively high: about 29.4% (49.7 of the males, 9.29 of the females). Thus children 
constitute more than 9 % of the total labour force. Secondly, old people (60 years and 
over) also show a rather high participation rate: 51.8% (83.3% of the males, 10.6% of 
the females). 
With regard to the participation rates by sex, it must be said that Pakistan has one 
of the lowest female participation rates in the world. Partly this could be attributed to 
the social system of the predominantly Muslim society, and partly it may have resulted 
from underestimation, either because the women shy away from registering themsel-
ves as earning members of the family, or there is no correct identification of their work. 
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Table 14. Proportion of civilian labour force in the population of Pakistan and its two provinces by 
selected age groups, 1961, in percentages 
Age 
Males Females Both sexes 
group East West Pakistan East West Pakistan East West Pakistan 
Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. 
10-14 58.0 38.6 49.7 12.7 4.7 9.3 35.2 21.6 29.4 
15-19 81.0 72.0 76.8 16.9 7.7 12.7 48.6 39.9 44.6 
20-24 91.9 88.1 90.1 17.4 9.7 13.8 54.5 49.7 52.3 
25-34 97.0 93.5 95.5 19.2 10.5 15.5 58.9 53.9 56.8 
35-44 96.4 94.5 95.6 19.5 11.5 16.0 61.3 56.5 59.2 
45-54 97.4 94.0 95.9 20.6 11.5 16.5 62.9 57.7 60.6 
55-59 95.1 91.1 93.4 16.3 11.1 13.9 62.5 55.6 59.5 
60 & over 87.7 80.1 83.8 13.4 7.8 10.6 54.3 49.3 51.8 
All ages over 10 87.3 80.8 84.3 17.2 9.1 13.6 53.5 46.9 50.5 
Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, 
Census Bulletin No. 5, (Karachi, 1963), Table 3. 
From Table 14 it is evident that, while the above-described characteristics represent 
Pakistan as a whole, there are several differences between its two provinces with res-
pect to the age- and sex-specific labour force participation ratios. As was indicated 
earlier, although the proportion of persons of 10 years and over in the total population 
is greater in West Pakistan, the labour force proportions are higher in East Pakistan. 
There are at least two factors which seem to have contributed to this situation: the 
greater proportion of child labour and the greater female participation ratios in East 
Pakistan. These discrepancies between the two provinces may be attributed to dif-
ferences in the level of their economic development and socio-psychological attitudes 
towards work. That there is a greater proportion of the population in the labour force 
of East Pakistan, especially among the younger age groups, is an indication of its 
lower level of economic development. It seems to result from inadequate educational 
facilities, a large reservoir of unpaid and underemployed family members in the 
agricultural sector, and the relative scarcity of non-farm job opportunities. 
Since the distribution of the total civilian labour force has not yet been divided into 
various categories of professions, only the proportion of agricultural to non-agricultu-
ral labour force could be analysed. 
Table 15 shows some interesting features. About 74.53 % of the total labour force in 
the country is agricultural; for East and West Pakistan these data are 85.46 and 59.31, 
respectively. This indicates the higher level of industrialisation in the latter province. 
Moreover, in both provinces the proportion of the female labour force in the agricul-
tural sector is higher than that of males, but the corresponding ratio of female labour-
participation is higher in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. 
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Table 15. Percentage distribution of the agricultural labour force in Pakistan and its two provinces, 1961 
Age group 
Males Females 
EastPak. West Pak. Pakistan EastPak. West Pak. Pakistai 
1 0 - 1 4 9 0 . 8 8 7 1 . 6 0 8 4 . 0 2 9 1 . 5 9 7 0 . 0 0 8 6 . 9 5 
1 5 - 1 9 8 5 . 6 4 5 9 . 0 6 7 4 . 2 0 9 3 . 5 0 7 5 . 0 0 8 9 . 6 5 
2 0 - 2 4 7 9 . 5 5 5 1 . 3 9 6 6 . 5 8 9 3 . 3 8 7 3 . 6 8 8 7 . 9 3 
2 5 - 3 4 8 1 . 5 7 5 3 . 8 5 6 9 . 5 7 9 2 . 6 5 7 5 . 0 0 8 7 . 5 1 
3 5 - 4 4 8 2 . 6 6 5 5 . 6 1 7 1 . 0 1 8 9 . 1 3 6 6 . 6 7 8 2 . 0 9 
4 5 - 5 4 8 4 . 8 2 5 9 . 2 4 7 3 . 2 7 9 0 . 9 1 6 6 . 6 7 8 3 . 3 3 
5 5 - 5 9 8 9 . 6 6 6 3 . 4 2 7 8 . 7 9 8 5 . 7 1 7 5 . 0 0 8 1 . 8 2 
6 0 and over 8 9 . 0 6 6 8 . 0 0 7 8 . 6 6 8 7 . 5 0 6 6 . 6 7 8 0 . 0 0 
All ages 8 4 . 2 6 5 8 . 1 0 7 2 . 8 6 9 1 . 9 9 7 1 . 3 1 8 5 . 8 2 
( 1 0 and over) 
Source: See Table 14; op. cit.. Statement 9 and Table 3. 
While it is a well-known fact that in many predominantly agrarian economies open 
and disguised unemployment is widely spread, in Pakistan, surprisingly enough, only 
about 1 % of the labour force was reported as unemployed in the 1961 Census: 0.5 % in 
East Pakistan and 1.7 % in West Pakistan. These are definitely very low and hence un-
representative figures for a country like Pakistan. The various reasons for their dis-
torted character have been dealt with by HASHMI and others. 9 9 
3.4 The Extent and Direction of Industrialisation 
As to industrialisation in Pakistan, it presents a picture of a limited yet varied number 
of forms and methods of organisation. Viewed against the fact that, at the time of her 
birth Pakistan had almost no industrial base, in the decade or so until 1961 the indus-
trial sector certainly made impressive progress. Thus the index of industrialproduction, 
especially of the large-scale manufacturing industry, increased from the very low figure 
of 39.5 in 1950 to 203.2 in 1961 (1954 = 100); see Graph I. Of late, and especially since 
1959, the yearly percentage increase in industrial production has risen from 7.0 to 
10.5 in 1961-62. This annual rate of growth has been achieved largely because of the 
establishment of new industrial capacity and better utilisation of the capacity already 
installed. 
A dominating characteristic of industrial growth in Pakistan is that most industrial 
estabUshments belong to the light category, which are also relatively less capital inten-
mIbid., and H A S H M , op. cit., p. 9 8 . (fn. 8 4 ) 
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sive and require simple technology. This is partly because of historical reasons. What 
is now Pakistan, in the pre-partition days, comprised areas which traditionally sup-
plied food commodities and agricultural raw materials - wheat and cotton from the 
Punjab and Sind regions of West Pakistan, rice and jute from East Pakistan - to other 
areas of the Indian sub-continent. Not only was no industrial base laid in these areas 
before 1947 for the utilisation of their own raw materials, but such other raw materials 
as bamboo, grass and straw for the paper industry, gypsum for fertilisers and Virginia 
tobacco for cigarettes remained almost unexploited. It was only after the inception of 
Pakistan that these industries could be established and multiplied. Thus at present in 
Pakistan most light but large-scale industries depend mainly on the local raw material; 
cotton, jute and paper are good examples. However, there are other light industries, 
such as woollen mills, safety-match factories and cigarettes, which depend partly upon 
imported raw materials. 
More recently, and chiefly because of the rapidly growing domestic industrial 
market for heavy and basic industries, there has been a general yet slow realisation of 
the need to establish such industrial enterprises in the country. Thus, especially after 
1960, after the discovery of sizable deposits of natural gas in West Pakistan and its po-
tential in East Pakistan with some iron ore, industries like steel, fertilisers and chemical 
plants are being established. 
From the industrial development of Pakistan during 1948-61, two conclusions can 
be drawn. Firstly, the use of local raw materials, mainly jute and cotton, has been of 
great consequence in deterrnining the pattern and structure of large-scale industries. 
Secondly, the industrial development in Pakistan has shown a firm bias in the domestic 
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market for consumer goods, with the major exception of jute manufactures. Thus the 
first line of development has been towards import substitution in consumer goods 
followed by export promotion. Of course, in the process of import substitution, effi-
ciency and cost considerations have not always been overriding. Besides the emergence 
of large-scale manufacturing industries, Pakistan economy has traditionally been de-
pendent on small- and medium-scale cottage and other industries, which are mostly 
located in or near small urban centres or on the fringes of rural areas. 
According to the 1959-60 Census of Manufacturing Industries, it can be seen in 
Table 16 that small-scale industries in Pakistan formed 38.7% of the total industrial 
establishments; they provided 4.4% of the average daily employment and 3.6% of the 
total value added. 
In Table 16, it can also be seen that West Pakistan possesses more than 79 % of the 
total industrial establishments in the country; it provides 69 % of the country's average 
daily employment, and its industrial value added amounts to 74 % of the country's to-
tal. It is interesting to note that this imbalance between the two wings is further increas-
ed if defence establishments and railway workshops were added: a very large part of 
them is located in West Pakistan. 
In order of importance, the industrial establishments have been classified as follows: 
textile manufactures (cotton, silk, wool and jute); cotton ginning, jute pressing, plas-
Table 16. Number of industrial establishments in Pakistan and its two provinces: their average daily 
employment and value added1 
. _ . , . . , Number of Average daily Value added (in 
Area and type of establishment , , . , ^ , ' , „ . establishments employment thousand Rupees) 
EAST PAKISTAN 
All industries 707 139,010 392,604 
Small-scale industries 263 3,870 10,244 
(37.2) (2.8) (2.6) 
WEST PAKISTAN 
All industries 2,758 310,932 1,152,111 
Small-scale industries 1,078 15,848 44,229 
(42.7) (5.1) (3.8) 
PAKISTAN 
All industries 3,465 449,942 1,544,715 
Small-scale industries 1,341 19,718 55,490 
(38.7) (4.4) (3.6) 
Source: Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1959-60, 
(Karachi, 1962), p. 51. 
'Figures in parentheses are the percentages of all industries in the area mentioned. 
'West Pakistan figures include Karachi. 
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tics and ice; metals; food processing and beverages; and sixteen other categories. How-
ever, as to their location by type, there are striking differences between East and West 
Pakistan. 
From Table 17, it is evident that in all cases of industrial estabhshments the western 
wing is in the lead. As to the pattern of location of each of these categories of industrial 
enterprises, it is determined by, among other things, the availabihty of raw material, 
capital and entrepreneurship. Thus, for instance, in textile manufactures, all jute ma-
nufacturing is done in East Pakistan, while others like cotton, silk and woollen textiles 
are concentrated mainly in West Pakistan. It may not be out of place to point out 
that within West Pakistan itself the distribution of large-scale manufacturing indus-
tries is very uneven; most of them are located in relatively few places, of which Kara-
chi is a good example. 
Table 17. Number of manufacturing establishments by major types in Pakistan and its two provinces 
Type of manufacftiririg establishment East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan 
Textiles (cotton, jute, silk, wool, thread and 
ballmaking, dyeing, printing, etc.) 8 4 6 4 0 7 2 4 
Miscellaneous manufactures (cotton ginning 
and pressing, jute pressing, ice, plastics, etc.) 7 9 4 3 3 5 1 2 
Metal products (excluding machinery and 
transport equipment) 8 0 3 4 5 4 2 5 
Food manufactures (excluding beverages) 171 2 4 6 4 1 7 
Others ( 1 6 broad types) 2 9 3 1 , 0 9 4 1 ,387 
All types 7 0 7 2 , 7 5 8 3 , 4 6 5 
Source: See Table 16; op. cit., pp. 32-46. 
The present differences in the extent of industrialisation in East and West Pakistan 
are due to many causes, the more notable ones are : 1 0 0 
a. Agriculture in East Pakistan has always been less developed, so that (apart from 
jute) it produced only small quantities of raw materials for industrial production. 
Even jute, before partition, was either directly exported or processed in West Bengal. 
b. Though West Pakistan itself could not be considered an industrial region, the or-
ganisation of smaE- and medium-scale industries has been more diffused. 
c. Communications and transport in general have been better in West Pakistan. 
d. After the birth of Pakistan, the influx of Muslim refugees was mostly directed to 
1 0 0 The following works give a good account of these factors: HAQ, op. cit., pp. 9 2 - 1 1 1 . (fit. 7 2 ) ; 
GHOUSE, op. cit., pp. 1 7 - 4 3 . (fit. 7 2 ) ; N. ISLAM, "Some Aspects of Interning Trade and Terms of 
Trade in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 3 , No. 1, 1 9 6 3 , pp. 1 - 3 6 ; and Pakistan, 
Planning Commission, Outlineofthe Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), (Karachi, 1964) , pp. 7 7 - 8 1 . 
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West Pakistan. They brought with them substantial entrepreneurship. Some of them 
could even transfer capital from India. The Khojas, Bohras, Memons and others were 
able to establish medium- and large-scale industries; the petty artisans and craftsmen 
among the refugees could contribute in their own way. In East Pakistan the exodus of 
Hindus (who comprised the entrepreneurial class) was not matched by the arrival of 
Muslims from India. It is only recently that some West Pakistani private entrepre-
neurship has gone to East Pakistan. 
e. Besides the benefits accruing from the location of most defence and almost all Cen-
tral Government establishments in West Pakistan, there has been until recently a net 
transfer of resources from East Pakistan. 1 0 1 Even the inter-wing trade figures, as given 
in Table 18, show the unfavourable position of East Pakistan. 
f. The allocation of public expenditure, financed both from domestic and foreign 
sources, was not always directed towards redressing inter-wing disparities. Even in 
the First Five Year Plan (1955-60) the investment in West Pakistan was twice that in 
East Pakistan. 1 0 2 It is only recently that this situation has changed. 1 0 3 
From the foregoing it seems obvious that in Pakistan the extent and direction of indus-
trialisation wiE to a large extent depend on how both private and public investments 
are aEocated between East and West Pakistan. In fact, the growth of the industrial 
sector, especiaEy in East Pakistan, wEl have to rest on the initiative of the State. 
Table 18. Inter-zonal trade of Pakistan for selected years: from 1948-49 to 1960-61, in million Rupees 
Imports into West Pakistan Imports into East Pakistan 
from East Pakistan f rom West Pakistan 
Year 
Pakistan foreign total Pakistan foreign total 
merchandize merchandize merchandize merchandize 
1948-49 18.8 1.0 19.8 137.6 2.7 140.3 
1950-51 46.0 16.9 62.9 210.8 61.7 272.5 
1954-55 180.7 17.5 198.2 293.0 12.0 305.0 
1957-58 264.0 5.5 269.5 690.2 12.2 702.4 
1960-61 361.0 7.5 368.5 798.7 25.2 823.9 
Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1963-64, (Rawalpindi, 
1964), Statistical Section, Table 34, p. 55. 
1 0 1 ISLAM, op. cit., p. 8. 
1 0 a N . ISLAM, "The Economic System of Pakistan," in: C. B . HOOVER (ed.), Economic Systems of the 
Commonwealth, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 424. 
l 0 3 This has been stressed by the Central Government in the Outline of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-
70), op. cit., p. 23, and pp. 77-81. (fn. 100) 
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3.5 The General State of Agricultural Production 
Perhaps no statement about the predicament of agriculture in Pakistan could be as 
meaningful as that contained in the famous REVELLE Report: 'Pakistan presents the 
disheartening picture of an agricultural nation that cannot feed itself'.104 While an 
unwary person might argue that not every country can (and should) necessarily be 
self-sufficient in food production, this certainly is inapplicable to Pakistan. On the 
contrary, it can be argued that Pakistan possesses sufficient real and potential agricul-
tural resources not only to feed her own growing population at higher levels of con-
sumption, but also to export some valuable processed food commodities and agricul-
tural raw material. In fact, to put it bluntly: the ultimate test of economic development 
in Pakistan lies in the capability of her agriculture to respond to the challenge with which 
it is confronted at present. 
3.5.1 Crop Production 
In general terms, during the years 1950-61, the average annual growth rate of agricul-
tural production in Pakistan fluctuated between 1.0 to 2.0%. That the production of 
crops in general has not increased significantly over the years can be deduced from the 
data on acreage and production of the two main groups of crops usually cultivated in 
East and West Pakistan. In Table 19, the acreage and production of food and cash 
crops by three five-year averages for the two provinces are given separately. Two 
interesting features of Pakistan agriculture, among others, can be noted in Table 19. 
First, food to cash crop acreage ratios between East and West Pakistan differ greatly. 
Although in both provinces the area under food crops dominated throughout the 
period under consideration, in East Pakistan the percentage of food crops in the total 
acreage varied from 85.6 to 88.0, whereas in West Pakistan this percentage varied from 
73.7 to 76.5. This in a way goes to show that East Pakistan depends relatively more 
on the area given to the cultivation of food crops. Second, the possibilities of expanding 
the cropped area is very hmited in East Pakistan, while in West Pakistan this margin of 
extension is considerable. In fact, as will become clear later on, while land is a critical 
factor in East Pakistan, it is water which is crucial in West Pakistan. 
Crop production in Pakistan is characterised by low yields per acre. Moreover, as 
can be seen in Table 20, both in East and West Pakistan it has shown almost no ten-
dency to rise over the years. 
These very low levels of yield per acre of almost all important cash and food crops, 
but especially of food crops, coupled with the fact that about 75.0% of the country's 
total labour force is engaged in agriculture, give to Pakistan agriculture yet another 
1 0 4United States, The White House, Department of the Interior, Panel on Waterlogging and Salinity 
in West Pakistan, Report on Land and Water Development in the Indus Plain, (Washington, D.C., 1964), 
p. 49. This report will hereinafter be referred to as the Revelle Report. 
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Table 19. Acreage and production of food and cash crops in East and West Pakistan for selected years 
Acreage in thousand acres Production in thousand tons 
Province and group average average average average average average 
ofcrops 1947-48 1952-53 1957-58 1947-48 1952-53 1957-58 
to to to to to to 
1951-52 1956-57 1961-62 1951-52 1956-57 1961-62 
EAST PAKISTAN 
Food crops1 20,043 21,124 21,123 7,322 7,641 8,480 
Cash crops8 2,890 2,568 2,783 4,485 4,984 5,133 
All crops 22,933 23,692 23,906 11,807 12,625 13,613 
WEST PAKISTAN 
Food crops1 19,794 20,949 22,345 6,055 5,736 6,521 
Cash crops2 4,649 5,390 5,868 6,638 8,864 12,491 
All crops 24,443 26,339 28,213 12,693 14,600 19,012 
Source: See Table 1%; op. cit.. Statistical Section, pp. 15-32. 
'Food crops include rice, wheat, maize, barley, sorghum, millet and gram. While in East Pakistan 
rice accounts for over 90 % of the provincial acreage of food crops, in West Pakistan it is wheat 
which covers on average about 50% of the food acreage. Rice in West Pakistan covers about 
10 % of the area, and the rest is under gram, sorghum and millet in that order. In East Pakistan, 
sorghum, millet and maize are of hardly any importance. 
"Cash crops include iute, cotton, sugar-cane, rape and mustard, sesamum, tabacco and tea. Jute 
and tea are grown exclusively in East Pakistan. Thus, in East Pakistan, jute covers more than 
50% of the cash crop acreage; then come rape and mustard. In West Pakistan, cotton claims 
more than 50 % of the cash crop acreage and about 25 % is given to rape and mustard. 
significant feature, namely, its subsistence character. It is also partly due to the tradi-
tionally determined cropping pattern in the country. Thus, according to a recent sam-
ple survey in Pakistan, it was estimated that about 98 % of foodgrains produced in 
East Pakistan were consumed by farm families, as against 67 % in West Pakistan. This 
survey also reveals that the utilisation of food crops varies according to tenurial 
arrangement and the size of farm. For instance, in West Pakistan owner-operators sold 
about 21.2% of their foodgrains and share-croppers only 9.5%. The share of land-
lords in the share-croppers' total foodgrain production was estimated to be about 4 1 % ; 
in the case of cash crops, like cotton and sugar-cane, the share of landlords was found 
to be even greater. On the other hand, though in general a similar pattern exists in 
East Pakistan, share-croppers are fewer in number. As to the size of farms, East Pakis-
tan has a greater proportion of small-size farms than West Pakistan, thus in the former 
province the percentage of food crops retained with the owners is also greater. 1 0 6 
""Pakistan, Department of Marketing Intelligence and Agricultural Statistics, Survey Report on 
Utilization of Agricultural Commodities in Pakistan, SS. HI, (Rawalpindi, 1962), Tables 6 and 28, 
p. 27 and p. 67. 
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Table 20. Yield per acre of selected crops in East and West Pakistan, in kilogrammes 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Crop average average average average average average 
1947-48 1952-53 1957-58 1947^8 1952-53 1957-58 
to to to to to to 
1951-52 1956-57 1961-62 1951-52 1956-57 1961-62 
Rice (cleaned) 373.24 369.51 409.07 350.85 358.31 360.55 
Wheat 231.41 235.14 230.66 354.58 306.06 325.46 
Sorghum (Jowar) - - _ 197.82 186.62 195.58 
Millet (Bajra) - - - 156.76 156.76 162.74 
Maize 242.61 272.47 286.65 403.10 403.10 408.32 
Barley 197.82 209.01 218.72 283.66 242.61 281.42 
Gram 250.07 265.00 253.06 246.34 205.28 212.75 
Jute 563.59 683.03 662.12 _ _ _ 
Cotton 55.99 55.99 63.34 74.65 85.85 88.83 
Sugar-cane 14,869.88 15,198.33 14,813.15 12,962.63 11,798.12 11,978.02 
Rape and Mustard 186.62 201.55 173.18 164.23 149.30 175.42 
Tobacco 347.11 376.97 301.58 567.32 649.44 594.94 
Sesamum 190.35 197.82 186.62 123.17 100.77 100.78 
Tea 235.14 324.72 299.34 - - -
Source: See Table 18; opcit.. Statistical Section, pp. 15-32. 
From the same survey yet another important feature could be noted: the greater the 
importance of a crop to farmers' own consumption, like rice in East Pakistan and 
wheat in West Pakistan, the smaller tends to be the proportion of the crop for sale. As 
to the cash crops, very little is retained at the farm level, except for local (Desi) cotton 
in West Pakistan. 1 0 6 
Crop production in Pakistan does not only suffer from the fact that yields per acre 
of most crops are low, but also from a farming pattern which is traditionally biased 
towards the production of foodgrains. Thus tradition and inadequacy of such physical 
inputs as irrigation, fertilisers and improved seeds have forced the farmer to concen-
trate primarily on his own needs. 
So far in the foregoing only the very broad features of crop production in Pakistan 
have been presented. To understand more fully the actual place of crop production in 
the overall agriculture of the country, it is important to bring into sharper relief the 
pattern of cropping. It depends to a large extent on the climatic and soil conditions in a 
given country or agricultural region. However, since the subject of climate and soils 
lies outside the scope of the present discussion, in what follows an attempt will be 
™Ibid. 
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made to present the land utilisation and cropping patterns in Pakistan, highlighting of 
course the peculiarities obtaining in its two wings. 1 0 7 
3.5.1.1 Land Utilisation and Cropping Intensities 
The land utilisation pattern in a country is the base on which the production of crops 
stands: it indicates, when related to economic and social variables, the present limita-
tions and future prospects of agriculture. In a country like Pakistan, its study is all the 
more important if differences between East and West Pakistan are fully taken into 
consideration. 
Table 21. General classification of the available land area of Pakistan and its two provinces, 1959-60, 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
East Pakistan 35.3 34.7 5.6 1.9 5.5 20.3 1.3 21.7 5.6 25.8 0.6 
West Pakistan 198.7 114.6 50.3 19.9 3.3 31.9 9.2 41.1 3.9 35.8 84.0 
Pakistan 233.9 149.3 56.0 21.8 8.8 52.2 10.5 62.8 9.5 61.8 84.6 
Source: Pakistan. Ministry of Agriculture and Works, Land and Crop Statistics, (Rawalpindi, 
1962), Tables 1, 2 and 3, pp. 3 ^ . 
Table 21 shows that the total land area of Pakistan is 233.9 million acres, of which 
about 15% belongs to East Pakistan (35.3 million acres) and the rest to West Pakistan 
(198.6 million acres). From the agricultural point of view, it is interesting to note that, 
in official statistics, of the total land area of Pakistan about 36 % (84.6 million acres) is 
reported to have no records available, thus classified as 'not reported'. This does not 
mean that this area knows no agriculture, but that the government has as yet not suc-
ceeded in bringing it on official records. Most of this area is located in West Pakistan: 
it has no records for about 42% of its surface; in East Pakistan this percentage is only 
1.8. The fact that West Pakistan has such a high percentage of non-reported area is well 
l 0 'For climatic and soil conditions of East and West Pakistan, references may be made in: N. AHMED, 
An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 40-57, and 
S. M. AKHTAR, Economics of Pakistan, Vol. 1, (Lahore: Publishers United, 1963), pp. 4-6. 
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borne out by the existence of large tracts of unsettled agriculture in most parts of the 
tribal territories of north, north-west and western Baluchistan and in the eastern parts 
of Bahawalpur. 1 0 8 Thus to assess in general the present land use in Pakistan, only the 
'reported' statistics are relevant. 
In the country, of the reported area of 149.3 million acres, about 62.8 million acres 
are cultivated: 41.1 million acres in West Pakistan and 21.7 million acres in East Pa-
kistan. This means that while in East Pakistan, of its total reported area, about 62.5 % 
is under cultivation, in West Pakistan only about 35.8% is cultivated. Among other 
things, this indicates that there is definitely a greater scope for extending the margin of 
cultivation in West Pakistan. But the significance of this potential should not be over-
estimated: because in West Pakistan, of the area not under cultivation (73.5 million 
acres), about 69 % consists of rocky and barren land which may never be cultivated at 
all. However, the area which can be brought under cultivation, after varying degrees 
of improvement, is about 19.9 million acres. 
In East Pakistan the situation is quite different: of the total uncultivated area, an 
estimated 48% is unsuitable for agriculture, thus leaving about 1.93 million acres 
which may be cultivated after improvements. Forests in Pakistan, which are classified 
as uncultivated area, form only 3.7 % of the total land area of the country and about 
5.8 % of the area reported. Of the total forest area of the country, more than 62 % is in 
East Pakistan: in fact, in West Pakistan forests cover only about 2.9 % of the reported 
area of the province as against 15.8 % in East Pakistan. 
While the foregoing description of the general land use pattern in Pakistan is only a 
bare outline, it is interesting to discuss the availability of the total farm area in the two 
wings and its utilisation. According to the Agricultural Census of 1960, East and West 
Pakistan were reported to have a farm area of about 21.7 and 48.9 million acres, res-
pectively.1 0 9 With regard to the utilisation of these areas some interesting relationships 
can be observed. 
First, in East Pakistan a greater percentage of the farm area is cultivated than in 
West Pakistan: 88 % against 76 %. 
Second, of the cultivated area in East Pakistan, about 98 % is utilised for crop pro-
duction in one year and the rest is left fallow; but in West Pakistan, about 86 % is cul-
tivated and the rest is left fallow. The higher percentage of cultivated area in East 
Pakistan could be atrributed to at least two factors: the greater scarcity of land, and 
a cropping pattern which allows for a greater intensity of cropping, which in itself is 
greatly influenced by the availabfiity of water. 
Third, of the uncultivated area, the percentage of unculturable waste land in East 
""Pakistan, Ministry of Agriculture and Works, Land and Crop Statistics of Pakistan, FSS III, 
(Rawalpindi, 1962), Tables 8,14 and 18, p. 7, p. 9, and p. 11. Peshawar Division: 65%; Bahawalpur 
Division: 46%; and KalatDivision: 79%. 
""Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture: A Summary of 
East and West Pakistan Data, Two Volumes, (Karachi, 1963), p. 20 and p. 22. 
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Pakistan is 35 as against 62 in West Pakistan. Also in West Pakistan, the culturable 
waste farm area (which is fit for cultivation but is not being cultivated at present) is 
about 61 % as against 18 % in East Pakistan. These differences reflect that the amount 
of land available for further cultivation in East Pakistan is relatively limited. 
Fourth, forest area in East Pakistan accounts for 20 % of the total uncultivated farm 
area of the province as against only 2 % in West Pakistan. But, of the total farm area in 
East Pakistan, forests cover about 2% as compared with only 1 % in West Pakistan. 
These figures do not include vast areas of government-owned forests in both provinces, 
which again are greater in percentage in East Pakistan. 
Finally, the intensity of land use - which means the ratio expressed as a percentage 
between the 'net sown' and 'total culturable' area (total culturable area is the sum of 
cultivated and culturable waste land) - is higher in the eastern wing as compared to its 
western counterpart: the ratio being 96 % in East Pakistan and 72 % in West Pakistan. 
Yet another measure of land use in Pakistan is to compare the cropping intensity 
between the two provinces. The cropping intensity is the ratio expressed in percentages 
between the total cropped area during a year and the net sown area: in simpler terms, 
it indicates the number of crops raised on the cultivated area in the course of one agri-
cultural year. In 1960, the cropping intensities in East and West Pakistan were 148 and 
120 %, respectively. In other words, in East Pakistan every acre of cropped land was 
sown on an average 1.5 times in one agricultural year; but in West Pakistan it was only 
1.2. Of course, these two average cropping intensities do not reveal the wide variations 
within each of the two provinces, especially in West Pakistan. 1 1 0 
3.5.1.2 Cropping Patterns 
A host of factors determine the cropping pattern in a given agricultural area, the 
chief among them being: the physical and ecological setting, the avattability of irriga-
tion water where natural precipitation is both inadequate and uncertain, the structure 
of the peasant economy with regard to its own food requirements and the extent to 
which it is market-oriented. Although many agricultural regions could be described in 
Pakistan, each with its peculiar cropping patterns, the differences between East and 
West Pakistan are again very striking. 
Both in East and West Pakistan there are two main field crop seasons: Kharif (sum-
mer season) and Rabi (winter season). In addition, in East Pakistan there is the pre-
monsoon season called Aus. Although the characterisation of these two seasons in both 
the provinces is almost the same, the proportion of area devoted to different crops in 
each season differs greatly: according to the 1960 Agricultural Census, 80% of the 
cropped area in East Pakistan is commanded by Kharif crops against 42 % in West 
u oAccording to a national sample survey, the cropping intensities for East and West Pakistan were 
found to be 134 and 84%, respectively. See: Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Survey 
Report on Cropping Pattern and Cropping Intensities in Selected Districts of Pakistan, SSII, (Rawal-
pindi, 1962), Tables 4 and 12, p. 8 and p. 17. 
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Pakistan. The most important reason for this wide difference between the two provin-
ces can be accounted for by the distribution of rainfall in East Pakistan and the avail-
ability of irrigation in West Pakistan. It has been observed that in East Pakistan not 
only the Kharif season crops dominate, due largely to the monsoon rains, but that double 
cropping is also common during this season; Rabi crops in East Pakistan are grown only 
in those areas where some kind of irrigation can be had, which is indeed very limited. 
In West Pakistan, being largely an arid zone, the type of irrigation has a great influence 
on the cropping pattern. This influence is particularly marked in those areas of the pro-
vince where rainfall is extremely low and its distribution very uncertain. Thus in most 
irrigated areas of West Pakistan, canals being the predominant source of irrigation 
water, the proportion of Rabi crops is even larger than the average indicated above . m 
The major Kharif season crops in East Pakistan are: rice (Aus, pre-monsoon, and 
Aman, monsoon), jute, sugar-cane, sunhemp; in West Pakistan they are: cotton, rice, 
sugar-cane, maize and millet. The major Rabi season crops in East Pakistan are: 
wheat, groundnuts, mustard and rice (Boro); in West Pakistan they are: wheat, gram, 
mustard, barley and rapeseed. It is important to note that jute and tea are not grown 
in West Pakistan, and in East Pakistan crops like millet, maize, barley, wheat and 
cotton form a negligible part of the total crop acreage. Both provinces grow almost all 
varieties of pulses. 
The more pronounced differences in the cropping patterns of the two provinces 
should also be noted. In East Pakistan, rice covers about 76 % of the cropped area, in 
which Aman rice accounts for about 60% because it is the main monsoon (summer) 
crop, followed by Aus rice and lastly the Boro rice. In West Pakistan, wheat occupies 
more than one-third of the total crop acreage, followed by fodder crops, cotton, rice, 
gram, millet, oilseeds, sugar-cane and others. 
To complete the picture of crop production in Pakistan, it is essential to describe the 
place that such crops as pulses, fodders, fruits and vegetables occupy in the cropping 
pattern of East and West Pakistan. 
There are six major types of pulses grown in both the provinces: gram, masoor, arhar, 
khesari or mattar, mash and moong. The first four are Rabi season crops and the last 
two are Kharif crops. While all of these pulses are grown in varying quantities in East 
and West Pakistan, there are two or three special features which must be noted with 
regard to their distribution. Firstly, over the years, an average of more than three-
fourth of the country's acreage under pulses has been confined to West Pakistan. Fur-
ther, while there has been some slight increase in pulse acreage in West Pakistan, the 
decline in East Pakistan during the same period has been almost equal. Secondly, on 
the side of production, thanks largely to a significant decline in East Pakistan as a con-
sequence of low and stable yield per acre and the diminution in total acreage, there 
has been a slight but steady decline in the country as a whole. There is hardly any room 
for further expansion in their acreage, thus the constraint, especially in East Pakistan, is 
quite clear. In addition, over the years the yield per acre has shown no tendency to in-
^Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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crease. There are several reasons for this, the chief among them being that, since most 
of these pulses are Rabi season crops and depend largely on natural precipitation, ad-
ditional water through irrigation is limited during their growing period as it is in great 
demand for the cultivation of such crops as wheat, especially in West Pakistan. 
With regard to the distribution of area under various pulses in the two wings, gram 
alone covers more than one-half of the total and is grown mostly in West Pakistan. 
Among other pulses, the differences between East and West Pakistan are not very signi-
ficant, except that after gram, mattar occupies the largest area in both provinces. 
Regarding the cultivation of fodders, most farmers in Pakistan have to devote some 
part of their cultivable land to them for their draft and milk animals. In doing so, espe-
cially owning relatively small farms, they are not always able to allocate an adequate 
area for fodder growing because their cropping pattern is oriented primarily to the cul-
tivation of staple food crops. This is the more important problem in East Pakistan 
where the man/land ratio is definitely more unfavourable than in most areas of West-
Pakistan. Thus, according to the 1960 Agricultural Census, only about 1 % of the total 
cropped area in East Pakistan was covered by fodder crops and only about 9 % of all 
farms in the province reported any fodder crop. On the other hand, in West Pakistan, 
about 12 % of the total cropped area was reported to be under fodder crops and about 
41 % of the farms cultivated them. Further, it was found that while in East Pakistan 
fodder crops were confined mostly to large farms (above 40 acres), in West Pakistan 
they were grown on medium- and large-size farms. However, between the two wings, it 
is the Rabi season fodders which dominated: about 92% of the total fodder area in 
East Pakistan and over 57 % in West Pakistan. 
The chief fodder crops grown in the country are: berseem, lucerne, jowar, bajra, 
maize and guara. Berseem, which is grown mainly during the Rabi season, is the most 
important fodder crop in West Pakistan. Berseem and lucerne give more than two cutt-
ings during one year and they are often combined as fodder and green manuring crops 
in most crop rotations followed by the farmers in West Pakistan. As for the use of jowar, 
bajra and maize as fodder crops, they are fed to the cattle both as green and dry fodder. 
In addition to these fodder crops, there are several grasses which, over large areas in 
the northern and north-western parts of West Pakistan, form grazing grounds for 
sheep and other livestock. 
Finally, a few words about the cultivation of fruits and vegetables. Although many 
types of fruits are grown in the country, there is as yet no organised fruit culture and 
industry. 
In East Pakistan, where climatic and soil conditions are less varied, a major part of the 
total fruit acreage is given to a hmited number of tropical and sub-tropical fruits; but 
in West Pakistan, where both climatic and soil conditions present greater regional di-
versities, the range of fruit types is much larger. Nevertheless the total fruit acreage in 
East Pakistan is much larger than in West Pakistan: according to the 1960 Agricultural 
Census, about 2 % of the total cropped area of East Pakistan was covered by compact 
fruit orchards as against 1 % in West Pakistan. Besides these fruit orchards, however, 
there are also a substantial number of fruit trees scattered all over the two provinces. 
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Fruit growing in Pakistan still remains a traditionally determined vocation, except 
for the limited number of reasonably good orchards in some parts of East Pakistan 
and the former provinces of the Punjab, Sind and North-Western Frontier (N.W.F.) in 
West Pakistan. Generally speaking, therefore, fruit growing is not well integrated into 
the general cropping pattern of most farmers; it is only among the larger farms that 
compact areas for fruits are utilised. 
Not only has there been no large-scale organised fruit culture in Pakistan, but also 
the existing fruit industry is only very limited. Although some orchard-grown 
fruits like mangoes, bananas, lemons and oranges are of commendable quality, they 
usually are available solely in fresh form. Thus during the harvest season and immedia-
tely afterwards fruit may be plentiful and cheap in the market, but at other times it is 
expensive if at all obtainable. The fruit preservation and canning industry is still in its 
nascent form, thus jeopardising the interests of both the producers and consumers. In a 
country like Pakistan, where there is a great potential for high quality fruit, and present 
fruit consumption in the country itself is at a very low level, there is a great scope for 
a successful fruit culture and industry.1 1 2 
With regard to the cultivation of vegetables in Pakistan, the conditions are no bet-
ter. Commercial vegetable growing in the country is restricted to the vicinity of large 
cities and other urban localities. In rural areas, vegetables are grown mainly as cash 
crops or as by-products of a cash crop. Thus it is even more difficult to assess the real 
position of the acreage and production of vegetables in the country. However, one 
thing is clear: just as with fruits, East Pakistan devotes about three times the acreage 
of West Pakistan to the cultivation of different types of vegetables. Perhaps the most 
important reason for this difference lies in the fact that, unlike most ordinary farm 
crops, vegetables require an assured and regular supply of water which is definitely a 
critical factor in most areas of West Pakistan. Hence, while the demand for vegetables 
is increasing rather rapidly, partly because of the flow of population from the rural 
areas to the towns, and partly also because the rural people are becoming increasingly 
conscious of the value of vegetables as an important part of human diet, vegetables 
have been continually imported into the western wing from East Pakistan. 
3.5.2 Livestock 
The importance of livestock in an agricultural economy, such as that of Pakistan, 
cannot be over-emphasised. They all serve one or more of the following purposes: 
a. to provide protective food such as meat, milk and eggs to the population; 
b. to provide almost all the motive power for agricultural operations; 
c. to provide such other by-products as hides, skins, wool, hair, bones and manures. 
Since the birth of Pakistan two livestock Censuses have been taken, one in 1955, the 
u a F o r an account of this subject, see: "Survey Report on Fruits of Pakistan," Pakistan Trade, Vol. 10, 
No. 3,1959, pp. 14-23. 
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other in 1960. The discrepancies between the figures of the two Censuses are so wide 
that no comparison can be made. However, in Table 22, livestock data from the 1960 
Agricultural Census of Pakistan and the FAO are given; the latter are based on the 
1955 livestock Census. In the case of almost every major class of livestock the FAO 
estimates are lower than those revealed by the 1960 Agricultural Census. But the most 
striking discrepancies relate to the numbers of oxen and poultry: while the 1960 Census 
shows the oxen population to be 33.53 millions in that year, the FAO estimates for the 
same year are 24.06 millions; in the case of poultry, the figures for 1960-61 are 30.12 
and 13.90 millions, respectively. These wide differences seem to result from some under-
estimation in the case of FAO figures, especially of work animals among the oxen and 
chicken among the poultry. For the present study, the 1960 Agricultural Census figures 
will perhaps be the most dependable, if not entirely reliable. 
Table 22. Livestock statistics of Pakistan, 1960 and 1961, in millions 
Species 
Agricultural Census of 1960 











































Source: 1. Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 
Vols. 1 and 2, Tables 39 to 43 and 42 to 45, respectively. 
2. FAO, Production Yearbook, 1963, Vol. 17. Tables 71-79. 
'Almost all the FAO statistics are based on the 1945 and 1955 livestock Censuses in former 
British India and in Pakistan. 
aOf these about 47 % are donkeys, about 26 % camels and about 24 % horses. 
3.5.2.1 Cattle (Oxen and Buffaloes) 
The total cattle population of Pakistan in 1960 was about 41.94 million head (22.52 
millions in West Pakistan, 19.42 millions in East Pakistan). While in East Pakistan 
more oxen were reported, thanks largely to their use as work animals, buffaloes are 
confined mostly to West Pakistan. Of the oxen, about two-tiiirds in both the provinces 
were regarded as work animals. While in East Pakistan 38 % of all holdings reported 
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milch animals (both cows and buffaloes), in West Pakistan the percentage was 64. Of 
these milch animals, in East Pakistan there were about 99 % cows, but in West Pakis-
tan 55% were buffaloes and 45% cows. However, all milch animals in both the pro-
vinces consisted of 50% in milk, the rest being dry. The distribution of work animals 
in both the provinces was more or less the same: 63 % of the holdings in East Pakistan 
and 61 % in West Pakistan reported these animals. 
The cattle population at present is inadequate both in quantity and quality due to the 
following reasons: 
a. insufficient and unsuitable composition of food, due mainly to the pressure on land 
for foodgrain production; 
b. mdiscriminate breeding, with the result that even some very good breeds are kept 
in the form of scrub stock; 
c. high mortality due to the wide prevalence of diseases, of which controls are only 
too poor; 
d. indiscriminate slaughter. 
All the above factors, individually and collectively, adversely affect the milk and 
draft quality of cattle and also reflect the shortage of work animals in the field. It is 
widely believed that in Pakistan there is a growing shortage of work animals, especially 
in West Pakistan where an increasing area of land is being brought under cultivation 
through irrigation. The fact that the cattle wealth of Pakistan is inadequate both in 
number and efficiency can only be judged by the indirect evidence of the availability of 
good quality products. For instance, it has been estimated that on an average a cow in 
Pakistan yields about 1200 to 1400 lbs. of milk per lactation, and a buffalo about 1700 
to 1900 lbs. The fat percentage in both cases varies from less than 3.0 to 6.0. Meat out-
put is also very low, largely because the animals are often slaughtered in hide-bound 
conditions. Thus the gap between the supply of and demand for such products seems 
to be widening: milk and its products are becoming increasingly dearer even in the 
rural areas, to say nothing of the urban areas; as for meat, Pakistanis have to go with-
out it by decree of the government for two days in the week. 
Despite these general features which the two provinces have in common, there are 
wide differences between them. In West Pakistan there are six major breeds of oxen: 
Red Sindhi, Sahiwal (milch breeds), the Than (dual-purpose breed) and the Bhagnari, 
Dhanni and Lohani, which are draft breeds. Each of these possesses its own peculiar 
characteristics and is suited to the different regions of the province. But in East Pakis-
tan there is no pure breed, although two distinct types, a grey in the west and a red in 
the east, are recognised. Among the buffaloes too the situation in East Pakistan is 
different. While in West Pakistan there are at least three distinct breeds, namely, Ravi, 
Nilli and Kundi, there are hardly any such breeds in East Pakistan. Moreover, there 
seems to be a general aversion to buffaloes in East Pakistan and preference is given to 
oxen. 
The greater neglect of cattle wealth in East Pakistan is due primarily to the inade-
quate feeds and fodder supply. While commercial cattle rearing is not common in 
either of the provinces, one does find pockets of such stock in West Pakistan, whereas 
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in East Pakistan they are very hmited. Hence the task of cattle improvement in East 
Pakistan requires not only the orthodox remedies such as better feeding and control of 
common diseases, but also selective breeding through the imported stock of oxen and 
buffalo breeds from West Pakistan which can well adapt to the local conditions. 
3.5.2.2 Sheep and Goats 
In Table 22, it can be seen that in 1960 there were about 10.27 million sheep and about 
12.92 million goats in Pakistan. Of the sheep population, over 95% were confined to 
West Pakistan; the population of goats was quite evenly distributed between the two 
wings: about 56% in West Pakistan and about 44% in East Pakistan. The relative 
importance of these animals differs from East to West Pakistan: with most of the 
sheep population in the western wing, it is there that the important breeds of sheep are 
found. The province has large tracts of land which are either too arid or too steep and 
rocky for farming but provide good ground for range grazing. Thus in West Pakistan 
sheep have shown great promise, especially when reared scientifically in the range 
areas of the province. But, due largely to the absence of organised sheep farms and the 
poor living conditions, even the most promising breeds do not provide a satisfactory 
output of wool and mutton. Further, the insatiated demand for meat in most areas has 
given rise to indiscriminate slaughter, thus more often than not depriving the animal's 
value for wool as well. 
The position of goats is no better. In fact, it can well be argued that unwarranted 
alarm against goats in West Pakistan has not always been justifiable, especially in the 
areas where irrigated farming is commonly practised. Even in the range areas it is not 
due entirely to the nature of goats themselves that denudation of vegetation occurs, 
but it is more often the neglect with which they are left to find their own grazing. In 
East Pakistan, where goats seem to play a significant role in the village economy and 
offer many advantages, the neglect is perhaps equally great. In fact, of all the livestock, 
goats require the least care as to their feeding, for they can always thrive rather well 
on succulent fodders and other crop stalks, of which the supply is definitely critical 
in East Pakistan. 
3.5.2.3 Poultry 
The population of poultry in Pakistan, which includes chickens, ducks and turkeys, 
was estimated at 30.12 millions in 1960, of which two-thirds were in East Pakistan. Of 
these, chickens form the majority, especially in West Pakistan where ducks and turkeys 
are rather Hmited in number. In East Pakistan, however, ducks form about 20 % of the 
poultry population and provide about one-third of the total egg production of the 
province. As with cattle, sheep and goats, there are no large-scale farms for poultry 
alone in the country, except for a few near two or three cities. 
Poultry in Pakistan suffers acutely because of two basic problems: one is the wide-
spread occurrence of diseases which cannot easily be controlled by most poultry 
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keepers, and the other is the lack of appropriate feeding. All poultry birds are relatively 
very sensitive to health and feeding, thus their laying capacity is indeed very low and 
so is their meat output. In fact, even in the case of high-laying hens, like White Leg-
horns and Rhode Islands, their laying capacity is low. 
Although, through the years, the demand for eggs and poultry meat has been in-
creasing rapidly, especially in the urban localities, the lack of transport and the absen-
ce of organised markets add to the factors mentioned above in preventing a fast devel-
opment of poultry enterprise. 
3.5.2.4 The Prospects of the Livestock Industry 
In order that livestock industry in Pakistan plays an increasingly vital role in not only 
providing more and cheaper protective food but also in exporting valuable foreign 
exchange earners, livestock farming has to become specialised. In other words, where 
at present small- and medium-size farms raise livestock in a disorganised manner, they 
must form some kind of co-operatives to make the livestock enterprise a paying con-
cern. It seems that there are two basic problems to be considered for the future develop-
ment of the livestock industry in Pakistan. 
Firstly, there is a clear need to change the existing organisation of production, which 
can partly be based on co-operative lines and partly aided by the government for indi-
vidual needs for better breeding, improved feeding and disease control. 
Secondly, the establishment of regulated markets and provision of adequate trans-
port facilities must be attended to. These two will help not only in providing such 
marketing functions as credit, storage, grading and standardisation, but also make de-
mand more articulate by more stable prices, especially for milk and its products, meat 
and eggs. 
3.5.3 Fisheries 
It is well-known that fish is an excellent source of proteins. This is the more so in a 
country like Pakistan, where the average diet is deficient in proteins. 
East Pakistan is claimed to have vast resources offish, and fish is very popular here 
as a food, their exploitation is still in a poor state. According to some surveys, the fol-
lowing estimates of water areas have been made : U 3 
Natural depressions (bheel) and ox-bow lakes 724,000 acres 
Brackish water ponds 39,000 acres 
Homestead tanks 189,000 acres 
Rivers, canals and estuarine creeks 4,000 miles 
l l a A . R. K. ZOBAIRI, "Development of Inland Fisheries in East Pakistan," Agriculture Pakistan, Vol. 
13, No. 2,1962, p. 245. 
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Table 23. Fish production in Pakistan and its two provinces, 1954-55 and 1959-60, in thousand tons 
1954-55 Production 1959-60 Production 
Area 






















Source: Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five Year Plan (1960-65), (Karachi, 1960). 
Table 12, p. 170. 
Though in West Pakistan (with the exception of the former Sind province) fish is 
not as important a component of the human diet as it is in East Pakistan, there are 
extensive areas of inland fish culture and also along the coast. 
Table 23 gives some rough estimates of fish production in Pakistan for the years 
1954-55 and 1959-60. The data show that about 70% of the total production in the 
country originated from East Pakistan and that over the years it increased at a higher 
rate than in West Pakistan. It may, however be noted, that marine production has been 
higher in West Pakistan. 
Both marine and inland fisheries in Pakistan face several problems. In marine fishing 
so far both exploration and exploitation have been meagre. Their intensification 
would require the extension of mechanised fishing material, the increase in the number 
of harbours and the improvement in marketing facilities. Many improvements in all 
these areas have already been made with the active participation of the government. 
On the organisational level, it has been encouraging private initiative in the production 
and preservation of marine fish. Since most fishermen on the two coasts have meagre 
capital for the mechanisation or modernisation of their equipment and are also unable 
to transport, store and market their fish efficiently, the most effective way has been 
found through a co-operative effort in which the government plays a leading role. 
With regard to inland fisheries, it seem that resources are more Umited and an in-
crease in output is even more difficult to obtain than in the case of marine fish. But 
again the conditions between the two wings differ rather widely. In East Pakistan, 
where inland fishing is extensive, the main problem is to improve the quality of fish. 
On the other hand, in West Pakistan the primary task is to extend the areas devoted to 
fishing. Thus, in East Pakistan, where a greater domestic market already exists and 
fish has been an export commodity - in 1960 alone it was estimated that exports from 
East Pakistan earned about Rs. 35 million - the government undertook the implemen-
tation of about 35 schemes costing about Rs. 37.7 million under the Second Five Year 
Plan. 1 1 4 A similar programme for the extension of the fishing area and the improve-
U 4 i6W.,p.246. 
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merit of existing production and distribution conditions was undertaken in West Pa-
kistan. However, in both the provinces the basic problem in inland fishing is the dis-
organised manner in which many hundred thousands of fishermen work almost inde-
pendently with very little capital. 
3.6 Rural Food Consumption 
While referring to the subject of food consumption in Pakistan, however briefly it is 
touched upon, it is necessary to retain the broad perspective of the nature of the agri-
cultural sector. Besides, theoretically speaking, per caput food consumption depends 
on the level of income per capita and its distribution; the tastes and habits of a people 
(which are an outcome of a particular tradition and geographic setting); the size of the 
population and its distribution by age and sex; and the availability of the various food 
commodities, which is determined mainly by the volume of production and price struc-
ture. Thus the level and composition of the food consumption of a given population at 
a given time must show differences, depending upon which of the several criteria are 
chosen: by age composition, by rural and urban distribution, income groups, geo-
graphic location, etc. 
The present discussion will be hmited to some basic features of food consumption in 
Pakistan in general and its rural areas in particular. While recognising the fact that in a 
country like Pakistan there are quite significant differences between rural and urban 
food consumption patterns, the intention here is not to probe into them any further. 
The immediate purpose here is to show the interdependence of rural food consump-
tion and agricultural production, both of which seem to have given to Pakistan agri-
culture its present structure. 
The people of Pakistan in general are both under- andmal-nourished, the former 
term signifying the sub-standard content of calories available per person per day and 
the latter indicating the inadequacy of protective food or proteins in general. However, 
this statement cannot be substantiated quantitatively with great precision. For one 
thing, no nutritional surveys have so far been conducted in Pakistan; besides, the avai-
lable information, indirect as it is, leaves many points which can be contested. 
In Table 24, the net supply of different food materials per capita is given for Pakis-
tan and six other countries. Some interesting features can be noted in this table. Firstly, 
taking Pakistan alone, the calorie content of the diet per caput per day is about 1,980 
and the total protein content is about 45 grams per day. Of the ten broad categories of 
foods, cereals alone provide more than 75 % of the calories to a person. The position 
of protective foods, such as meat, eggs, milk, fish, is by any nutritional standard very 
poor. These distressing features of the diet in Pakistan seem all the more unsatisfactory 
when they are compared with other industrialising and industrialised countries. 
With the exception of India and Ceylon, where the diet per caput exhibits a more or 
less similar deficiency of calories and proteins, all other countries enjoy an incompara-
bly better diet per caput than that of Pakistan. In fact, except for Japan, in the three 
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ON. Table 24. Net annual food supply per capita in Pakistan and other selected countries in recent years 
Food item 
Cereals 
Potatoes and other starchy food 
Sugar 
Pulses and nuts 






Fats and oils 
Total calories per day 
Total proteins in grams per day 
Pakistan India Ceylon Japan Australia 
kg. cal. kg. cal. kg. cal. kg. cal. kg. cal. 
per per per per per per per per per per 
year day year day year day year day year day 
155 1,516 139 1,346 127 1,252 149 1,398 84 831 
4 9 11 28 34 95 71 157 44 87 
13 138 18 184 19 197 16 172 50 570 
5 50 22 210 30 316 17 163 4 57 
16 55 - 26 42 45 85 100 64 139 
4 18 2 6 2 9 8 26 109 693 — 2 - 1 1 4 6 27 12 47 
2 5 1 3 6 39 27 87 5 18 
2 3 1 1 7 
89 108 33 41 346 
2 2 1 1 7 
4 96 4 91 4 88 5 116 14 356 





























































Source: See Table 22; op. cit.. Tables 97 aad 98, pp. 247-55. (ƒ«. 1) 
industrialised countries referred to in Table 24, cereals do not provide more than 25 % 
of the total calories per person per day. While in these countries the diet per caput con-
tains not less than 3,000 calories per day, most of these calories are derived from other 
foods. Thus not only is the calorie content of these diets much higher than that of 
Pakistan, but also the protein content is about double of what is available to an aver-
age Pakistani. 
What is even more disheartening is that over the years the net food supply per caput 
in Pakistan has been on the decline. For instance, according to the FAO estimates, 
while the daily food supply per caput in 1949/50 had a total calorie content of about 
2,010, it fell to 2,000 in 1951/53, to 1,990 in 1954/56 and finally to 1,980 in 1961/62.115 
This apparently declining trend also reflects the magnitude of food shortages exper-
ienced in the period 1952 and later. 
Before proceeding further, a word of caution must be added lest the above figures 
are taken as almost literally true. These estimates are related not to the actual con-
sumption per capita but to the net supply of food per caput; the latter is derived from 
the food balance sheets. These sheets provide data on such items as the domestic pro-
duction of various food commodities, their utilisation and waste for purposes other 
than human consumption, and their import and export balance during the same pe-
riod. Thus, at best, they give an approximate estimate of the net food supply at the 
retail level. To arrive at per capita figures in a country, the total net supply is divided by 
the population figure; the latter is either based on a recent census or derived from 
other estimates for the period under reference. From all this it is clear that, in arriving 
at any estimates of the net food supply, no consideration is given to the pattern of dis-
tribution of food consumption in a country. And, even if one were to ignore the distri-
bution aspect altogether, the estimates of food production and its utilisation within a 
country and its total population at a point of time are usually no more than intelligent 
guesses in countries like Pakistan. 1 1 8 
Taking into consideration the Umitations inherent in the use of such global estimates, 
the obvious choice falls on nutritional surveys. But, in the absence of such surveys in 
Pakistan, the only recourse for the present analysis is to depend on family budget sur-
veys. Although since 1959 such national sample surveys in Pakistan have become a 
regular annual feature, they are mostly restricted to the rural areas. No comparable 
surveys for the urban areas, except those of 1956-57 for some urban localities and the 
1960-61 survey of only one urban locality (Rawalpindi), are available. But, since in this 
chapter the main theme is related to the production and consumption situation in the 
agricultural sector of Pakistan, only some leading features of the levels and composition 
of diets in the rural areas will be highHghted. 
First of all a few remarks about the differences in the household and per capita in-
come levels between East and West Pakistan. The common belief that the eastern wing 
1 1 6 FAO, Production Yearbook, 1963, Vol. 17, Tables 97 and 98, pp. 247-55. 
U 6 F o r the estimation of population and food requirements, there are several conceptual and empirical 
problems. These are discussed in detail in many of the FAO publications. 
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Table 25. A verage monthly income per rural household andper capita in East and West Pakistan in 1961 
Percentage distribution Average income per Income per 
Income of households household (in Rupees) capita (in Rupees) 
(Rupees) East West East West East West 
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan 
Under 25 1.06 0.63 23.40 21.00 11.20 6.50 
2 5 ^ 9 9.26 2.35 49.80 39.50 20.30 16.60 
50-74 15.68 10.09 60.40 59.50 16.90 18.80 
75-99 14.92 14.12 83.70 83.70 19.30 21.60 
100-124 13.61 16.11 107.80 112.20 21.90 23.20 
125-149 10.93 14.25 130.10 138.10 23.10 25.20 
150-199 14.01 17.01 170.50 173.00 28.60 27.00 
200-24? 5.97 9.37 221.40 221.90 28.60 32.30 
250-299 4.65 5.97 271.00 268.00 37.30 36.00 
300-399 4.86 4.89 325.60 336.40 38.10 40.80 
400-500 2.18 2.17 446.50 445.40 49.20 49.60 
Over 500 2.88 3.03 781.10 820.70 63.80 84.90 
Total 100.00 100.00 153.40 173.90 28.40 31.00 
Source: Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, National Sample Survey (Third Round) 1961, 
(Karachi. 1963), Table 6.1, p. 36. 
The total number of households in the samples of East and West Pakistan was 1,977 and 2,210, 
respectively. 
of Pakistan has a lower per capita income than its western counterpart is well substan-
tiated by the average per capita income figures in the rural areas as revealed by the 
National Sample Surveys of 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus, for instance, in Table 25, the 
average monthly per capita income in rural East Pakistan was Rs. 28.40 as against Rs. 
31.00 in rural West Pakistan in 1961. In the same table it can be seen that the two pro-
vinces differed as to the distribution of their rural incomes: while in East Pakistan 
about 78 % of the households surveyed fell in the income range of Rs. 25.00 to Rs. 
199.00, in West Pakistan about 81 % of the households were in the range of Rs. 50.00 to 
Rs. 249.00. Further, it is also clear that there was a higher percentage of households 
falling in higher income groups in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. However, in 
both the provinces the predominance of low-income rural households is a distinct feat-
ure, indicating in general the low standard of living in the rural areas. This common 
characteristic gives a better representation of the general level and composition of food 
consumption throughout the country. 
Regarding the pattern of expenditure of rural incomes, Table 26 shows that an 
average household in rural Pakistan spent more than 60 % of its income on food. But, 
comparing East and West Pakistan, the percentage of expenditure on food in the for-
mer province was 67 (though it was about 71 in 1960) as against 63 in the latter pro-
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Table 26. Monthly income and consumer expenditure per rural household and par capita in East and 
West Pakistan, 1960 and 1961 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Income and expenditure by items 
1960 1961 1960 1961 
AVERAGE INCOME PER MONTH (in Rupees) 
per household 131.10 153.40 142.10 173.90 
per capita 24.80 28.40 25.30 31.00 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE (in Rupees) 
per household 121.90 152.70 143.80 162.40 
per capita 23.00 28.30 25.70 29.00 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA 
Food 71.30 67.00 67.50 62.50 
aothing and footwear 5.20 6.30 9.20 10.70 
Housing 11.50 14.50 9.00 11.20 
Miscellaneous 12.00 12.30 14.20 15.70 
Source: See Table 25: op. cit.. Table 6.3, p. 39. 
vince (it was 68 in 1960). Among the various food items taken separately, again there 
were differences in the distribution of food expenditure per household in the two wings 
of the country. 
In Table 27, while in East Pakistan cereals alone - rice being the main component -
claimed over 57% of the total food expenditure, in West Pakistan the percentage of 
cereals was just under 44. As to the other food items, the differences in expenditure 
seem to be even greater, thus indicating, on the one hand, the different food habits and, 
on the other, the availability of each food item in the two wings separately. For in-
stance, an average rural household in West Pakistan spent 28.5 % of its food expendi-
ture on milk and its products; its counterpart in East Pakistan spent only 4.7%. In 
the case of oils and fats (other than those originating from milk), the rural household 
in East Pakistan spent about four times the percentage in West Pakistan. Similar ex-
amples can also be given for other food items. 1 1 7 
While the above estimates regarding the distribution of food expenditure in rural 
East and West Pakistan provide only indirect evidence of the actual levels and compo-
sition of diet in general, in Table 28 an attempt has been made to show the actual 
supply of different food items to a person. This table also shows the calorie and protein 
contents of rural diets in East and West Pakistan. The most interesting feature of this 
table is that, while the actual supply of different items per caput per day differs between 
the two provinces, the total calorie content and proteins of the two diets are almost the 
"'These expenditure figures for the two provinces conceal the effect of price differentials. 
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Table 27. Percentage distribution of average monthly expenditure on food in East and West Pakistan in 
1961: by items per household 
Food items East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Cereals: total 57.10 43.50 
Wheat and wheat flour 0.40 31.80 
Rice 56.20 6.70 
Sorghum, millet, maize and gram 0.02 4.20 
Other cereals 0.50 0.80 
Baked products 0.90 0.40 
Pulses 3.60 2.80 
Milk and its products: total 4.70 28.50 
Milk 3.90 12.80 
Butter and cooked butter (Ghee) 0.40 14.20 
Curd and other products 0.40 1.50 
Edible oils and fats 4.20 0.90 
Meat, poultry and fish: total 10.50 4.60 
Mutton 0.80 1.90 
Beef 0.90 1.30 
Chicken 1.40 0.70 
Eggs 0.40 0.40 
Fish 7.00 0.30 
Fruit and vegetables 6.70 3.80 
Condiments and spices 4.10 2.80 
Sugar and sugar products 2.80 7.30 
Miscellaneous food items 0.70 1.30 
Other food, drinks and tobacco 4.70 4.10 
Source: See Table 25; op. cit.. Table 6.4, pp. 41-43. 
The average size of the household in East and West Pakistan was 5.4 and 5.6 persons, respec-
tively. 
same, except that the West Pakistani diet contains more animal protein than that in 
East Pakistan. 
Notwithstanding the rather cursory nature of the evidence posited so far regarding the 
level and composition of diets in East and West Pakistan, there are at least three strik-
ing conclusions. First, in general, Pakistanis are suffering from under- and mal-nutri-
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Table 28. Per caput food supply in the rural areas of East and West Pakistan, 1961 
Quantity of food Calories Proteins 
Food item (in grams) (in grams) 
EastPak. West Pak. EastPak. West Pak. EastPak. West Pak. 
Cereals 525 502 1,848 1,767 43.05 41.16 
Pulses 24 20 74 62 4.56 3.80 
Milk and its products 38 163 32 135 1.37 5.87 
Oils and fats 9 2 79 18 - -
Meat 10 12 15 18 1.20 1.44 
Fish 28 2 16 1 2.38 0.17 
Eggs 2 1 2 1 0.20 0.10 
Fruit and vegetables 70 25 27 10 0.70 0.25 
Sugar 18 41 63 144 0.22 0.49 
Total calories - - 2,156 2,156 - -
Total proteins _ _ 53.68 53.28 
Animal proteins - - - - 5.15 7.58 Vegetable proteins - - - 48.53 45.70 
tion, of which the preponderence of cereals is a good indicator. Second, the level of 
nutrition in the two provinces is not dissimilar in as much as the calorie and protein 
contents of rural diets are almost equally low. Third, there are some very distinct cha-
racteristics in the food habits of the two provinces, and the West Pakistani rural house-
holds seem to be spending less on food than those in East Pakistan. 
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4 Some Causes of the Poor State of Agriculture in Pakistan 
4.1 Introduction 
In the foregoing chapter an attempt was made to outline the basic structure of the eco-
nomy of Pakistan and describe in some detail the state and organisation of the agri-
cultural sector. It was concluded that agriculture plays a preponderant role in the eco-
nomy, but that its state and organisation still suffer from some very deep-seated pro-
blems as is evident from the following facts: 
a. that the cropping pattern in most areas of Pakistan is basically oriented to the pro-
duction of food crops, hence it is not much diversified and specialised, and the culti-
vation of fruit and vegetables and the rearing of livestock occupy only a secondary 
place; 
b. that the yields per acre of almost all crops, but especially of food crops, are very 
low and that, over the years, they have not shown any tendency to rise consistently; 
the same holds true for other agricultural products. 
In fact, the poor level of agricultural production in Pakistan could be ascribed to 
many causes. First of all, it could be said that the cultivated area per capita is small, 
especially in East Pakistan. Even in West Pakistan, where the pressure of population 
on land is not so great, there is a definite Umit to the possibilities of expanding the cul-
tivable area, either because of the quality of the land or because of the extent to which 
water may be available. For the low yields of crops, livestock and fisheries, a host of 
factors seems to be responsible, either individually or collectively. For crop production 
the foEowing are the prominent causes of the low yields per acre: 
a. Adverse land tenure arrangements and the problem of land fragmentation. 
b. Problems of labour utilisation. 
c. Problems of capital: inadequate credit facilities for productive purposes and a high 
incidence of farm indebtedness. 
d. The inadequacy and irregularity of rainfaE; prevalence of waterlogging, saHnity 
and soil erosion; lack of irrigation, drainage and flood control and, finally, the in-
appropriate methods of field irrigation. 
e. High incidence of pests and diseases and the inadequate measures against them, 
f . Lack of improved crop seeds and insufficient use of manures and fertilisers. 
g. Primitive methods of crop production. 
h. Markets and marketing problems, both structural and functional. 
i. Attitudes of the farmers towards new incentives and social organisation in the rural 
areas. 
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None of the above-mentioned causes can be given a unique place, nor could any of 
them be called only a causative element. In fact, all of them are so intertwined that the 
overall picture of agriculture appears to be one of 'vicious circles', where on closer 
examination the prima facie causes turn out to be the effects and vice versa. Neverthe-
less, in the present chapter an attempt will be made to show the nature of the relation-
ship between the low levels of agricultural production and their underlying causes. 
4.2 The Adverse Land Tenurial Arrangements 
The importance of land tenure systems in a society cannot be over-emphasised: they 
determine the size and unit of ownership, thus directly or indirectly affecting the tech-
niques of farming through a socio-economic lever of incentives or disincentives; they 
settle the share of the actual tiller of the soil in its total produce, hence they not only 
affect the volume of agricultural production, but also determine the distribution of the 
produce among the parties involved. 
While postponing the discussion on the general features of the various tenure sys-
tems in Pakistan to the next chapter, some of the major problems arising from them 
will be pointed out here. Two major types of farms can be distinguished: the landlord-
tenant farms and the owner-operator farms. There is still a third category of farms in 
which some owner-operators rent part of their land to other share-croppers, but it is of 
negligible importance. Each of these types has its own peculiarities and problems, but 
from the point of view of this study there are four major problems which must be 
treated in some detail. The first three problems, namely, the concentration of land-
ownership in a few hands, absentee landlordism and the exploitation of tenants, are to 
be found in the landlord-tenant system prevailing in most parts of West Pakistan. The 
last problem relates to the size of cultivation units and their fragmentation; it refers 
both to the owner-operator types of farms and to the landlord-tenant system, but espe-
cially to the former in East Pakistan. Each of these problems will be discussed in turn. 
The landlord-tenant systems in East and West Pakistan have not been similar. In 
East Pakistan the percentage of owner-operator farms has been higher than in West 
Pakistan. Further, the extent of ownership concentration and landlord-tenant relations 
have also been less feudalistic in East Pakistan. 1 1 8 
4.2.1 Concentration of Land-ownership 
Whatever good one could say about the zamindari and jagirdari systems, for all feud-
alism is at best paternalistic, the fact remains that in Pakistan their social and economic 
effects have proved largely to be detrimental to progress in rural society. There is per-
U 8 F o r differences in the land-ownership pattern in East and West Pakistan, see: 1960 Pakistan Census 
of Agriculture, Vols. 1 and 2, op. cit. (Jh. 109) 
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haps hardly any need to go into details to defend this contention, for even the most cur-
sory survey of the extent of concentration of land-ownership (concomitantly the social 
prestige and political power) in a few hands and the relationship of landlords and their 
tenants in most parts of Pakistan will make it amply clear. 
Though it is very difficult to give precise documentation of the extent of concentra-
tion, due again to the paucity of data, there are some broad figures which are quite 
suggestive. 
According to one estimate, in West Pakistan about 3.3 million people (or about 
60 % of the owners) had at one time only about 7.4 million acres of land (or about 15 % 
of the total area) in holdings not exceeding 5 acres each as against about 60,000 people 
(or about 0.1 % of the owners) occupying as much as 7.5 million acres in estates of not 
less than 500 acres each. 1 1 9 The situation was even worse in the former province of 
Sind: before the promulgation of the 1959 West Pakistan Land Reforms Act, it was 
estimated that about 1 % of the owners possessed as much as 30% of the land in hold-
ings of more than 500 acres each; and, against this, about 60 % of the owners possessed 
only about 12 % of the area in parcels of not more than 15 acres each. 1 2 0 In the former 
province of N.W.F., a similar condition could be seen: about 0.1 % of the owners had 
about 12 % of the area in estates of not less than 500 acres each. 
4.2.2 Absentee Landlordism 
The emergence of absentee landlordism, especially in West Pakistan, is the result of the 
concentration of land in the hands of a limited number of land-owners with large estat-
es and varying degree of property rights. This absentee landlordism has been both 
physical and functional : in the physical sense it implies that the landlord lives away 
from the land and leaves the overall management of his estate in the hands of his 
functionaries; in the functional sense, it means that even if the landlord is present on 
the land he performs little or no productive function. 
In addition to the concentration of land in a few hands, coupled with the high pro-
portion of farm area cultivated by the tenants usually given to them in tiny parcels 
with varying degrees of security and charged to them at rates both legal and illegal -
most of the zamindar and jagirdar supplied neither capital nor ready management nor 
any other significant assistance to promote the productivity of their land or of the 
labour engaged on it. Due to his socio-political influence, rather well-established histo-
rically, the landlord was interested primarily in the collection of his share in the pro-
duce through his functionaries. More often than not he enjoyed a luxurious life either 
in the towns or at his country-house, and there he could afford to spare enough time 
•"Pakistan, Report of the Land Reforms Commission, 1959, (Lahore: Government of West Pakistan 
Printing Press, 1961), pp. 13-14, and Appendix 1. 
^Ibid., and: Pakistan, Planning Board, Draft of the First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, Vol. 2, (Karachi, 
1956), p. 117. 
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and resources for his many hobbies, political adventures and local intrigues often being 
the most likely ones. 
The peculiar social and economic consequences of such tenurial arrangements de-
termined the attitudes of landlords and their tenants towards agricultural progress. 
This has been summed up rather well by the West Pakistan Land Reforms Commission 
in the following words: 
"There is nothing inherently wrong with the institution of tenancy but if there is no proper adjustment 
in the terms of tenancy, production incentives are adversely affected; landlords and tenants do not 
generally look upon each other as partners in a joint enterprise and neither of them is prepared to do 
anything which in his judgement is likely to benefit the other more than will it benefit him. The tenant 
may be conservative and ignorant and he often is, but he is nevertheless a shrewd judge of his own 
interest... The result is that the tenant can simply see no object in adopting new techniques or applying 
more intensively such techniques that he may know already in order to improve his productivity'.121 
4.2.3 The Exploitation of the Tenants 
Turning to the landlord-tenant relationship, there are two types of tenants, namely, 
occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will. 
The occupancy tenants are those who have a more or less permanent, heritable and 
transferable right to land so long as they continue to pay the fixed rent to their land-
lord. It was observed, in the former provinces of the Punjab and N.W.F., that they 
enjoyed most of the privileges that the owner-operators had. 
The tenants-at-will had their tenancies fixed from year to year. Their share and rent 
were usually determined by custom or more often by the dictates of their landlord. 
These tenants could be ejected, as their name implies, by the landlord at his will, and 
often their dependence on the landlord was complete, not only for food but also for 
shelter. Most tenants in the former Sind province were in this category; in the former 
Punjab about 50% of the area at one time was cultivated by these tenants; the same 
was more or less true in the former province of N.W.F. 1 2 2 
That in a landlord-tenant situation, as it existed in most parts of Pakistan, the tenants 
were a genuinely aggrieved party can be ascribed to several reasons, the more impor-
tant of them being: the socio-political influence of the landlords, the poverty and igno-
rance of the tenants, and the lack of alternative avenues of employment. Exploitation 
of tenants took many forms and its degree varied from place to place. High rents and 
other charges, not justified on any legal grounds, personal services without payment 
and other social exactions were quite common. Rack-renting among the tenants of 
West Pakistan and the burgardar of East Pakistan have even be officially admitted from 
time to time. Quite understandably, then, the effects on the tiller of the soil and on the 
productivity of land itself have been detrimental. 
^•Report of the Land Reforms Commission, 1959, op. cit., pp. 15-16. {fit. 119) 
™Draft of the First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, op. cit., pp. 117-18. (fit. 120) 
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4.2.4 The Units of Cultivation: Their Size and Fragmentation 
In almost all areas of Pakistan, but specially in East Pakistan, most farms are below 
the economic size for agricultural production (Table 29). Even more characteristic is 
the high percentage of vary small farms, especially among the owner-operators, tenants 
and burgardar. These features are most apparent in East Pakistan. 1 2 3 In addition, 
the holdings are often fragmentated, particularly among the owner-operated farms. 
To this the only exceptions are the canal colonies and some other recently colonised 
areas in West Pakistan. Table 30 supplies some recent data on the extent and nature of 
land fragmentation in the country. 
Table 29. Percentage distribution of farms by size in East and West Pakistan, 1960 
Size of the farm East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Small1 51 49 
Medium2 45 43 
Large3 4 8 
Source: See Table 22; op. cit.. Vol. 1, p. 10, and Vol. 2, p. 12. (fn. 0 
'Small-size farm: Bast Pakistan, under 2.5 acres; West Pakistan, under 5 acres. 
aMedium-size farm: East Pakistan, 2.5 to 12.5 acres; West Pakistan, 5 to 25 acres. 
"Large-size farm: East Pakistan, 12.5 acres and above; West Pakistan, 25 acres and above. 
Agriculture in Pakistan is not only confronted with adverse land tenure systems 
(especially in West Pakistan) which permit the concentration of land in a few hands 
with all its consequences, but it is also characterised by uneconomic units of cultiva-
tion (especially in East Pakistan). Perhaps the problems of small-size farms and their 
excessive fragmentation are the most critical ones. While these two problems in them-
selves have proved to be a great obstacle in improving agricultural production, they 
have arisen due largely to the growth of population, inadequate avenues of alternative 
employment outside agriculture, and the law of inheritance which requires the division 
of the holding of a deceased peasant among all his sons and daughters. 
4.3 The Problem of Labour Utilisation 
The pattern of labour utilisation in the agricultural sector of an economy like that of 
Pakistan, depends mainly on: 
1 2 3 For the owner and tenant farms in East Pakistan, the percentages of the small-size farms were 62 
and 61, respectively. 
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Table 30. Farm classification by number of fragments and size of farms in East and West Pakistan, 1960 
Total Percentage 
number of of non-
Size of farms fragmented 
farms (in'000') farms total 
(in acres) 
Percentage of fragmented farms 
2 to 3 4 to 5 6 to 9 10 and over 
East West East West East West East West East West East West East West 
Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. 
Size A 803 742 47 77 53 23 44 21 7 2 2 
SizeB 690 855 12 55 88 45 49 34 26 8 11 3 2 
SizeC 1,677 806 5 37 95 63 22 37 28 14 31 9 14 3 
SizeD 1,615 581 3 32 97 68 10 35 16 15 32 12 39 6 
SizeE 698 759 3 26 97 74 6 36 10 15 23 13 58 10 
SizeF 442 729 2 21 98 79 4 35 8 17 17 14 69 13 
SizeG 188 286 2 14 98 86 3 29 6 21 13 19 76 17 
SizeH 21 88 3 9 97 91 3 19 5 19 8 24 81 29 
Size I 5 14 5 6 95 94 5 15 5 15 7 15 78 55 
All size 6,139 4,860 10 39 90 61 21 33 17 12 23 9 29 7 
Source: See Table 22; op. cit.. Vol. 1. p. 86, and Vol. 2, p. 159. (ƒ«. 1) 
Since the farm sizes differ in East and West Pakistan, the sizes indicated in this table represent 
those given in the original tables of the Census. 
a. the total available agricultural labour force ; 
b. the composition of this labour force as per age and sex, and their participation 
rates; 
c. the tenure system; 
d. the nature and pattern of agricultural operations ; 
e. the availabiUty of other forms of factor inputs and their relationship with labour ; 
f. the level of techniques; 
g. the extent to which labour can move out of agriculture either temporarily or per-
manently for other employment; 
h. the type of social organisation to which labour is traditionally bound. 
While all these factors, both individually and collectively, affect the pattern of labour 
utilisation, the latter in turn affects the productivity of labour. No detailed and reliable 
data on the pattern of kbour utilisation in Pakistan agriculture are as yet available, 
which means that the effect of the above factors could not easily be discerned on 
the pattern of labour utilisation, nor could labour productivity be measured directly. 
The discussion here will therefore have to be confined to those aspects of this problem 
which can be adduced indirectly from the available information. 
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As was shown in Table 15 in the foregoing chapter, the total agricultural labour force 
of Pakistan in 1961 was about 23.76 million persons (20.25 million males and 3.51 mil-
lion females), of which 15.86 million persons (13.22 million males and 2.64 million 
females) were reported working in East Pakistan and 7.90 million persons (7.03 million 
males and 0.87 million females) in West Pakistan. Thus the fact that in East Pakistan 
over 85 % of the total labour force was engaged in agriculture and also that the amount 
of the available cultivable area is much smaller than that of West Pakistan obviously 
has serious implications for the utilisation of the agricultural labour force in that pro-
vince. 
Of the total agricultural labour force, 97 % are cultivators, but not all of them are 
self-employed. A quite substantial number of this category of workers finds part-time 
employment in some other work. Besides, there are also some workers in the agricul-
tural sector who are landless and are hired either permanently or temporarily by other 
farmers. The percentage distribution of all classes of cultivators is given in Table 31. 
Table 31. Percentage distribution of cultivators (10 years and over) by land tenure in Pakistan and its 
two provinces, 1961 
Class of cultivators East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan 
Owning all land tilled 35.33 25.62 32.13 
Tilling land partly owned and partly rented 9.37 9.39 9.37 
Renting all land tilled 1.28 28.32 10.20 
Unpaid family help 33.02 28.62 31.57 
Share-croppers 3.55 - 2.38 
Landless agricultural labourers 17.45 8.05 14.35 
All cultivators 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: See Table 12; op. tit.. Statement 6.14, p. V-27. 
First of all a few remarks must be made about the landless agricultural labourers. 
According to the 1951 Census, these labourers comprised about 10 % of the total agri-
cultural labour force in Pakistan: 14.3 % in East Pakistan and 2.3 % in West Pakistan. 
If consideration is given to the inter-censal growth of population in East Pakistan, the 
limited rate of absorption of the labour force in the non-agricultural sectors and the 
process of fragmentation of holdings without any substantial increase in the total 
cultivated area, then it can safely be concluded that the percentage of landless labour-
ers must have increased significantly. But, in West Pakistan, although there has 
been a four-fold increase in this percentage, the problem of landless labourers does not 
seem to be a major one. 
It is among the predominantly self-employed workers, i.e. in the classes of owner-
operatores and tenants, that the phenomena of underemployment and disguised un-
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employment can be found. However, the extent of self-employment, and thus the two 
types of unemployment, among these workers depends to a large extent upon the size 
of the individual holdings. Thus, for instance, in East Pakistan alone it has been ob-
served that among the small cultivators there is always a substantial proportion of 
workers who seek employment either on others' farms or outside the agricultural sector 
itself.124 
As to the real employment situation in the agricultural sector in Pakistan, no 
country-wide estimates are as yet available.1 2 5 However, from some recent area studies, 
limited as they are in their scope and objectives, some tentative conclusions can be 
drawn on the nature and extent of unemployment among the agricultural labour force, 
especially among the owner-cultivators and tenants. Table 32, therefore, gives a global 
estimate of the unemployed agricultural labour force in East and West Pakistan. Since 
these estimates rely upon an indirect method, some of the major Umitations of this 
method must at once be clearly pointed out. 
a. The figures of the total agricultural labour force include all types of workers, the 
landless, the owner-operators and the tenants. This aggregation, despite the fact that 
the last two categories of workers predominate, affects the composition and identifi-
cation of the type of unemployment. 
b. Although the labour force here includes children (10-14) and women, the extent to 
which they are employed in family labour is not clear. 
c. Two norms have been assumed for East and West Pakistan separately: the first one 
is related to the available number of hours per man-year and the second to the requi-
rements of hours per man-year for livestock rearing and all other agricultural work, 
the latter including not only the agricultural operations directly concerned with the 
production of crops, but also their disposal. But these norms are not based on any 
actual field investigations of the techniques and pattern of crop production in the 
country in general and in various agricultural regions of the two provinces in parti-
cular. 
d. In this method, the overall pattern of labour utilisation of the total man-days 
supplied by the agricultural labour force, which in Pakistan are available not only for 
work on one's own holding or as hired labourers but also for various non-agricultural 
activities, is not indicated. As it happens, even when the members of a household re-
main idle for a large part of a day or a longer period, they may not feel that they are 
actually unemployed hence they may not look for additional employment. These fac-
tors further aggravate the problem of identification of rural unemployment. 
l a 4 N . ISLAM, "Concepts and Measurement of Unemployment and Underemployment in Developing 
Economies," International Labour Review, Vol. 89, No. 3,1964, pp. 240-56. 
1 2 6Only the following three studies about the various aspects of agricultural labour utilisation in East 
Pakistan are available so far: Dacca University, Socio-Economic Survey Board, Report on the 
Survey of Rural Credit and Rural Unemployment in East Pakistan, 1956, (Dacca, 1958); Dacca Uni-
versity, Bureau of Economic Research, The Pattern of Agricultural Unemployment: A Case Study of 
an East Pakistan Village, (Dacca, 1962); and Rajshahi University, Socio-Economic Research Board, 
The Pattern of a Peasant Economy - Puthia, A Case Study, (Rajshahi, 1963). 
8 9 
e. These estimates indicate only the total volume (as a percentage of the total hours 
per man-year available) of the unutilised labour force, ceteris paribus given the norms. 
Thus they do not really show the proportion of underemployed to disguisedly unem-
ployed workers over the whole year. This means, in other words, that no exact con-
clusion can be drawn about the existence of surplus labour either in permanent or in 
seasonal form. 
Returning now to Table 32, it can be seen that about 37 % of the available hours per 
Table 32. Estimates of unemployment in the agricultural sectors of East and West Pakistan, 1961 
Particulars East Pak. West Pak. 
1. Total agricultural labour force, in thousands1 15,860 7,900 
2. Approximate number of available hours per man-year2 2,200 2,600 
3. Total number of livestock units, in thousands3 22,670 26,920 
4. Livestock units per agricultural worker (3-M) 1.42 3.40 
5. Number of working hours required for one livestock unit per year4 300 300 
6. Number of working hours required for all livestock units per worker 
per year (4 x 5) 426 1,020 
7. Number of hours available per man-year for other agricultural 
work (2-6) 1,774 1,580 
8. Total cropped area, in thousand acres8 25,800 35,800 
9. Average number of hours required per cropped acre per year6 600 300 
10. Average number of hours per worker per acre for full employment 
in other agricultural work (7H-9) 2.96 5.27 
11. Cropped area per worker, in acres (8-M) 1.62 4.53 
12. Percentage of time occupied in other agricultural work per worker 
[(11-4-10) x 100] 55 86 
13. Percentage of time per worker unoccupied in other agricultural work 45 14 
14. Number of unoccupied hours per worker per year [(13 x 7)-f-100] 798 221 
15. Unoccupied hours as a percentage of the total number of hours 
available per man-year [(14-^2) x 100] 37 8.5 
16. Unemployed number of hours as converted to unemployed labour 
force, in thousands [(15-M00) x item 1] 5,868 679 
17. Real employment of the agricultural labour force, in thousands 
(1-16) 9,992 7,228 
'See Source in Table 2; Annex 4. Table 1. 
aILO, Manpower Survey of Pakistan, 1956, p. 17 and p. 24. 
"See source in Table 22; (ƒ«. 1). To arrive at these 'livestock units', the following conversions have 
been made: each head of cattle (oxen and buffaloes) is equal to one livestock unit; five sheep and 
goats are equal to one livestock unit; ten heads of poultry are regarded as equal to one livestock 
unit 
'See source in Table 2; Annex 4, p. 4. 
•See source in Table 21. 
The present figures are different from those given by the source in Table 2. These are based 
on some area studies on cropping pattern, intensities and other relevant factors. 
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man-year in East Pakistan and about 8.5% in West Pakistan could be regarded as 
unoccupied. Converting these unoccupied hours into unoccupied workers, about 
5,868,000 workers in East Pakistan and about 679,000 workers in West Pakistan could 
be called as unemployed. 
It seems that in East Pakistan, where some area studies corroborate this contention, 
most of these unemployed agricultural workers are in fact underemployed, or that the 
permanent removal of these workers from the agricultural sector will necessitate spe-
cial measures to meet the excess requirement of labour during the peak seasons. 1 3 8 
Even among the small-size farms, where the productivity of labour is very low because 
of population pressure and the inadequacy of other factor inputs, there is no indica-
tion of chronic surplus labour. From the national point of view, this means that the 
withdrawal of such workers can take place only for a certain period of time, for they 
are either seasonally unemployed or underemployed at all times of the year, unless a 
total reorganisation of the cropping pattern, the addition of capital and other such 
productive inputs takes place. 
In West Pakistan, of which no area studies are available and where the conditions 
cannot be described with any justice if only because of their diversity, unemployment 
in agriculture seems also to be of a seasonal nature. Disguised unemployment does not 
seem to exist in this province, with perhaps a few exceptional and limited areas where 
only a single cropping pattern dorriinates on small-size farms and other avenues of 
employment are not available. The fact that some workers' productivity may be very 
low, or that these workers may be underemployed throughout the whole year, can at 
best be justified by the inadequacy of other factors and excessive land fragmentation. 
Thus, on the whole, it may safely be assumed that the problem of labour utilisation 
in the agricultural sector in Pakistan does not amount to what has been called the 
'permanently withdrawable surplus labour'. The problem, especially in East Pakistan, 
is rather one of underemployment, which is manifest both in the seasonal unemploy-
ment of a significant proportion of the agricultural workers and in the low average 
labour productivity in general. The fact that in East Pakistan the percentage of unoc-
cupied workers in the agricultural labour force is over four'times that of West Pakistan 
can well be substantiated by, among other things, the rate at which casual labour em-
ployment is offered for non-farm jobs. 1 2 7 
4.4 The Problem of Agricultural Financing 
In fact, the vicious circle of poverty in Pakistan agriculture originates from the fact 
that the low level of agricultural production does not leave most farmers, and especial-
l a 8 i S L A M , op. cit., p. 255. {fit. 124) 
m A recent example of the effective utilisation of underemployed agricultural labour force in East 
Pakistan is of the rural works programme. See: R . V. GILBERT, "The Works Programme in East 
Pakistan," International Labour Review, Vol. 89, No . 3, 1964, pp. 213-26. 
91 
ly those farmers whose farms are not only small in size but are also fragmented, with 
any savings which could be ploughed back as investment for additional and improved 
factor inputs. The meagre amount of capital which most of these farmers possess is 
embodied in the stock of traditional capital: ploughs, hoes, harrows, draft animals and 
other such minimal assets. In cases where there is any saving potential it is often spent 
on satisfying such social obligations as do not contribute to the output on the farm. 
Thus, thanks to the subsistence level of agricultural production, most farmers in Pa-
kistan are almost always in debt. While indebtedness in itself is no sign of the back-
wardness of the agricultural enterprise (for borrowing for productive purposes is often 
a necessity), the fact is that in Pakistan indebtedness is usually the result of borrowing 
for non-productive purposes. The problem of indebtedness is aggravated further by 
the type of agencies which cater to such non-productive needs of the farmers. 
The extent of rural indebtedness in East and West Pakistan, as revealed by the 1960 
Agricultural Census, is given in Tables 33 and 34. In Table 33 it can be seen that in East 
Pakistan about 49 % of the farms reported indebtedness; in West Pakistan (Table 34) 
this percentage was about 29. It seems that in East Pakistan the average burden of debt 
is highest among the medium-size farms, but in West Pakistan it increases with the 
size of the farm. Further, it can also be noted that the smaller the size of the debt the 
greater is the percentage of small-size farms reporting debt; but again these percentages 
are higher in East Pakistan. From all this it is quite clear that the burden of indebted-
ness depends upon, among other things, the size of the farm in general. 
In order to put this problem of Pakistan agriculture in its proper perspective, it is 
Table 33. Farm indebtedness in East Pakistan by size of farms and debts, 1960 
Size of farm 
(in acres) 
Number 
of farms All farms 
(in '000') 
Percentage of farms reporting debts 
Rs. 1 Rs. 100 Rs. 250 Rs. 500 Rs. 1,000 Rs. 2,000 
to to to to to and 
Rs. 99 Rs. 249 Rs. 499 Rs. 999 Rs. 1,999 over 
under 0.5 803 37 46 36 11 5 1 0.3 
0.5-1.0 690 45 38 38 14 8 1 0.3 
1.0-2.5 1,677 50 32 40 18 8 2 0.4 
2.5-5.0 1,615 54 26 40 20 10 3 1 
5.0-7.5 698 53 21 37 22 14 5 1 
7.5-12.5 442 50 15 33 23 19 7 3 
12.5-25.0 188 47 11 27 22 22 12 6 
25.0-40.0 21 45 6 17 14 24 18 21 
40.0 and over 5 43 7 11 14 21 24 23 
All size 6,139 49 29 38 19 10 3 1 
Source: See Table 22; op. tit., Vol. 1. Table 34, p. 245. (fit. 1) 
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Table 34. Farm indebtedness in West Pakistan by size of farms and debts, 1960 
Percentage of farms reporting debts in Rupees 
Number 
Size of farm of 1 250 500 1,000 2,000 3,500 5,000 
(in acres) farms All farms to to to to to to and 
(in '000') 249 499 999 1,999 3,499 4,999 over 
under 1.0 742 21 34 22 24 13 5 1 1 
1.0- 2.5 856 25 35 23 24 12 5 1 1 
2.5- 5.0 806 29 34 23 24 12 5 1 1 
5.0- 7.5 581 32 33 23 25 12 5 1 1 
7.5- 12.5 759 34 29 24 26 13 5 1 1 
12.5- 25.0 729 35 25 22 27 15 8 1 2 
25.0- 50.0 286 35 20 20 27 18 9 2 4 
50.0-150.0 88 35 20 15 25 18 10 4 8 
150.0 and over 14 41 26 14 18 8 16 4 14 
All size 4,860 29 30 23 25 13 6 1 2 
Source: See Table 22: op. cit.. Vol. 2. Table 37, p. 606. (ƒ«. 1) 
necessary to mention in some detail the purpose for which debts are incurred and the 
various agencies which extend credit to the farmers. The fact that most of the rural in-
debtedness has resulted from borrowing for non-productive purposes can well be 
judged from the cross-sectional evidence in Table 35. 1 2 8 From this table it can readily be 
adduced that the highest percentage of indebtedness results from the need of the far-
mers to meet family expenditure: on average about 67% in East and about 55% in 
West Pakistan. Only then comes the expenditure which the farmers undertake for 
agricultural production : about 19 % in East Pakistan and about 32 % in West Pakistan. 
It seems that in East Pakistan a substantial amount of indebtedness has been caused by 
non-productive expenditure; but in West Pakistan, although the percentage of debts 
incurred through non-productive expenditure is not insignificant, the farmers do un-
dertake a substantial expenditure for direct productive purposes. 
Now turning to the agencies which help farmers meet their credit needs, it appears 
that both in East and West Pakistan it is the non-institutional agencies which provide 
the major part of the credit. Thus, according to some cross-sectional surveys, as given 
in Table 36, among the non-institutional agencies the largest proportion of credit 
comes from relatives and friends. But, again, there are differences between East and 
West Pakistan: while in East Pakistan about 90% of the non-institutional credit is 
1 3 8 As is evident from this table, these figures are neither upto-date, nor are they representative of the 
entire country. However, in the absence of any recent and comprehensive study, they do reflect in 
general the present situation in Pakistan. 
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Table 35. Causes of rural indebtedness in some selected areas of East and West Pakistan, in perce ntage 
West Pakistan (3) East Pakistan 
Purpose (1) Former (2) Former Narayan- Rangpur Rajbari Feni 
Punjab Punjab ganj 
Capital expenditure in farming1 29.9 19.6 8.1 12.5 8.3 8.4 
Current expenditure in farming2 3.7 12.0 9.8 8.5 13.4 12.3 
Total expenditure in farming 33.6 31.6 17.9 21.1 21.7 20.7 
Non-farm business expenditure8 13.5 1.2 11.9 3.0 10.1 6.4 
Family expenditure4 51.4 62.0 67.4 74.7 63.5 69.6 
Repayment of debts 1.3 3.2 1.8 1.2 4.3 2.8 
Miscellaneous purposes 0.2 2.0 1.0 - 0.4 0.5 
Source: 1. Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry, Report on the Need and Supply of Credit in the 
Rural Areas of the Punjab, Publication No. 101, (Lahore, 1951). 
2. Punjab University, Socio-Economic Research Project, Agricultural Credit Enquiry 
in Six Villages of Lahore District. 
3. Dacca University, Socio-Economic Survey Board, Report on the Survey of Rural 
Credit and Rural Unemployment in East Pakistan, 1956, (Dacca, 1958). 
'Including purchase of land, farm equipment and livestock, construction of fencing, and other 
capital expenses. 
"Including purchase of seeds, manures and fertilisers, hire of labour and equipment, payment of 
rents, and other current expenses. 
3Including capital and current expenditure for non-farm purposes, 
'Including expenses for family consumption, residential construction, social ceremonies, educa-
tion, and medical care. 
Table 36. Percentage distribution of various sources of farm credit in East and West Pakistan 
West Pakistan (3) East Pakistan 
Source of farm credit , , . „ ,_ _ 
(l)Former(2)FormerNarayan- Rangpur Rajban Feni 
Punjab Punjab ganj 
Relatives and friends 63.2 62.8 59.52 58.64 53.87 41.27 
Landlords and other well-to-do 
people 16.9 0.2 17.85 23.26 13.73 31.58 
Co-operatives 13.2 14.3 0.39 - 1.41 0.42 Government 2.9 13.4 0.32 5.99 5.28 5.68 
Village shopkeepers 2.5 0.4 12.75 4.49 17.26 10.25 
Seopari, Faria, etc. - 4.7 2.19 5.17 2.11 0.97 Money-lenders 1.3 1.1 3.92 1.36 2.82 8.86 
Others - 3.1 3.06 1.09 3.52 0.97 
Source: See Table 35; op. cit. (fit. 1, 2, 3) 
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given by relatives, friends, landlords, village shopkeepers, etc., in West Pakistan only 
75 % of this credit comes from these sources. Since, of the institutional agencies, the 
co-operatives and the government are the only two major sources of credit, East Pakis-
tani farmers do not benefit from them as well as their counterparts in West Pakistan do. 
The most striking feature of the non-institutional sources of credit is that, although 
the traditional money-lender disappeared from the rural scene after the birth of Pakis-
tan, 'those who have replaced him cannot be said to be operating on lines substantially 
different from him'. Hence the 'price for money lent is, as a rule, extortionate and their 
contribution to the development of agriculture or to the well-being of the farmer is in no 
way better than that of the departed money-lender'.1 2 9 The economic and social conse-
quences of a system of credit can be well imagined, when most of it comes from unor-
ganised sources which do not make any distinction between the 'legitimate' (produc-
tive) and 'illegitimate' (non-productive) needs of the farmers. On the other hand, there 
are many reasons why the institutional agencies, co-operatives and government, do not 
yet provide any significant portion of the total credit to the farmers. 1 3 0 
To discourage non-productive borrowing in general by the farmer, it is essential, 
first of all, to know what and how much the productive requirements of the farmers 
are. There are no two similar estimates of these credit requirements in Pakistan. 1 3 1: they 
vary from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000 million.1 3 2 
Credit requirements for agricultural production in Pakistan can also be classified on 
the basis of time: (a) long-term, for five years and over, (b) medium-term, for one to 
five years, and (c) short-term, for less than one year. The first category of credit is 
usually required for permanent improvements to the land, sinking of tube-wells, con-
struction of embankments and such other overhead investments. The second type of 
credit is usually needed for the purchase of livestock, more expensive farm implements, 
and sometimes also for the construction of farm buildings. The third category of credit 
is required for such current expenditure as the purchase of seeds, fertilisers, feeds for 
livestock, etc. 
It has been observed time and again that, even in cases where the non-institutional 
agencies do provide credit for productive purposes to the farmers, it is often for their 
short-term needs and at quite unreasonable terms. Not only is the rate of interest often 
disproportionate to the size and duration of loans, but the security required for ac-
l 2 f lState Bank of Pakistan, Agricultural Credit Department, Agricultural Credit in Pakistan, (Karachi, 
1962), p. 21. 
1 3 0 The reasons are given in some detail in: Pakistan, Credit Enquiry Commission Report, 1959, 
(Karachi, 1959), pp. 14-37. 
1 3 1There are two major sources in which this disagreement can be seen: M. I. KHAN, "The Develop-
ment of Institutional Credit in Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1963, 
Table 1, p. 73, and the Credit Enquiry Commission Report, 1959, op. cit., p. 7. 
1 3 a The low estimates, which represent the average for the period 1960-61 to 1964-65, are given by 
KHAN, op. cit. They are equal to about 15 % of the annual output flow from agriculture. The higher 
estimates are given by the Credit Enquiry Commission Report, 1959, op. cit. These are equal to about 
25 % of the output flow from agriculture. 
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quiring these loans compels small farmers to mortgage their land and/or other proper-
ty. Thus, while the disadvantages of private non-institutional lending have been very 
detrimental to most farmers, the supply of credit by the institutional agencies and its 
conditions have also not been very encouraging; although of late, through various debt 
legislations, the government have made concerted efforts to strengthen ah the existing in-
stitutional agencies and discourage the exploitation of farmers by the private money-
lenders. 
As was stated a little earlier, there are two major institutional sources of rural credit 
in Pakistan, the government and the co-operatives. In the case of the government, 
loans have been given to the farmers either directly by the revenue department or by 
the more recently established statutory bodies. In the case of the co-operatives, the 
farmers have been getting credit either at the primary level through their own co-ope-
rative societies or at the secondary level through the co-operative banks. Each of these 
agencies has its own peculiar features and problems. 1 3 3 Save for the co-operatives, 
these institutional agencies have so far played only a very limited role in fulfuling the 
credit requirements of the farmers. This can well be judged by the following two as-
pects. 
Firstly, it has been estimated that, during the period 1948-60, institutional credit 
covered only about 8.5 % of all farmers in Pakistan: about 6.8 % in East and 13.2 % in 
West Pakistan. 1 3 4 Secondly, during the same period, only Rs. 230 rnillion as an aver-
age annual amount of credit was received by the farmers as against the estimated mini-
mum requirement of about Rs 1,682 million. However, in fact when it is realised that 
the co-operative banks (which usually lend to the existing marketing intermediaries 
and not to all farmers directly) have alone given on average about 80.4% of all insti-
tutional credit in the country, then even the sum of Rs. 230 million overstates the 
amount actually received by the agriculturists.136 
What is even more interesting to note is the inter-wing disparity in the flow of insti-
tutional credit over the period in reference. Of the estimated average annual Rs.230 
million as stated above, about Rs. 216 million (or 94%) went to West Pakistan and 
only about Rs. 13.7 million (or 6%) to East Pakistan. 1 3 6 This wide difference can be 
explained largely by the successful growth of co-operatives in West Pakistan and then-
rapid decline in East Pakistan. The share of co-operatives in agricultural credit in 
West Pakistan has been about 93.1 % as against 41.3 % in East Pakistan during the 
same period. However, the government, on the other hand, have provided only 3.5 % in 
West Pakistan as against 39.8 % in East Pakistan. 
The annual flow of institutional credit over the years has not been smooth. While the 
direct government credit has shown the greatest year-to-year fluctuation in the two pro-
l a 3 These peculiarities and problems are given in detail in Agricultural Credit in Pakistan, op. clt. 
(fit. 129) 
1 3 4 K H A N , op. cit., Table 9, p. 93. (fit. 131) 
™Ibid., Table 3, p. 78. 
1 3 eiZ>W.,Table4,p.82. 
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vinces, the credit provided by the primary co-operative societies has been steadily 
rising in West Pakistan and constantly dechning in East Pakistan. The flow of credit 
from the statutory bodies, starting from a very low base, has risen rapidly in both the 
provinces during this period. 1 3 7 
Before closing this discussion, it may be of some interest to mention briefly the role 
of co-operatives in providing agricultural credit for the farmers in Pakistan. The co-
operative movement in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent was initiated at the behest of 
the government in the beginning of this century with the primary objective of providing 
credit for the rural masses at reasonable terms so as to afford relief from indebtedness 
to the private and unorganised money-lenders. However, even the most optimistic 
stock-taking of this movement in Pakistan would indicate its spectacular failure in 
arousing the farmers' enthusiasm for benefiting from their own co-operative efforts. 
Thus, with the exception of a few areas in West Pakistan, the movement was largely 
inactive at the birth of Pakistan, especially at the primary level in East Pakistan which 
it was designed to help the most. 1 3 8 For the numerative distribution of the primary agri-
cultural and non-agricultural co-operative societies see Table 37. 
The co-operative credit structure in Pakistan has not been uniform: in the former 
province of the Punjab and East Pakistan there is a three-tier system, with t i e Provin-
cial Co-operative Bank at the top, the Central Union or the Central Multi-purpose 
Table 37. Numerative distribution of co-operative societies in Pakistan and its two provinces in selected 
years 
Type of 1948-49 1955-56 
1959-60 
co-operative 










































































All societies 32,353 15,619 47,972 8,656 19,895 28,551 5,435 22,589 28,024 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Agricultural Credit Department, Agricultural Credit in Pakistan, 
(Karachi. 1962), p. 44. 
la7Ibid., Tables 4 and 5, p. 82 and p. 84. 
1SBCredit Enquiry Commission Report, 1959, op. cit., p. 25. (fit. 130) 
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Society at the intermediate level and the Primary Credit Co-operative Society at the 
base. But, in the former provinces of Sind and N.W.F., a two-tier system exists, with 
the Apex Banks directly linked with the Primary Societies. Between the Primary 
Co-operative Societies, which are the foundation of this credit system in the country, 
there are differences in organisation too: while in East Pakistan most primary societies 
are of the multi-purpose type, in West Pakistan only the single-purpose societies are 
found. However, following the recommendations of the Credit Enquiry Commission 
of 1959, an effort is being made to organise almost all primary societies in East Pakis-
tan on the same lines as those in West Pakistan. 
Viewed against the dismal background of the organisation and working of co-ope-
ratives in East Pakistan, it has been recognised that the most suitable medium of rural 
development in general and the extension of rural credit in particular is the primary 
co-operative society. In consequence, the Food and Agriculture Commission of 1960 
called for 'a display by Government of its conviction that the development of genuine 
and successful co-operatives is one of the cardinal points of its farm policy'. 1 3 9 This 
Commission thus made some bold recommendations for the rejuvenation of the entire 
co-operative credit structure of the country. The implementation of these recommenda-
tions, however, has only just begun. 1 4 0 
4.5 Soil and Water Problems 
The hazards and uncertainties to which most farmers in Pakistan are exposed are not 
all of their own creation. But, undoubtedly, their poverty and ignorance often contri-
bute to strengthening the dictates of Nature's niggardhness. The problems arising from 
the mismanagement of soil and water have thus assumed such proportions that only 
the collective ingenuity of the entire population of Pakistan may in the long run be 
able to achieve any significant degree of relief. 
The soil and water problems in Pakistan can be divided into two groups: soil ero-
sion, and the problems of irrigation, drainage and flood control. 
4.5.1 The Problem of Soil Erosion 
Soil erosion is caused both by wind and water, but this menace is essentially restricted 
""Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Report of the Food and Agriculture Commission, 1960, 
(Karachi, 1960), pp. 181-82. 
""The role of co-operatives at the primary level in Pakistan agriculture can hardly be overemphasised. 
The field of 'co-operative farming' offers a great scope for the development of agriculture. Co-operative 
farming experiments, both in the former Punjab in West Pakistan and in the Comilla Thana of East 
Pakistan, have shown very encouraging results. See, for example: O . SCHILLER, Individual Farming 
on Co-operative Lines, CLahore: The Punjab Co-operative Union, 1956), and the various publications 
of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, East Pakistan. 
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to the arid and range areas of West Pakistan. 1 4 1 
With regard to the erosion by wind, in East Pakistan there is complete protection 
because the land remains moist during the greater part of the year. In West Pakistan, 
however, in the eastern deserts of the Bahawalpur and Hyderabad divisions and also in 
some parts of the Quetta and Kalat divisions wind erosion is very active. Most of these 
areas, being sandy, are used chiefly for seasonal grazing, some parts also being used for 
occasional cultivation of crops in years of timely and adequate rainfall. The result is 
that the land, denuded of its vegetation, is left open to the free and fierce action of the 
wind which very often blows away the top layer of the soil leaving coarse sand to form 
sand dunes and floating monds. 
One of the major causes of this unhappy situation is the misuse of land by the culti-
vators. Often the farmers in these areas do not take appropriate measures to contain 
this menace and protect the soil. Indeed they aggravate the problem by their profane 
farming practices, like bringing land under the plough which has been under perma-
nent vegetation and leaving it fallow over a long period, allowing indiscriminate 
grazing, cutting the trees, and improper tillage practices without any regard to the 
possibility of terrace farming. Consequently, in an agriculture where soil is being so 
ruthlessly robbed of its natural properties, the yields of crops cannot but be abysmally 
low. This is the more so in view of the poor humus and nitrogen content of these soils 
and also because of the still hmited use of organic manures and fertilisers. 
Turning to the problem of soil erosion caused by water, in East Pakistan again this is 
not a serious one, for most of the plain areas are fairly level and covered with vegeta-
tion. Moreover, the major crops are rice and jute which require impounding of water. 
Therefore, only certain parts of the river banks and hilly tracts of the eastern side 
suffer from erosion by water. In all other areas of the province, which in fact form the 
basis of crop production, field embankments (if properly constructed on the contour) 
are very useful in protecting the soil. 
In West Pakistan, waters of the hill torrents sweep away the soil from the hills and 
adjoining land, while heavy gales often blow away the fertile soil of the arid plains. 
Among the areas seriously affected by this kind of erosion are the Peshawar and Ra-
walpindi divisions. Here, gulleying has ruined the fertile land to the extent that there is 
hardly any chance of reclainiing the land economically. In other areas, such as the 
ranges of Quetta, Kalat and Peshawar divisions, goat and sheep rearing leave hardly 
5 % of the land for crop production. Thus continuous grazing over long periods has 
destroyed most of the natural vegetation cover of these ranges and their foot-hills, ex-
posing vast areas of land to erosion. 
•"Although no accurate statistics of the area affected by erosion and the extent of its damage are 
available, in West Pakistan alone it was estimated that about 160 million acres of land suffered from 
varying degrees of wind and water erosion. See: Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Second Five 
Year Plan (1960-65), (Karachi, 1960), p. 168. 
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4.5.2 The Problems of Irrigation, Drainage and Floods 
East Pakistan is mainly a lowland plain built by the delta-forming activities of the 
three main rivers (Ganges, Brahmaputra and Megna). It is typically characterised by 
heavy rainfall in summer accompanied by high floods followed by a rather long period 
of drought in winter. This highly seasonal pattern of precipitation and the frequent 
occurrence of flooding over most of the cultivated areas have therefore made it neces-
sary to adjust agricultural practices to the rhythm of Nature. Low yields and periodic 
partial or total failure of crops are usually the result of flood and drought in this pro-
vince. 
It has been observed that the climate of East Pakistan is suitable for growing three 
crops a year. However, not even a substantial proportion of the cultivated area is 
double-cropped in practice. According to one author if 'floods could be controlled and 
irrigation facilities provided, the area under crops could be increased by 6.5 million 
acres in the Aus season, 5.0 milhon acres in the Aman season and 16.7 million acres in 
the Rabi season'. 1 4 2 In other words, the present cultivated area of about 21.6 million 
acres could be increased to about 28.2 million acres. 
The extent of flooding in East Pakistan is about 8 to 9 million acres, especially fol-
lowing the monsoon rains, thus leaving about 13 million acres uninundated during 
any year. The areas inundated are not usually cultivated during this period; only rice 
is grown when the water recedes. During the Rabi season much of the area remains un-
sown because of insufficient moisture, and even when some crops, like Boro rice, some 
vegetables and pulses and wheat, are grown during this season they give rather poor 
yields. 
Irrigation, even when flooding can be controlled, cannot possibly be provided by 
canals; it has to depend on several methods, like pumping, storage and diversion of 
flood water and extensive drainage systems. In 1960-61, only about 3 % of the total 
cropped area of East Pakistan was being irrigated. 
It is quite obvious that the magnitude of the problem of annual flooding and the need 
for extensive irrigation are beyond the means of most farmers even collectively, though 
some local control against flooding and the use of stored water for irrigation during 
winter are not by any means completely absent. But water problems are so acute that 
even at the national level an extensive flood control system cannot be completed for a 
long time, despite the resolute efforts in planning and implementing such a program-
me. 1 4 3 
Even the relatively easier task of providing adequate irrigation and drainage facili-
ties in most areas of this province has begun only recently under the auspices of the 
Water and Power Development Authority. At present, four major irrigation projects 
are being carried out: (a) canal irrigation in the Ganges-Kobadak area, (b) tube-wells 
1 4 2 G. MOHAMMAD, "Some Strategic Problems in Agricultural Development in Pakistan," The Pakistan 
Development Review, Vol. 4, N o . 2,1964, p. 244. 
1S3Ibid., p. 245. 
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in the northern area, (c) low-lift power pump irrigation in Dacca-Mymensingh-Sylhet 
plains, and (d) small tube-wells in the Comilla area. 1 4 4 
Crop production in West Pakistan is dependent largely on irrigation, as the rainfall 
over most areas of this province is neither sufficient nor evenly distributed to fulfil the 
water requirements of most field crops. According to the 1960 Census of Agriculture, 
it was found that in West Pakistan about 68 % of the cultivated area was artificially 
irrigated: about 25 million out of about 37 million acres of cultivated area. The rest, 
i.e. 32% of the cultivated area, was fed by rainfall and flood water: 24% rain-fed and 
8% flooded.146 
Since artificial irrigation forms the basis of most crop production in West Pakistan, 
the present discussion will be limited to problems arising from it. Artificial irrigation is 
provided by two major sources: the first is the main river and tributory storage of 
water, and the other is ground water. Canals are the carriers of the first type of irriga-
tion water, and wells, tube-wells, pumps and other such lifts are the menas for utilising 
ground water. The broad division of the total irrigated area of the province according 
to these sources of water supply is given in Table 38. 
Table 38. Percentage distribution of the means of irrigation water in West Pakistan, 1960 




Other means 7.0 
Source: See Table 22: op. cit, Vol 2. p. 292. (In. 1) 
Though some combination of all the various means of irrigation supply is used in 
varying degrees in West Pakistan, it is the extensive use of canal irrigation, particularly 
in the Indus basin, which creates problems for agriculture. There are two types of 
canals, namely inundation and perennial canals. Inundation canals are mere cuts runn-
ing parallel to the rivers in the flood plains. They fill with water when the rivers rise, 
otherwise they remain dry. Thus they may very often fail to provide water when it is 
most needed. The perennial canals, on the other hand, are fed by an elaborate head-
work commanding large areas. 1 4 6 
%MIbid., pp. 245-49. The author gives an interesting appraisal of these schemes. 
li&1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, Vol. 2, op. cit., Table 17, p. 292. (Jh. 109) 
1 M P . E . NAYLOR, "Control of Waterlogging and Salinity in West Pakistan," International Journal of 
Agrarian Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1963, pp. 1-12. 
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While the perennial canals usually provide an even flow of water, they have never-
theless given rise to two very serious problems. Firstly, the headwork obstructs the 
flow of silt into the fields which then gets trapped in the canal system. Secondly, inade-
quate drainage and improper regulation of water from these canals have created the 
twin problem of waterlogging and salinity. In fact, over most of the canal-irrigated 
areas in the Indus basin, the productivity of land has been deteriorating because of the 
detrimental effects of the high water-tables of the canals and the excessive concentra-
tion of injurious salts in the fields. It has been estimated that in these areas about 12 
million acres of land (or about 40 % of the total irrigated area) have already been 
affected, and about 3 milHon acres of the cultivated area had been rendered uncultiv-
able up until 1960-61. Further, about 100,000 acres of cultivated land go out of culti-
vation every year. 1 4 7 
The problem of waterlogging and salinity in West Pakistan is of comparatively 
recent origin, and has mainly arisen because of the increasing intensification of irriga-
tion through the perennial canal system. As long as the summer irrigation from inun-
dation canals was the main source of water supply to crops, no general waterlogging 
problem existed. But, with the advent of barrage irrigation in the Indus basin, the rate 
at which water could be discharged from the acquifer was too slow to remove addition-
al deep percolation resulting from seepage of the new canals, thanks to the absence of 
a drainage system, and from the water used to irrigate the new lands. As a result the 
water-tables have been rising ever since the barrage-controlled irrigation system began 
to operate on an extensive scale throughout the Indus basin. 1 4 8 
Coupled with the loss of water, which occurs between the canals' headwork and the 
fields (estimated at 50 %), the uneconomic use of water in the fields only adds to the 
gravity of the situation. Thus it has been observed that one cusec of water is generally 
supplied for 333 acres as compared with 100 acres in arid areas of the U.S.A. with 
similar climatic conditions. Water thus supplied is often less than the évapotranspira-
tion requirements of the crops, hence the water does not wash down much beneath the 
root-zones, leaving the injurious salts accumulated in the surface layer of the soil. 
The obvious result is that, on the one hand, most crops suffer from an inadequate water 
supply and, on the other hand, waterlogging and salt accumulation damage soil ferti-
lity and crop growth. 
Although in the past some piecemeal attempts were made to tackle these problems 
by some kind of land reclamation and water management practices, it was not until 
1954 that a national effort was made. 1 4 9 The various measures tried in some areas on a 
limited scale before included the Uning of selected reaches of the canals, lowering of the 
li7Revelle Report, op. cit., and S. M. AKHTAR, op. cit., p. 12. (fits. 104 and 107) 
1 4 8 It is estimated that in general the water-table has risen to about 10 feet below the ground level. 
See: G. MOHAMMAD, "Waterlogging and Salinity in the Indus Plain: A Critical Analysis of Some of 
the Major Conclusions of the Revelle Report." The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 4, No. 3,1964, 
p. 358. 
uHbid., p. 359. 
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water level in the canals, closure of canals in winter and construction of drains. But, 
with the estabHshment of the Water and Power Development Authority in 1954, these 
efforts were stepped up, and by 1959 this Authority had prepared a comprehensive 
programme of sahnity control and land reclamation for the former province of the 
Punjab. This was subsequently extended to other areas of the Indus basin, and eventu-
ally a Master Plan was drawn up in the middle of 1961. This Plan called for the con-
struction of 31,000 tube-wells, 7,500 miles of major drain-canals and 25,000 miles of 
supplementary drains at a total cost of Rs. 5,900 milHon.150 Since all these plans 
will obviously require a long period of time before their real effects become fully oper-
ative, in most areas of the Indus basin the farmers will have to fight hard. 
4.6 Incidence of Plant Diseases and Pests 
It has been estimated that every year 5 to 15% of the standing crops in Pakistan are 
lost due to the damage caused by various plant diseases and pests. In cases of serious 
outbreaks, such as of locusts, rusts and caterpillars, the losses to a particular crop may 
extend from 50 to 100% in many areas. What is even more distressing is that the inci-
dence of plant diseases is not restricted to the crops when they are standing in the field, 
but that many of them are carried through the seasons or damage the stored grains. 
Table 39. Acreage covered by various plant protection measures in Pakistan (in thousand acres) 
Area covered by seec I treated Area covered by plant 
Year against plant diseas es 
protection methods 
East Pak. West Pak. Pakistan East Pak. West Pak. Pakistan 
1955-56 239 239 36 36 
1958-59 34 2,008 2,042 422 714 1,136 
1960-61 71 2,573 2,644 746 1,242 1,988 
Source: Pakistan, Planning Commission, Handbook of Agricultural Statistics, (Karachi, 1964), 
Table 55 and 56, pp. 117-18. 
Most farmers in Pakistan neither have any knowledge of detecting the disease orga-
nisms and the damage caused by them, nor do they possess adequate means to prevent 
and combat them. Some of the diseases are transferred to the soil right after the sowing 
of infected seeds; the farmers hardly ever treat them. During the various stages of 
plant growth, the attack of insects and micro-organisms further aggravate the healthy 
growth of the crops. Thus, at harvest time, the farmers have to content themselves 
xmIbid. 
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with whatever produce is left by the courtesy of their foes. Even when some farmers do 
take measures against the high incidence of diseases, they are either insufficient in them-
selves or rendered ineffective because the other farmers provide a good source of in-
fection. To add to all this, the cultural practices carried out by most farmers are only 
too conducive to the occurrence of some diseases in a recurrent fashion. 
In such circumstances, the need for a national effort to save the crops cannot be 
over-emphasised. Thus, at the behest of the government, plant protection measures in 
Pakistan have been more widely applied as can be seen in Table 39. From this table it 
is clear that a very insignificant part of the total cultivated area, especially in East 
Pakistan, has been covered by such measures, and that it is only recently that the 
efforts have been enhanced to come to grips with this formidable problem. 
4.7 The Use of Improved Crop Seeds and Fertilisers 
It need hardly be emphasised that in countries where crop production has attained 
a high level this is largely due to the use of good quality seed, manures and above all 
artificial fertilisers. In Pakistan, however, at present not only is the number of farmers 
who use improved seed and apply fertilisers very limited, but the quantities used of 
these inputs are also very meagre. 
4.7.1 The Production and Distribution of Quality Seed 
The use of improved crop seeds means essentially the use of superior varieties of crops, 
especially well-adapted to particular soil and climate conditions. In Pakistan, while 
many good varieties of most crop plants, such as rice, wheat, cotton, jute and sugar-
cane, are available, their breeding and distribution to the farmers fall very short of the 
minimum requirements. In fact, the great majority of the farmers continue to use crop 
seeds irrespective of their trueness to variety and germinating quality. This applies to 
almost all types of crops, whether field crops or vegetables and fruits. In general, the 
farmer contents himself with the sowing of the seed which he may have either stored 
after the preceding harvest or bought from the local market or his neighbours. Similar-
ly, in the case of vegetables and fruits, most of the stock remains the same from year to 
year. 
The organisation of seed production and distribution in Pakistan is largely in the 
hands of the government, for only a very few private or co-operative agencies deal in 
the movement of seeds from the time they leave the producer to the time they arrive at 
the farm. In this organisation, there are usually three stages at which the government and 
private growers participate: most improved seed is produced on government research 
farms, where it forms the nucleus stock for multiplication; multiplication is done both 
on the government auxiliary farms and on the farms of 'registered growers', but it is 
mostly concentrated on the former types; finally, this seed is distributed to the farmers 
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through private agencies, particularly through the registered growers. Although seed 
production on government farms has increased quite considerably over the years, espe-
cially of the leading food and cash crops, it has been estimated that in 1961 these farms 
covered only about 9,724 acres in East Pakistan and about 44,073 acres in West Pakis-
tan. 1 5 1 After the evaluation of this organisation, the Food and Agriculture Commission 
of 1960 found it rather inefficient and recommended that the newly established Agri-
cultural Development Corporations should gradually take over the entire work and 
run it in co-operation with private enterprise in a business-like manner. The Com-
mission also emphasised the need to regulate and control the standardisation of all 
improved seed. For the distribution of improved seed to the farmers the role of co-ope-
ratives was specially stressed. 
4.7.2 The Application of Fertilisers 
All crops continually remove from the soil the nutrients which are essential to their 
healthy growth. The most important elements of plant growth in the soil are nitrogen, 
phosphorus and potassium. In order to maintain soil fertility, and so provide a sound 
basis for continued plant growth, these nutrients must be replaced in the soil. Thus, 
unless the plant nutrient balance in the soil is adequate for the optimum growth of 
crops, other factors conducive to increasing agricultural production, such as better 
seeds, water and improved land preparation, can hardly be of any avail in bringing 
about the desired results. Therefore, it is essential that organic manures and artificial 
fertilisers should be regarded as a prime factor for better crop production. 
In the absence of any detailed information about the use of manures and fertilisers 
in Pakistan, it is indeed very difficult to document precisely the extent and pattern of 
their utilisation by the farmers. However, thanks to the 1960 Census of Agriculture, 
some idea can be formed from the figures given in Table 40. Some salient features of 
this table may be noted here. 
About 39 % of the farms reported the use of some type of manures (artificial and 
organic) : in East Pakistan the percentage is 45 and in West Pakistan 33. It is interesting 
to note that in both the provinces a proportionately higher percentage among the 
medium-size farms reported the use of these manures. As to the area manured, about 
16 % of the net sown area of the country was covered in that year: 23 % in East Pakis-
tan and 11 % in West Pakistan. The higher figures for East Pakistan seem to be a result 
of the greater use made of farmyard and other organic manures in that province. 
This can be verified by the quantities of fertilisers used and the area covered by 
them: 4% of the farms in East Pakistan reported their use, as against 6% of the 
farms in West Pakistan; and the quantities of these artificial manures used in East 
Pakistan were incomparably smaller than those in West Pakistan. 
"'Pakistan, Plarining Commission, Handbook of Agricultural Statistics, (Karachi, 1964), Table 59, 
p. 123. 
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Table 40. Use of manures, classified by size offarm, in East and West Pakistan, 1960 
All manures Chemical manures 
Number of all Net area sown 
Size of farms (thousand percentage of percentage of percentage of quantity used 
farm (in thousands) acres) all farms net area sown all farms (tons) 
(in acres) 
East West East West East West East West East West East West 
Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. 
Size A 803 742 138 239 26 16 28 58 1 2 186 5,643 
SizeB 690 856 399 1,030 39 25 30 30 3 4 609 14,647 
Size C 1,677 806 2,450 2,282 46 32 27 19 4 6 3,269 19,861 
S izeD 1,615 581 5,098 2,823 50 37 24 15 5 7 4,852 17,547 
SizeE 698 759 3,726 5,842 51 41 22 13 5 9 2,629 30,303 
SizeF 442 729 3,651 9,524 51 44 21 10 6 10 2,246 39,481 
SizeG 188 286 2,623 6,317 50 41 19 8 7 9 1,385 21,089 
SizeH 21 87 519 3,054 47 26 18 5 9 7 250 10,264 
Size I 5 14 244 900 43 14 25 5 13 7 586 3,889 
All size 6,139 4,860 18,848 32,011 45 33 23 11 4 6 16,012 162,724 
Source: See Table 22; op cit.. Vol. 1. Table 19, p. 150, and Vol. 2, Table 33, p. 546. (fn. 1) 
For the different sizes of farms, see Table 30. 
In Pakistan, farmyard manure and compost have traditionally been the two main 
sources of organic matter and nitrogen in the soil. But although organic manure is 
usually prepared on the farm, almost all urine and a good part of the dung do not find 
their way to the field. Firstly, about 13 to 15 % of the dung in the country is used for 
fuel. Secondly, even the remainder is not preserved properly with the result that plant 
nutrients are either leached away or oxidised. This is largely due to the fact that most 
livestock (especially the cattle) is not stall-fed, and also that the farmer does not pro-
perly look after the preparation of compost. 
According to a survey, which was conducted in 1959-60, of the farmers reporting 
the use of organic manures on their farms, especially farmyard manure, on an aver-
age only 25 to 30% of their usual requirements were met. 1 5 2 This, in other words, 
means that not even the most essential elements of soil fertility are being replenished in 
any significant quantity. Further, the cropping patterns in most areas of East and 
West Pakistan do not properly incorporate the practice of green manuring. The prac-
tice of green manuring appears to be uneconomical to most farmers, and especially 
to small farmers, because the growing of a crop for harvest may have to be sacrificed. 
From the foregoing it is evident that, to maintain soil fertility and increase the pre-
sently poor yields of most crops in Pakistan, the use of fertilisers must assume along 
with other crucial inputs a leading place on the farm. In Table 41, the distribution of 
fertilisers in East and West Pakistan for selected years is shown in equivalent of three 
nutrients: nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. When these figures are viewed against 
the available cultivated and net sown area, the consumption of fertilisers per acre is 
one of the lowest in the world. For instance, in East Pakistan in 1960-61 only about 
1.08 and 1.17 kg., per acre, respectively; for West Pakistan, the corresponding figures 
worked out to be 0.77 and 1.0 kg. 
Table 41. Distribution of fertilisers in East and West Pakistan in selected years (in thousand tons) 
Nitrogen Phosphorus Potassium All nutrients 
Year 
EastPak. WestPak. EastPak. WestPak. EastPak. WestPak. EastPak. WestPak 
1952-53 1.8 1.0 2.8 2.8 
1954-55 3.5 14.1 _ _ _ 3.5 14.1 
1956-57 5.1 9.0 _ _ _ 5.1 9.0 
1959-60 10.3 19.3 0.9 0.1 11.2 19.4 
1960-61 19.7 31.1 3.6 0.4 23.4 31.5 
Source: See Table 3 9 ; op. cit.. Table 57. pp. 1 2 0 - 2 1 . 
•^Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Survey Report on Use of Fertilizer in Pakistan, S.S. 1, 
(Rawalpindi, 1961). 
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Around 1952-53 a very limited quantity of fertilisers was imported into Pakistan, 
and that too mostly for the tea estates in East Pakistan. It was not until 1956-57 that 
fertiliser consumption, mostly of ammonium sulphate and urea, began to show a con-
sistent increase, especially in West Pakistan. Although extensive research work on the 
suitability of various types of fertilisers in East and West Pakistan has already been 
done, especially on some selected cash and food crops and fruits, so far the use of ni-
trogenous fertilisers has been the most popularised. 
While there is an obvious need to increase the consumption of fertilisers in Pakistan, 
and of late the response of the farmers in general has been very encouraging, there are 
several problems which the farmers and government are facing. There are three major 
factors which influence the use of fertilisers by the farmers, namely: (a) cost considera-
tions and credit facilities, (b) the distribution of fertilisers, and (c) the lack of adequate 
knowledge of the amount of each fertiliser, or a combination of more than one, needed 
for a particular crop and the methods of application. From the government's point of 
view, the problems include: the need to organise research; the expansion of extension 
services for demonstrating the application of fertilisers in the farmer's fields; and the 
production and distribution of cheap and most appropriate fertilisers. It is important 
to note that, realising the encouraging response of the farmers, the government in 
Pakistan has been subsidising the sale of fertilisers to the extent of 50 %, and more re-
cently it has adopted new methods of distribution of fertilisers through privately or 
co-operatively organised agencies. Further, since the continuous and increasing im-
ports of fertilisers have formed a serious drain on the foreign exchange resources, some 
production plants have already been established and more are under construction. 
4.8 Techniques of Crop Cultivation 
A corollary of insufficient financial resources and the traditional state of crop produc-
tion in Pakistan is the inadequate use of appropriate farm implements for various farm 
operations and the wasteful methods of crop cultivation. The techniques of cultivation, 
as meant here, include the preparation of land for seed, sowing, inter-culturing opera-
tions and the harvesting of crops. 
Proper preparatory treatment of land is an essential factor in crop production, and 
improved tillage assumes increased importance if new varieties of crops, improved sou 
fertility treatment and water management are to produce the maximum effect on the 
yields of crops. Timely ploughing and sowing are the two basic factors conducive to 
good yields; late sowing reduces the yield of all crops. While almost every cultivator 
in Pakistan, however meagre his means of production are, realises the rationale of these 
elements, he is very often handicapped in carrying them out in time, thanks to the 
adverse effects of such factors as the absence of water either because of untimely 
rains or because of the absence of irrigation facilities. Further, he is often inadequately 
equipped with the required power and implements. 
In Pakistan, almost all draft power on the farm is either derived from animals, espe-
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cially bullocks, or dependent upon the manual labour of the farmers themselves, and 
the success or failure of a crop may often depend upon the plough, the way it is operat-
ed and the power with which it is pulled. Bullock power, especially in East Pakistan 
and also in some parts of West Pakistan, is poor. Not only is the animal power weak, 
but it is also often misused by yoking it to unsuitable types of farm implements besides 
the traditional plough. 
A farmer in Pakistan normally ploughs his land five to eight times before putting the 
seed into the soil, depending on the type of crop and soil and the availability of water. 
Since the use of improved furrow-turning ploughs is very limited, it is often only the 
upper crust of the land which the farmer is able to break. Seed-bed preparation is 
not only inadequate because of the absence of the right type of implements, like 
ploughs, clod crushers and levellers, but also because the farmer has no concept of 
rational and judicious management of soil and water. Although extensive experiments 
in Pakistan have clearly demonstrated the advantages of line sowing, it is more often 
the broadcasting method which the farmer follows. In so doing, not only is the seed 
wasted, but is also not sown at the proper depth. Yet another defect of the broad-
casting method is the difficulty which it creates for inter-culturing operations, like 
weeding, irrigation, application of fertilisers, thus adversely affecting the optimum 
growth of crops. 
With regard to the inter-culturing practices, of which weed control is of utmost im-
portance, they are wasteful both in terms of labour and time, for they demand hard 
and long hand operations and are costly if carried out with the help of primitive tools. 
The harvesting and post-harvesting operations, like threshing and winnowing, also 
suffer largely because of the use of improper implements and tools, thus resulting not 
only in great waste of the farm produce but also in the deterioration of its quality. 
What is known today as mechanised agriculture in the more industrialised countries 
is conspicuously absent in Pakistan agriculture. This can be attributed to many causes, 
as for example: a critical shortage of financial resources among the farmers; fragmented 
holdings; the presence of a large proportion of the labour force working in agriculture, 
a substantial portion of which may be underemployed; and the almost complete ab-
sence of production and maintenance facilities for agricultural machinery. Thus, ma-
chine-driven implements are confined to either large private or government farms. The 
use of tractors, with attendent implements, and bulldozers has been restricted mainly 
to such large-scale operations as land reclamation, new irrigation projects, and the 
opening up of new agricultural land. 
The only implements which could be called mechanised yet not entirely dependent 
on the use of machine-driven draft power, are the mould-board ploughs, water lifts like 
the Persian wheel, sugar-cane crushers, threshers, etc. In fact, it is this area of semi-
mechanised agriculture which has the maximum scope for expansion, as it is relatively 
less costly to operate, maintain and is quite well-adapted to the genius of most farmers 
and to the size of farms and existing labour conditions. The government has begun 
only recently its popularisation on a significant scale. Thus, mechanisation in the sence 
of heavy dependence on machine-driven implements and tools, which are not only 
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costly but often also labour-replacing type, has been limited to the following opera-
tions which are undertaken either by the government or sometimes by a few well-to-do 
farmers and landlords: 1 5 3 
a. reclamation of derelict areas, especially in East Pakistan, and of culturable waste 
land in West Pakistan; 
b. development of land in newly irrigated areas, e.g., recent projects in West Pakistan; 
c. anti-erosion measures in West Pakistan and flood-control work in East Pakistan; 
d. dry farming and moisture conservation work in West Pakistan, as is at present being 
done by the government. 
4.9 Marketing Problems 
The marketing of agricultural products in Pakistan presents a host of problems. Since 
most of the farmers have small and often fragmented holdings and their farm produc-
tion is characterised by their heavy dependence on the cultivation of food crops, the ex-
tent of marketable surpluses of these commodities depends largely on the immediate 
needs of the farming community. In the case of most food products, since more than 
84.0% of the country's population lives in villages, marketing more often assumes the 
simplest form of disposal in that the crops and other farm products are sold directly by 
the individual farmers in the market of the village. This process does not involve any 
specialised marketing functions and the prices of the commodities are determined by 
haggling and bargaining. Even in the case of cash crops, of which a variable yet small 
proportion is retained by the farmer, prices are determined in a similar way either 
at the grower's door-step, where itinerant dealers go around to buy in small lots, or 
in the primary market in the village. 
Beyond the village markets, since most farmers have hardly any waiting capacity 
owing to the lack of credit and storage facilities, the bargaining position of the farmers 
vis-á-vis the intermediaries is further weakened by the inadequate transport and com-
munication facilities. Thus in meeting the demand of the urban population for food 
commodities and in disposing of the cash crops for industrial purposes either at home 
or abroad, marketing becomes a very complicated process. It involves a chain of 
middlemen who, even without really performing any specific function, are in a position 
to exploit the producer (farmer in this case) on the one hand, and on the other, multi-
ply the costs of marketing which adversely affect the consumer in the distant urban 
localities. The existence of too many superfluous middlemen in Pakistan can be ascrib-
ed to several reasons, the most important being 'inadequate financial resources of the 
1 8 3 For an interesting discussion on the subject of agricultural mechanisation, see: Pakistan, Report 
of the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee, 1951-52, (Karachi, 1952), pp. 10-22; Draft of the First 
Five Year Plan, 1955-60, op. cit., pp. 38-42. (fit. 120); Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Agriculture in Pakistan, (Karachi, 1959), pp. 18-26; and Report of the Food and Agriculture Commis-
sion, 1960, op. cit., pp. 106-10. (Jh. 139) 
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producers and their low standard of education, unsatisfactory communications, ab-
sence of properly regulated markets and co-operative effort amongst the producers'. 1 5 4 
While the foregoing remarks reflect in general the weaknesses of the marketing sys-
tem in Pakistan, there are several specific features which vary from one type of agri-
cultural product to another, depending on its place in the rural sector and exports and 
the extent of participation of the government in regulating and enforcing various mea-
sures at different stages of the marketing process. In order to bring the problems of 
agricultural marketing in Pakistan into sharper focus, a detailed discussion of the 
following six broad categories of problems will be given here to reflect the nature and 
extent of the defects with which marketing is plagued: 
a. The indifferent quality of the agricultural produce brought into the market 
b. The lack of storage and warehousing facilities 
c. Inadequate transport and communications 
d. Multiplicity of the middlemen 
c. The absence of properly regulated markets 
f. The absence of co-operative marketing 
4.9.1 The Indifferent Quality of the Produce 
Efficient marketing requires a sophisticated degree of uniformity and differentiation in 
farm products, attributes which cannot always be achieved successfully after the pro-
duce leaves the farm. In Pakistan the low quality of almost all agricultural products in 
the first stage results from many factors, the chief being (a) haphazard selection of crop 
seeds and livestock breeds, (b) methods of crop production and livestock raising which 
very often leave grains and other products mixed with dirt, straw, blemishes, etc., (c) 
natural calamities adversely affecting the standing crops and livestock health, (d) in-
adequate storage at the farm, (e) almost complete absence of grading and standardisa-
tion, and (f) deliberate spoilage of the produce through adulteration, dumping, etc. 
Not only does the produce leave the farm without much or any systematic grading, 
but even at the later stages of marketing, either within the village or in distant markets, 
it is not properly regulated. While in some areas there is some kind of voluntary grad-
ing of such products as wool, butter and mustard oil according to certain set standards, 
there is hardly any systematic grading. It is only recently that, at the secondary level 
markets, the government is encouraging grading of at least those products which are 
important foreign exchange earners. The most unhealthy consequence of the absence of 
grading in Pakistan is adulteration of almost all food commodities. The regulation of 
standardisation and grading of agricultural products is made specially difficult by the 
absence of co-operative marketing at the primary level, where in fact individual grow-
ers sell their produce in the form which they can most readily dispose of. 
^Report of the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee, 1951-52, op. cit., p. 45. 
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4.9.2 The Lack of Storage and Warehousing Facilities 
Because of the absence of waiting capacity on the part of most farmers and of their 
need to satisfy their own basic requirements, most of the agricultural products are sold 
within a very short time after harvesting. While in general this is true of food as well as 
of cash crops, most foodgrains are stored for self-consumption and seed requirements 
for the next sowing season. Only the very well-to-do farmers are able to store their pro-
duce for sale over a longer period of time. The storage facilities which most farmers 
have are often poor and cheap, and until there is a very large quantity of produce the cul-
tivators do not consider it worthwhile to store it. The storage of foodgrains is thus the 
only common practice at farm level; the other products (both perishable and non-
perishable) are sold immediately at the door-step or carried to the nearest market. The 
result of improvised storage at farm level is a loss, especially in foodgrains, which can 
vary from 5 to 10 % of the total volume of the produce. 
It is true that in the assembling markets storage facilities are sometimes provided by 
the dealers and other merchants, but their costs are often prohibitive to the farmers; 
the common use of gunny bags not only adds to the costs but also to the risk of 
spoilage against which the farmers have no security. While obviously the need for 
cold storage for fruits, vegetables, meat, fish and seed potatoes is very great, there 
is hardly any in existence either at production or consumption centres. 
The warehousing facilities are all the more precarious and limited. In practice, in the 
large assembling markets, the merchants, commission agents and even some joint 
stock banks do perform some of the functions of warehousemen, but only to the extent 
that they hold the produce belonging to their clients as security against cash advances. 
The produce is held at the risk of the client, or the producer in this case. Consequently, 
the costs are heavy and storage losses in quantity as well as in quality are also great, 
especially because of the absence of licensed warehouses. These improvised warehous-
es also result in the congestion of produce at consuming centres and ports. 
4.9.3 Inadequate Transport and Communications 
Limited and inefficient transport facilities are very often responsible for the continua-
tion of self-sufficient farming. Likewise, defective communication facilities hmit the 
range of marketing and confine the disposal of farm surpluses either to one of the 
itinerant dealers at the farmer's door-step or to the local village market. 
In East Pakistan the land is largely flat and often broken up by a network of river 
channels, streams and backwaters, and thus road development has so far been very 
limited. It has been observed that in this province the farmers experience great diffi-
culties in gaining ready access to markets in neighbouring villages or district centres, 
for more than one half of the villages are situated at a distance of more than 11 miles 
from any metalled road. Nearly all the fair-weather roads are impassable during the 
monsoon (June/July to September/October) and also for varying periods after the 
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heavy rains. Thus road development programmes in East Pakistan have been given 
top priority not only by the government at the provincial level, but also at the local 
level by the farmers themselves through the rural works programmes. The internal 
waterways present their own problems: excessive silting and the growth of water weeds 
often make them impassable. 
In West Pakistan, where road communication is by far the most important means of 
carrying the farm produce to the distant market, road development programmes in the 
past have in general been far more extensive and successful than those in East Pakistan. 
However, even in this province, except in the areas of the former provinces of the 
Punjab and N.W.F., only 61 % of the villages are situated at a distance of 5 miles or less 
from any metalled road. 1 5 5 Arterial roads, especially in the areas of the former provinces 
of Sind and Baluchistan and other hilly tracts, are negligible or completely absent over 
a wide area. The construction and upkeep of fair-weather roads around the villages 
through the joint efforts of the villagers, as in East Pakistan, is only of recent origin. 
With regard to the means of transport, bullock carts in West Pakistan and rowing 
boats in East Pakistan are the two major (and also) customary means of carrying the 
farm produce from the village to the assembling market. Sometimes, especially in 
West Pakistan, only pack animals may be used for this purpose. Road truck transport 
is rather limited because at this level most trade is in the hands of unorganised small 
farmers. But, at the secondary level, products like fruit and vegetables are often carried 
by trucks from the assembling markets to the distributing centres; the same applies to 
cash crops. However, in the case of milk and its products, supply to the urban areas is 
still made mostly by means of bullock cart and/or head-load. Since trucking of farm 
produce is usually beyond the means of an individual farmer or even an itinerant 
dealer, and no co-operative organisation exists for this purpose, only the very well-to-
do merchants handle this means of transport, hence the high cost of transportation. 
Transportation of products, especially the perishable ones, by the railways also 
suffers from many problems; the following are but the most important ones : 1 5 8 
a. the location of stations at distant places from the villages and assembling markets; 
b. inadequate covered storage at pivotal stations and Umited cold storage facilities; 
c. lack of rail express services; 
d. inordinate delays in transit and a good deal of spoilage and pilferage of products 
during transit. 
4.9.4 The Multiphcity of Middlemen 
In the assembly and distribution of most marketable farm products in Pakistan, a 
number of middlemen have emerged. The accompanying chart depicts a general pic-
1 MPakistan, Central Statistical Office, National Sample Survey (Third Round), 1961, (Karachi, 1963), 
p. 8. 
16BReport of the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee, 1951-52, op. cit., p. 49. (fn. 153) 
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ture of these middlemen and their relationship with each other and the farmer. This 
chart also shows that agricultural markets in Pakistan can roughly be divided into 
three main categories: village or primary markets, assembling or secondary markets, 
and distributing or terminal markets. 
Growers/ Producers 
Village moneylenders(Banla): 
local or itinerant dealers(Beopari); 
other growers 
Local village markets 
Selling aqentslKatcha arhtival 
in- assembling markets (Mandil 
Brokers ( Dalai I 
Buying aqentstPucca arhtlya) 









Chart 2. Marketing channels for agricultural products in Pakistan. 
Since no comprehensive marketing survey has ever been conducted in Pakistan, it is 
almost impossible to say anything precise about the volume of each or all of the agricul-
tural products which these middlemen handle and also the extent of the role of the 
three markets. Not all agricultural products, or even only crops, necessarily pass 
through all these channels to the same extent. It has often been observed that in the 
case of most foodgrains and some exportable cash crops the chain of middlemen at the 
lowest level is very large. But, in the case of most perishable commodities, the sales are 
usually made in local markets without any significant assembly at any level. 
In general, the transactions starting at the farm level could take any of the following 
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forms: a grower or producer may take his produce directly to the village market, 
which is often a permanent place; he may have to pledge the bulk of his standing crop 
to the village itinerant dealer or money-lender, who forms the first link in the chain of 
middlemen; he may take his produce to the selling agents in the assembling market at 
some district centre if easy means of transport is available; he may deliver his prod-
uce directly to the processors; in some cases where co-operative marketing societies do 
exist at the village level, he may hand over his produce to them for further disposal. 
In Pakistan it has been observed that, in the case of many bulky food and cash crops, 
the largest share is taken by the itinerant dealers and/or money-lenders, and the least 
goes to the co-operatives. Direct sales in the local village markets or assembling mar-
kets depend largely upon the distances, the means of transport and the extent of de-
mand for a particular product. Where standing crops are pledged, the grower gets 
loans at interest rates which may vary from 20 to 75 %, and the itinerant dealers and 
other middlemen make profit not only because of this interest but also because of the 
opportunity of selling the crop in the assembling market. 
The key merchants or dealers in the assembling markets, the mandi, are the selling 
agents, or katcha arhtiya as they are usually called. The growers or the petty village 
merchants hand over the produce to these agents, who may sell the crop either imme-
diately and pay the seller at once, or sell later and pay whenever it has been agreed 
upon. In many cases, these agents advance a proportion in cash even before conclud-
ing their sales in the mandi. After taking the delivery of the produce, these agents nor-
mally negotiate its sale on behalf of the grower or petty merchant who continues to 
retain the title to the produce until it is sold in the mandi by katcha arhtiya. The price 
this produce brings, less transportation charges, the advance, the interest on this ad-
vance and a commission for the sale of the produce, is remitted to the client. Interest 
and commission are the two important sources of income for the selling agents. Quite 
often these agents may also finance the village merchants and itinerant dealers who 
trade with them, even before taking for physical possession of the produce from the 
farmer. There are several methods in which these agents may sell the produce. All 
these methods usually result in varying degrees of abuse at the expense of the illiterate 
farmer. In the assembling market, where these sales are often carried out through auc-
tions, the influence of these agents is indeed very great. 
Brokers, or dalal as they are commonly known, mediate between the selling agents 
(katcha arhtiya) and the buying agents (pucca arhtiya); the latter may be large whole-
salers as well. These brokers have no other function than selling information to the 
buyers. They often exact their fees from both the parties. 
The buying agents (and the wholesalers) in the distributing market may sell the 
produce to sub-wholesalers or wholesaler-retailers and help finance them until they 
are finally able to sell the produce at the retail level. These agents, like the selling agents 
are also commission agents, but they conduct a much larger business. They may have 
their offices at various buying centres and may act on behalf of the wholesaler-retailers 
and exporting agencies. The charges of their business are very often not as indiscreet as 
those of the selling agents in the assembling market. 
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The position of the wholesaler-retailers is that they generally service the local retail-
ers, to whom they may give credit as well. The difference between the large wholesalers 
and these agents in practice is in the pricing technique, that is, while 'the former "buy 
cheap and sell dear" and the latter generally sell at purchase price plus fixed markup'. 1 5 7 
There seems to be a consensus of opinion against the existence of so many types of 
middlemen, because there is no economic justification for their functions which very 
often overlap and, because of the exorbitant costs of these functions, the price forma-
tion in the market is always subject to their dictates. For instance, it has been alleged 
that such middlemen as the village itinerant dealers, money-lenders, brokers and selling 
agents are superfluous. But, as was alluded to before, their emergence has been due 
largely to the absence of co-operative effort on the part of the farmers themselves and 
also because of the lack of sufficient regulated markets in the country. These problems 
will now be discussed in detail. 
4.9.5 The Absence of Regulated Markets 
In Pakistan, village or primary markets are fairly widespread. However, since they 
have evolved in various localities under different circumstances, they often vary in 
size, character and organisation. A great majority of these markets consists of open 
spaces where buyers and sellers carry on their transactions. Their character may differ: 
for example, in West Pakistan most of them are permanent, but in East Pakistan these 
markets, locally called as hatt, are temporary and are generally held at a central place 
for a small number of villages on some fixed day(s) of the week. The market place may 
belong to either a local authority or individuals; in all cases a certain charge for the use 
of the place is collected. 
Wholesale markets, or mandi, are fewer in number, and they usually perform special 
functions besides enabling the buyers and sellers to undertake transactions on the spot. 
However, most of these markets operate under unregulated conditions: they are often 
unorganised as to the conduct of auctions, the use of legal weights and measures, the 
charges on various functions, etc. Settlement of prices 'under cover' by the commission 
agents, extortion of a variety of charges without any service to the ignorant farmer are 
some of the common abuses. 
At the secondary level, regulated markets have emerged only in the former Punjab, 
and there too their number is very limited both in area and volume of transactions 
covered. Although in some other areas of West Pakistan similar attempts have also 
been made, the effect has not been significant. It is only recently that the government 
has awoken to take a strong initiative in both the provinces in estabhshing regulated 
markets, where not only the practices in the market could be rationalised according to 
1 M L . V. HIRSCH, "Wholesaling in India," in: R. BARTELS (ed.), Comparative Marketing, (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D.Jxwin, Inc., 1963), p. 135. Since most wholesalmg m PaMstan is similar to that in 
in India, Chart 2 in this chapter has been adopted from HIRSCH, but with some modifications. 
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certain rules, but better market information could also be provided to all the parties 
involved.1 5 8 
4.9.6 The Absence of Co-operative Marketing 
The co-operative effort of the farmers in marketing, as in the production process, has 
so far been negligible. In fact, such marketing societies at the primary level have only 
to a limited extent been successful in the former province of the Punjab in West 
Pakistan. In other areas, where multi-purpose societies have been in existence (as in 
East Pakistan), some of them have also participated in marketing the products of their 
members. 
Realising the importance of co-operative action, both at the primary and secondary 
levels, the West Pakistan Co-operative Enquiry Committee of 1955 proposed the esta-
blishment of a system of marketing in which 'the primary society will deal with the 
marketing of the produce in the villages' and the 'secondary institutions will be formed 
and the primary societies of all those villages which are served by a particular mandi 
will be affiliated to the secondary institutions in that mandV. For the 'final disposal of 
the produce a tertiary organisation at the provincial level would be necessary'.1 5 9 This 
scheme, although originally proposed for West Pakistan only, was later endorsed in 
full by the government in the Second Five Year Plan for the entire country. In fact, as 
only time will show, such a scheme, if carried out in earnest, will be of immense help 
to all those farmers who have small-size farms and whose waiting capacity is anything 
but strong. 
4.10 The Attitudes of the Farmers Towards New Incentives 
and Social Organisation in the Rural Areas 
It seems that in Pakistan there are two distinct types of social problems in its rural 
milieu. Firstly, on the production side, in agriculture the great problem is of replacing 
the inefficient and tradition-bound methods of farming by efficient and improved 
methods and inputs, the profitability of which can clearly be demonstrated in economic 
terms. Secondly, the social organisation in rural Pakistan does not permit most far-
mers to channelise their saved incomes or borrowed capital into economically produc-
tive ventures. Each of these problems will now be discussed in turn. 
Although in recent years the network of rural extension programmes has increa-
sed rapidly, there are as yet no systematic studies to demonstrate the effectiveness with 
which the farmers have started accepting and adopting new inputs and techniques on 
1 B 8 It has been reported that, just before the launching of the Second Five Year Plan in 1960, only 
about 85 regulated markets were in operation, and almost all of which were in the former Punjab. 
1 M West Pakistan, Report of the West Pakistan Co-operative Committee (1955), (Lahore, 1956), p. 68. 
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their farms. However, from whatever little research has been done in this field in 
Pakistan, some generalisations do emerge rather clearly.1 6 0 Thus it has been found out 
that, within the given socio-economic frame-work of the rural Muslim society of Pa-
kistan, the adoption and diffusion of new and improved agricultural practices are 
largely dependent upon the following factors: 1 6 1 
a. the personality of the individual farmer: his educational and social status and his 
motivations; 
b. the availability of land and other physical means of production; 
c. the degree of demonstration effect of the profitability of new inputs and practices; 
and, 
d. the time element which may be involved from the stage of 'awareness' of the new 
inputs and practices to their final 'adoption'. 
While all the above-mentioned factors are closely bound together, the motivations 
for economic betterment are often weak if only because of the risks involved. They are, 
ceteris paribus, often inversely proportional to the degree of risks involved in adopting 
a new venture. In this sense, the Pakistani peasantry is no more exceptional than any 
other peasant society. But, sociologically speaking, these motivations for material ad-
vance, if that is what economic progress signifies, are more basically affected by the 
goal-orientation of a particular society. This leads to the discussion of the second and 
perhaps more important area of social problems which seem to have proved a great 
impediment to economic progress in rural Pakistan, and in which the role of capital 
accumulation is central. 
In Pakistan, as in many other contemporary tradition-bound agrarian societies, 
even if some farmers do adopt such improved agricultural practices as they regard eco-
nomically profitable, their marginal savings are in fact disinvested rather than invested 
into the economic system. Not only do the additional earnings go to meet social needs, 
but even the borrowed capital is channelised towards the same end. Often such expen-
diture as is made on feasts, fairs and festivals, leaves most rural families in a hand-to-
mouth condition, if they have somehow managed to save themselves from perpetual-
indebtedness. These social 'needs' of the rural community, the degree of their fulfil-
ment being perhaps the only criterion of happiness, are deep-rooted in the value system 
of the society. 
The foregoing general remarks can be well substantiated by the type of social milieu 
which exists in rural Pakistan. Not many detailed studies on the various aspects of this 
problem are at present available in the country; HUSAIN'S pioneering work in East 
Pakistan does, however, reflect the kind of social organisation of the predominantly 
Muslim population of Pakistan. 1 6 2 His work, as of some others elsewhere under similar 
1 6 0 For a good study in Pakistan, see: S . A. RAHTM, Diffusion and Adoption of Agricultural Practices: 
A Study in a Village in East Pakistan, Pakistan Academy for Village Development, (Comilla, 1961). 
161Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
1 6 2 A . F. A. HUSAEST, Human and Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan, Two Volumes, 
(Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
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circumstances, clearly demonstrates that a great majority of peasants would work hard 
and long if only to make greater 'investments' to meet their social obligations in reli-
gious and/or cultural rituals. Their number seems to be larger in the more integrated 
communities.1 6 3 To those who see investment as the act of ploughing back one's mar-
ginal earnings into the productive system of the economy, these social expenditures 
represent merely a waste of capital, resulting in that familiar vicious circle of poverty. 
But, to the majority of the rural people in Pakistan whose goal-orientation is what some 
sociologists have called 'multi-directional', the channelisation of capital into these 
'wasteful ventures' is often the true measure of happiness. 1 8 4 
Even though, with the introduction of technological change, the old economic rela-
tions in traditional agriculture are tending to break down slowly, there is definitely a 
time lag in readjusting social relations. Thus the impact of changes in the production 
system is not always readily followed by the dissolution of the existing value system, or 
for that matter of the social organisation itself. And, in a society such as that of rural 
Pakistan, where social cohesion is provided by the extended family system and almost 
all rituals are given the sanction of religious and cultural values, the resistance to chan-
ge is understandably great. Nor is this all. Even among those of the Pakistanis who 
have shifted to an industrial-urban milieu, as HUSAIN clearly points out in his study, 
the inviolability of the old values and rituals epitomising their significance dies hard. 1 6 5 
lmIbui., pp. 6 3 - 1 0 1 . Another study of social customs and structure in the former Punjab is also very 
interesting: Z . EGLAR, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960 ) . 
1 6 4 B . F . HOSELTTZ (ed.), Industrialization and Society, (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963) , p. 12 . 
1 8 5 HUSAIN, op. cit.,pp. 140-212.(fit. 162 ) 
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5 The Role of the State in the Economic l ife of Pakistan: With 
Special Reference to the Agricultural Sector 
5.1 Introduction 
The role of the government in the organisation and regulation of economic activities 
has invariably evoked acrimonious controversies. On the one side there are those who 
would assign to the State, besides its traditional duties of maintaining law and order, 
only a very restricted control of the economy; on the other side are those who would 
defend tooth and nail the active and almost total participation by the State in nearly 
all economic and social affairs. While no country can be free from such apparently 
irreconcilable controversies, it is generally agreed that the State in contemporary 
underdeveloped economies has to assume a special place. This is the more so when 
development planning in some form has become an essential tool of State participa-
tion. 1 6 6 
The role of the government in the economic life of Pakistan 'extends from the regu-
lation and control of private enterprises in trade, industry, and agriculture to a direct 
participation in certain specific fields'. 1 6 7 However, it is mteresting to note that in Pa-
kistan the pattern and extent of government participation in the economy is not 
based primarily on any doctrinaire considerations as is well demonstrated by the 
'peaceful co-existence' of private and public enterprise. Nevertheless, thanks to the 
commitment of the national government to planned economic development, all short-
and long-term government policies in the economic sphere are often geared to the 
broad objectives and strategy of national economic plans. As an indication of the 
pragmatic nature of the approach to planning, it is worthwhile to quote from a recent 
statement of the President of Pakistan: 
'Our approach to economic pknning has been pragmatic all along. It has been the constant endeavour 
of the government to mobilise the creative energies of the nation and to give all possible incentives 
for the stimulation of private initiative. The government has limited its own role to providing a suitable 
frame-work for the private sector and to the creation of those facilities which the private sector had 
neither the ability nor the willingness to develop. There have been no grand experiments in nationali-
sation, no fancy slogans about socialism, no undue intervention in the private sector. In fact, the 
1 6 aOver the years, a consistent body of opinion has been building up in favour of economic planning in 
underdeveloped countries, and many persuasive writings could be quoted in this regard. However, two 
recent references will suffice here: E. E. HAGEN (ed.), Planning Economic Development, (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D . Irwin, Inc., 1 9 6 3 ) , Chapters 1, 1 1 and 1 2 ; and United Nations, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Planning for Economic Development, (New York, 1963) . 
"'ISLAM, op. cit., p. 4 3 0 . (fit. 102 ) 
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government has gradually removed most of the administrative and bureaucratic controls which 
hampered progress of the private sector.'1 6 8 
The above statement may betray a fair amount of complacency, and indeed the fact is 
that this pknning recipe has had its own weaknesses: on the one hand, it has not been 
able to satisfy the appetite of many ideologues among the intelligentsia and, on the 
other, it has not yet succeeded to enthuse the masses with an adequate spirit of partici-
pation. Further, what appears to be more distressing is that when references are made 
to such terms as 'Islamic Socialism' and 'Welfare State', the two being used almost 
synonymously, their substance remains at best only ill-defined. After all, these slogans 
will in the long run have to be justified by, among other things, their substance and not 
by their evocative power, however fanciful and strong it may appear. 
Since the main purpose of this chapter is not to analyse and evaluate in detail all the 
ramifications of the role of the State, the discussion will be limited firstly to the process 
of investment allocation in general and to the agricultural sector in particular, with 
special reference to the share of the public sector in these allocations. Then, within this 
frame of reference, the role of the government in the organisation of the agricultural 
sector or in the activities relevant to this sector and its development will be presented. 1 6 9 
5.2 The Allocation of Investments to the Agricultural Sector 
As was alluded to before, the agricultural sector still dominates the economic scene of 
Pakistan. While it is true that its expansion has not been satisfactory over the years, it 
has attained of late an annual rate of growth which cannot by any means be regarded 
as an unenviable achievement. Based on recent estimates by the government of Pakis-
tan, Table 42 presents the annual rates of growth of the three major sectors of the eco-
nomy, all of which show an increase over the years. 
The impressive increase in the annual rate of growth of the agricultural sector, as 
also of the other sectors, has been due mainly to a significant increase in total invest-
ment as a percentage of the GNP, and in which the government through the public 
sector have demonstrated their keen and determinedly increased participation in the 
national effort. To form a general idea about the overall and sector-wise investments 
(private and public), Table 43 shows the increased allocation as a percentage of the 
GNP. Besides the increase in total investment as a percentage of the GNP, from 4.6 % 
in 1949-50 to 16.6 % in 1964-65, the most significant fact in this table is the increase of 
the share of the public sector in total investment: in increased from about 28% in 
1949-50 to about 49 % in 1964-65. However, it must be mentioned that this increased 
share of the public investment has not been at the cost of private investment, for while 
public investment grew at an annual compound rate of over 17% during 1949-50 to 
lmThe Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., Foreword, without page number, (fit. 72) 
1 6 9 For a detailed discussion on the role of the State in Pakistan, see: ISLAM, op. cit., pp. 430-59, 
(Jh. 102); HAQ, op. cit., (fit. 72); and C. Wilcox, "Pakistan," in: HAQEN, op. cit., pp. 52-79. (fn. 166) 
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Table 42. The average annual rate of growth of the three major sectors of the economy of Pakistan 
Annual compound rate of growth ( %) 
Sector 
1949-50 to 1959-60 1959-60 to 1964-65 
Agriculture 1.3 3.5 
Manufacturing 7.4 8.6 
Services 3.5 6.7 
All sectors 2.5 5.2 
Source: Pakistan. Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70). (Karachi, 1965). 
Table 2, p 1-2. (Mimeographed). 
Table 43. Gross investment as a percentage of the GNP and the relative shares of public and private 
investment (million Rupees; 1959-60 prices) 
Type of investment 1949-50 1954-55 
Total investment 1,120 2,200 
Public 310 610 
Private 810 1,590 
Total investment as a percen-
tage of the GNP 4.6 7.9 
Source: See Table 42; op. cit.. Table 4, p. 1-5, and Table 5, p. 1-6. 
1964-65, private investment grew at an annual compound rate of 10 % during the same 
period. 
The importance of the agricultural sector in the economic development of Pakistan 
may also be judged from the fact that, although the manufacturing sector grew at a 
very rapid rate from 1949-50 to 1964-65, it hardly influenced the annual overall rate of 
growth of the economy, because of the large weight of the agricultural sector in the 
national output and its low rate of growth. In the words of the Pakistani planners, this 
slow rate of growth of agriculture 'limited the availability of exportable surpluses of 
agricultural raw materials and tended to dampen the demand for industrial products 
since purchasing power in the rural areas was not increasing at a fast enough rate' . 1 7 0 
Thus these 'widely divergent growth rates in agriculture and industry during these 15 
years made economic progress less harmonious than it should have been and exercised 
an adverse influence on the over-all rate of growth'. 1 7 1 
170The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., p. 1-3. (Jh. 72) 
mIbid. 
1959-60 1964-65 Annual compound 
growth rate (%) 
3,430 6,710 12.7 
1,710 3,310 17.1 
1,720 3,400 10.0 
10.9 16.6 
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With an increased investment effort in Pakistan over the years, as was indicated 
above, and the explicit recognition of the thwarting effect of the slow rate of growth of 
the agricultural sector on the development of the economy, there has fortunately been 
an increasing allocation of investment outlays in this sector within the development 
plans as can be seen in Table 44. 










Agriculture 6 7 13 15 
Water and power 13 17 19 15 
Rural works programme -> - 3 5 Industry, fuels and minerals 36 31 28 26 
Transport and communications 14 17 17 18 
Physical planning and housing 22 20 15 13 
Education 5 6 4 5 
Health 3 2 1 2 
Manpower and social welfare 1 - - 1 
All sectors 100 100 100 100 
Source: See Table 42, op. eft.. Table 7. p. IV-11. 
However, what is even more important to note is that, for the overall development 
of agriculture, the proportions of the total investment in such sectors as the 'water and 
power' and the 'rural works programme' are also of considerable value. When the 
percentage increases in these three sectors are taken together, the investment allocation 
rose from 19% in 1950-55 to 35% in 1960-65. For the Third Five Year Plan period, 
1965-70, the same percentage of investment is proposed as was allocated during 1960-
65. 
The increasing share of the public sector in the total investment, i.e. 60 %, has main-
ly been provided for the provision of infrastructure. Further, largely because of the 
relative weakness of the private sector in East Pakistan in almost all development 
spheres, the public sector there has assumed a more important role over the years. It has 
been estimated that the public sector investment in East Pakistan has been increasing 
on an average annual rate of 23.5 % during the period 1949-50 to 1964-65 as against 
17.5% in West Pakistan during the same period. 1 7 2 
™Ibid., Table 13, p. 1-15. 
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5.3 The Role of the Government in the Organisation and 
Development of the Agricultural Sector 
Speaking in general terms, there are three major areas in which the State in Pakistan 
has been either participating directly or influencing indirectly the structure and organi-
sation of the agricultural sector in the country. These areas are: 
a. The improvement of the already existing rural economic and social infrastructure 
and the creation of new ones, such as irrigation systems, road- and waterway trans-
port, schools and hospitals, and the provision of such direct inputs to the farmers as 
may be essential to help increasing agricultural production. 
b. The institutional reforms on the land, which relate to such matters as the regula-
tion of the terms of land-ownership and the consolidation of fragmented holdings. 
c. The collection of land revenue and other State charges which help to transfer capital 
resources from the agricultural sector to the rest of the economy and also the invest-
ment programme within this sector itself; the regulation of markets with a view to 
helping stabilise prices of various agricultural commodities and also influencing the 
acreage and production of the leading food and cash crops. 
In sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 the above-mentioned roles of the State will be discussed in 
detail. 
5.3.1 General Agricultural Development 
As was stated in the introductory section, the government in Pakistan has committed 
itself to planning economic development. It is within the national plan that priorities 
of development in the major sectors during a specific plan period are fixed. The expen-
ditures involved are in addition to those which the government has to undertake from 
year to year for the maintenance of a large number of the so-called nation-building 
departments, both at the centre and in the two provinces. However, it must be said in 
all fairness that not all the efforts of the government in the rural sector are, and by the 
nature of this sector's private organisation cannot be, directed towards the supplanting 
of the existing local private initiative and entrepreneurship. In general, therefore, the 
governmental agencies aim at improving the existing facilities where they appear to be 
inadequate and creating those which could not otherwise be undertaken or completed 
by the farmers themselves. 
Thus the role of the State in this sphere ranges from the establishment and improve-
ment of such infrastructure as irrigation barrages, dams and canals, rural accessory 
roads, health centres, primary and secondary schools, etc., to the provision of those 
factors which are required for enhancing directly or indirectly the productive effort of 
the farmers, such as farm credit, fertilisers, seeds, plant protection measures, etc. In 
covering such a large area of activities, with Umitated resources and personnel, the 
government has always been in a state of departmental reorganisation. This has usual-
ly been due either to the inherent defects in the existing departmental organisation or 
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to the lack of adequate co-ordination at almost all levels. The fact that there has tra-
ditionally been a tremendous multipncity of departments handling the subjects which 
affect the farmers was well taken by the Food and Agriculture Commission in its re-
port in I960. 1 7 3 
Since a formal evaluation of the activities of various government departments funct-
ioning in the agricultural sector lies outside the purview of the present study, it is 
sufficient to mention here some important activities of the State in the development of 
the rural sector. In water and power development and the rural works programmes the 
government has relied mainly upon autonomous bodies; but for the supply of various 
agricultural inputs and advisory work the services have been channeled through the 
agricultural department. However, of late the last two tasks have also been assigned to 
independent public agencies outside the frame-work of the traditional government 
organisation. 
5.3.1.1 The Rural Works Programme 
Realising the multitude of problems in the rural areas of Pakistan, the government 
initiated in 1953 a comprehensive programme of community development through a 
new organisation called the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development or the 
Village-AID in short. This body was given a more or less independent status outside 
the general frame-work of the then existing departments. While the objectives which it 
was designed to meet were in themselves multifarious and quite often unclear, the 
Village-AID organisation suffered very badly over the years from the duplicity of work 
arising from insufficient co-ordination among the various government agencies, the 
extension service of the agriculture department being the best example. Thus after a 
period of heart-searching and re-assessment of the Village-AID programme, the 
government abolished the organisation in 1960, and with it most of the cliché of 
'community development'. 
During the same period the country was also undergoing a process of far-reaching 
constitutional changes, with the result that a new political tier system under the name 
of 'Basic Democracies' was created. In this system, the rural and also the urban areas 
were to have effective local self-government through the elected Union Councils. The 
system was meant to use the people's elected representatives in any rural development 
programme which the government might propose to start in a given area or in the 
country as a whole. 
Within the new system, the erstwhile Village-AID programme was transformed into 
what is now called the Rural Works Programme. This programme, being less ambitious 
than the Village-AID, was based on the successful experience of a pilot project conduct-
ed in Comilla Thana in East Pakistan during the year 1960-61. Almost all of this pro-
gramme consisted of building and repairing such infrastructure as irrigation channels, 
drainage networks, roads, etc. Not surprisingly, through the active and willing partici-
"3Report of the Food and Agriculture Commission, 1960, op. cit., pp. 504-5. {fit. 139) 
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pation of the people's representatives at the local level, the confidence of most farmers 
in this area was readily gained. The results of this project were so promising that the 
government initiated a province-wide programme of this nature in East and West Pa-
kistan. The rural works programme has now become an integrated part of the national 
economic plans. This programme has four major objectives, namely, (a) the effective 
utilisation of any surplus rural manpower, (b) the development of rural economic and 
social infrastructure, (c) strengthening local self-government, and (d) planning from 
below. 1 7 4 
The growing importance of the rural works programme can well be judged by the 
increased allocation of funds. They amounted to: Rs. 100 million in 1962-63 for East 
Pakistan alone; Rs. 300 million in 1963-64 for both the provinces; and Rs. 400 million 
in 1964-65. However, while all these expenditures were undertaken outside the scope 
of the Second Five Year Plan, the new allocation of Rs. 2,500 million has been made 
within the frame-work of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), representing about 5% 
of the total investment in the plan period. 1 7 8 
The rural works programme under the Third Five Year Plan is expected to cover 
such self-help projects as minor irrigation works, flood control, rural communications 
and transport, supply of drinking water, community houses, dispensaries, schools, 
markets, etc. In addition to the funds allocated by the government as a part of its con-
tribution to this programme, each Union Council in the rural areas is expected to mo-
bilise additional resources either from local taxes or through the utilisation of volun-
tary labour. 
5.3.1.2 The Development and Control of Water Resources 
As was stated earlier, for increasing agricultural production, water occupies a central 
place in Pakistan: in West Pakistan the most crucial factor is the extent of the availa-
bility of irrigation water, and in East Pakistan it is the control of river waters which is 
of paramount importance. 
The large-scale infrastructural activities necessary for the realisation of the plans in 
these fields cannot be developed without the active leadership of the State. Hence, 
with a view to harnessing such water resources on the national level and also to saving 
the land and people from untold misery each year, the government has created a spe-
cial agency, the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA for short), which 
works independently of the other government departments. The WAPDA has its field 
staff in one autonomous office in each of the two wings of the country. This organisa-
tion not only undertakes large-scale irrigation, drainage and flood control schemes, but 
also helps individual farmers in getting irrigation water for their land by the construc-
tion of tube-wells. Besides the work of water development, the WAPDA undertakes 
the work of rural electrification throughout the country. 
'"'•Outline of the Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., pp. 232-34. (fit. 100) 
™The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., p. IV-16. (fit. 72) 
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5.3.1.3 The Provision of Farm Inputs, Advisory Service, Research and Educa-
tion 
Until 1960-61, all agricultural extension work, including the supply of improved seeds, 
fertilisers, plant protection material and advisory work (except the care of livestock 
health), was being done by the provincial agriculture departments. But, following the 
recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Commission of 1960, the government 
established an entirely new organisation which to begin with would concentrate on 
providing the farmers in some selected areas of the country with those inputs which 
they may benefit from. This body was named the Agricultural Development Corpora-
tion, with an independent status outside the general frame-work of the existing depart-
ments of agriculture, animal husbandry, co-operatives and the like. However, while 
this Corporation, with an autonomous office and organisation in each wing, was 
initially intended to cater for the needs of extension and supply work in the proposed 
project areas (16 in West Pakistan and 11 in East Pakistan), the rest of the country will 
continue to be served by a reorganised agricultural extension service and other such 
governmental agencies. 
Although great hopes have been attached rather prematurely to the success of the 
Corporation in bringing about the desired changes in the country's agricultural scene, 
it is as yet too early to say anything about its real prospects and the form it might even-
tually take. In the meantime, however, it is more than likely that the transitionary 
period may prove to be more arduous and uncertain both to the government and the 
farmer. This shift from one system to another is apt to create, at least for some time, 
confusion about the function of the government, not to mention the inter-department-
al jealousies and tensions. Perhaps the farmer may also have to contend with a greater 
number of government functionaries and advisors than previously. Thus, in the task 
of providing the farmer with the wherewithal for improving his own lot on the one 
hand, and increasing the volume and quality of the agricultural produce in the country 
on the other, the critical test of the effective role of the State in Pakistan seems to reside 
in the simplicity with which the farmer can be approached and the speed with which he 
may be made to accept and adopt new and improved farm inputs and methods of pro-
duction. 
The role of the government is equally important in the organisation and administra-
tion of agricultural research and education. Thus, keeping in view the increasing signi-
ficance of applied agricultural research on soils, crop husbandry and protection, live-
stock breeding, feeding and management, forest development and the utilisation and 
exploration of fish wealth, the government has attempted to bring research work as 
close as possible to the basic needs of those who are engaged in agriculture as an in-
dustry. However, in the field of crop and livestock production alone, the most impor-
tant problem has been one of establishing the most effective and harmonious relation-
ship between the research organisations and the agricultural extension service. Much 
too often it is claimed, and not without supporting evidence, that agricultural research 
in Pakistan is at best misdirected. From an economist's point of view, a more distress-
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ing fact is that few, if any, farm economics studies have been carried out in Pakistan, 
hence economising on farm enterprise remains at best a sophisticated game of 
gambling. Although some farm management studies have been initiated of late at the 
behest of the government, their results and analyses will provide only a modest beginn-
ing which in a country like Pakistan should have started much earlier, as was done in 
India. 
Since it was earnestly realised that a wide gap existed between research work and the 
farmer's immediate problems, the Food and Agriculture Commission recommended a 
closer contact between applied research and the extension staff. For instance, it was 
emphasised in the Commission's report that the Agricultural Development Corporation 
should in most cases draw upon basic research through demonstrations in the field, of 
course with the help of the existing research bodies. This would mean that it is the 
farmers' door-step which must be the ultimate market for the innovational activity of 
the government. 
5.3.2 The Reforms of the Land Tenure Systems 
5.3.2.1 General Background 
The problem of land tenure in Pakistan was one of the major national issues which the 
government had to face right after the birth of the country. This was the more urgent 
because there was no uniformity in the then existing land tenure systems. Not only were 
there some basic differences in those of East and West Pakistan, but while East Pakis-
tan had inherited a uniform system, the tenurial arrangements in West Pakistan pre-
sented a variety of forms, all with their own concomitant problems. The origin of these 
different tenurial systems on the land could be traced to the specific socio-political 
circumstances of each region just before and during the British raj in undivided India. 
While it is quite difficult to state in cut and dried form the exact nature of the land 
tenure systems which have existed in Pakistan, the following three groupings indicate 
rather clearly their broad forms : 1 7 6 
a. Large landed estates owned by landlords, usually cultivated by tenants (occupancy 
tenants and tenants-at-will). The landlords are referred to as either zamindar or 
jagirdar: these terms relate to the mode in which land has come into their ownership. 
At the inception of Pakistan this system prevailed in both the wings of the country, 
but in East Pakistan, after the promulgation of the 1950 East Bengal State Acquisition 
and Tenancy Act, it was gradually liquidated. In West Pakistan, as will be pointed out 
later, though this system continues to exist, it has been greatly modified since the pro-
mulgation of the Martial Law Regulation No. 64 in 1959. 
b. Then there are the peasant-proprietors, who own and cultivate their own areas. The 
""Draft of the First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, op. tit., p. 116 . (fit. 120 ) . See also, AKHTAR, op. tit., 
pp. 1 4 8 - 5 9 . (fn. 107) 
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cultivation is done with, the help of either the family members and/or hired labour. 
These types of owners usually live in compact village communities, 
c. Finally, there is the system in which the State is the actual owner of the land and the 
farmers cultivate it on a tenancy basis with security of tenure fully guaranteed, known 
locally as the ryotwari system. The occupant is quite free to leave his land and not pay 
the land revenue. The occupant also enjoys full heritable and transferable rights. This 
system prevails now in East Pakistan and also in many parts of the former province of 
Sind in West Pakistan. 
In fact, before the advent of the British raj in India, there was only a very vague con-
ception of the right of individual ownership of land. Thus, in what is now East Pakist-
an (formerly a part of the province of Bengal), in the pre-British days the landlords of 
Bengal were only intermediaries who worked for the State in collecting land revenue. 
But the British, during the last part of the 18th and early part of the 19th centuries, con-
ferred upon these land revenue collectors the permanent right of ownership, and thus 
created a landlord class. The landlords in West Pakistan, on the other hand, are the 
descendants of those who occupied large areas of land at the time of the British con-
quest of this part of undivided India. These people had come to own large estates in 
several ways. While these types of landlords, both the zamindar and jagirdar, were to 
be found in the former provinces of the Punjab and N.W.F., such a system did not 
exist in the former province of Sind. However, in Sind also since the occupants often 
belonged to the established political hierarchy, they acquired the status of large land-
owners. Consequently, almost 80 % of the land in this region was at one time owned 
by a relatively small number of landlords who, though legally the occupancy tenants 
of the State, got their land cultivated by tenants-at-will (locally known as hari). Be-
sides the zamindar, who pay land revenue to the government, the other class of big 
land-owners in West Pakistan are the jagirdar, who have inherited their land as grant 
from the State and they are exempted from the payment of land revenue. Like the 
zamindar, the jagirdar emerged from the peculiar historical circumstances in the Indian 
sub-continent.1 7 7 
With this rather sketchy background of the various land tenure systems in Pakistan, 
an attempt will be made in the following sections to show the role of the government in 
effectively legislating land reforms in the country. Since the two provinces have differed 
greatly in the pattern of land-ownership and since East Pakistan has been ahead of 
West Pakistan in its earnestness to adopt land reform measures, it is necessary to 
discuss them separately. 
5.3.2.2 Land Reforms in East Pakistan 
The economic and social evils of the zamindari system in East Pakistan, as it evolved 
during the British period in undivided Bengal, were recognised even before the incep-
tion of Pakistan. For the first time, the task of abolishing the zamindari, and more par-
1 , 7 See: AKHTAR, op. cit. (Jh. 107) 
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ticularly the system of 'Permanent Settlement', was taken up by the government in 
1940. Since it was the State which had the ultimate claim to the ownership of all land 
in that part of India, the main object of the task was to remove all intermediaries and 
the State had therefore to re-establish its relations directly with the actual cultivators 
of the land. However, despite the further emphasis laid by other official committees on 
this problem, the final decision by the provincial legislature of Bengal, as it was then, 
was delayed until the time of partition of the Indian sub-continent. Following the birth 
of Pakistan, this urgent matter was taken up once again by the East Bengal (as East 
Pakistan was then called) government, culminating in the adoption of The East Bengal 
State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. The salient features of this Act are the 
following:1 7 8 
a. The acquisition by the State of all rent-receiving interests through the removal of the intermediaries 
between the actual cultivator-tenant and the State itself. 
b. The large zamindari estates were to be acquired immediately by the government if reasonably 
reliable rent collection papers were available. The other rent-receiving interests were to be acquired 
by the State under a more comprehensive system, according to which the records of the rights had 
either to be prepared afresh or completed by revision based on surveys. 
c. The out-going rent receivers had the right to compensation according to the rates prescribed under 
the Act. 
d. The actual tillers of land were to become the direct tenants of the State paying land rent directly 
to the government, as soon as the intermediaries had been removed. These tenants, or ryot, were 
to be given permanent, heritable and transferable rights to their land. 
e. The land rents, fixed under the new system, were to be fair and equitable. These rents were not to 
be enhanced before a period of thirty years had lapsed after the fixation of the first tables of rent. 
f. No sub-letting was to be allowed under this Act, and restrictions were put on the sub-division of 
holdings with provision for the consolidation of fragmented holdings under certain conditions. 
While the above features pertain to the abolition of the zamindari system as such, 
the Act also made provisions for the owner-operated areas. The following are the 
main features: 
a. There was to be a ceiling on all self-cultivated, or khud-kasht or khas, lands, which had to be either 
100 standard bigha - 1 bigha equalling about 0.33 acres - or 10 bigha per member of the family, 
whichever of the two units was the greater, plus 10 bigha for the homestead. These limits could be 
relaxed only in exceptional cases. 
b. The land in excess of the above ceiling was to be acquired by the government, in return for due 
compensation, and was to be distributed among the cultivating families who owned uneconomic 
holdings and other landless agriculturists. 
It may be mentioned, en passant, that though in essence this act called for radical 
changes in the then existing land tenure systems in East Pakistan, it suffered from one 
initial weakness: it did not provide any protection for the class of cultivators called 
burgardar, those share-croppers who were not recognised as tenants. According to one 
estimate, at one time the burgardar cultivated from 10 to 19 % of the agricultural land 
™Ibid., and the Draft of the First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, op. cit. (fit. 120) 
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of East Pakistan. 1 7 9 Therefore, the Planning Board of Pakistan later recommended 
that these share-croppers be granted the legal protection their status demanded. 
As to the implementation of the above Act, its speed was very slow largely because of 
the many administrative and legal problems which arose from time to time in the 
course of acquisition and redistribution. Thus, with difficulties arising from such ques-
tions as the payment of compensation, rent fixation and the collection of revenue, the 
provincial government had to appoint (in 1958) yet another body, the Revenue Com-
mission, to re-examine the entire land tenure situation in East Pakistan. This Commis-
sion submitted its recommendations to the government in 1959. The most important 
being: 
a. To increase the individual ceiling on land from 1 0 0 bigha to 3 0 0 bigha, and even up to 4 0 0 bigha 
in some special cases of mixed and cattle farming. 
b. To prevent the fragmentation of individual holdings, no single piece of land was to be divided 
below 3 acres or 1 0 bigha. 
c. To readjust the mode of payment of compensation. 
d. To reorganise the method of revenue collection. 
e. Finally, the Commission recommended that all cultivators, who were in 1 9 5 8 de jure direct tenants 
of the State, should be declared the owners of their land, thus requiring them to pay only revenue 
and not land rent to the government. 
Though most of the above-mentioned recommendations of the Revenue Commis-
sion were accepted by the government, nothing was done about the question of the 
ultimate ownership of land. However, late in 1960 the Food and Agriculture Com-
mission also emphasised this last recommendation.1 8 0 Further, this Commission urged 
the government to make the land revenue system of the entire country uniform, thus 
ensuring the spirit of an earlier declaration of the government that 'the aim must be to 
build a rural society largely consisting of self-reliant peasant-propietors'.1 8 1 
5.3.2.3 Land Reforms in West Pakistan 
The nature and extent of land reforms attempted by the government in West Pakistan 
from time to time have been quite different for at least two reasons. Firstly, before the 
administrative integration of the various provinces and states into 'One Unit' in 1955, 
each of the three major provinces - Sind, Punjab and N.W.F. - had its own peculiar 
land tenure systems. Secondly, before the promulgation of Martial Law in Pakistan in 
1958 - as a consequence of the army take-over - the governments in each of these pro-
vinces had made half-hearted attempts to reorganise the existing land tenure systems.1 8 2 
Besides these three major areas comprising the 'One Unit', nowhere else in West Pa-
™Ibid.,v. 165. 
180'Report of the Food and Agriculture Commission, 1960, op. cit., p. 2 8 5 . (Jh. 139) 
lslDraft of the First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, op. cit., p. 124 . (fit. 1 2 0 ) 
1MIbid., and AKHTAR, op. cit.(Jh. 107 ) 
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kistan were tenancy reforms ever attempted, though the former states of Khairpur and 
Bahawalpur had more or less similar land tenure systems as the former provinces of 
Sind and Punjab, respectively. 
Without going into the details of all the efforts towards land reforms in West Pa-
kistan prior to 1959, it is sufficient to mention that, even in areas where tenancy reforms 
were started by the then provincial governments, the twin problems of concentration 
and fragmentation of holdings were not touched upon in any significant way. In fact, 
these attempts, instead of providing tenurial security to the mass of insecure tenants, 
only succeeded in creating an atmosphere of uncertainty among the tenants and an al-
most unmasked animosity between them and the landlords. Consequently, it was usu-
ally the tenant, especially the hari in the former province of Sind, who had to depend so 
much on the benevolence of the landlord that, in the absence of an honest and well-
integrated approach on the part of the government, he just could not afford to incur 
his obvious displeasure. Further, there was no reason to believe that the provincial 
governments, composed as they were of the vested interests of the landed gentry, could 
have earnestly undertaken any measures directed towards the erosion of their own 
socio-pohtical power. 
Even after the integration of the erstwhile provinces and states into one administra-
tive unit in 1955, no attempt was made to use this excellent opportunity to give West 
Pakistan a uniform basis of land tenure system and other related matters. In retro-
spect, it is somewhat difficult to say categorically whether this ineptness on the part of 
the government was due entirely to the pressure of the landlords, or whether their 
residence in or around the centre of political power in the province did not allow them 
to give any consideration to this crucial question. Perhaps it was the combined effect of 
both these considerations which deprived the tiller of the soil of his rightful share and 
the country of its much needed agricultural progress. 
How crucial the role of the State in bringing about such institutional reforms can be 
is well illustrated by the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in October, 1958. The 
coup d'etat, staged by the armed forces, was to prove almost a blessing in disguise. 
Among other tasks of national importance, the mihtary junta addressed itself first to 
the problem of land tenures in West Pakistan. A nine-man Land Reforms Commission 
was installed to consider problems relating to the ownership and tenancy of agricultu-
ral land and to recommend measures for ensuring' better production and social justice 
as well as the security of tenure for those engaged in cultivation'.1 8 8 This Commission 
submitted its report to the government in the very short time of four months, outlining 
first the characteristic features of the various land tenure arrangements then existing in 
West Pakistan and its recommendations on eight vital points rekting to the subject of 
land reforms. 1 8 4 
Keeping in consideration the cardinal points, and on each of them the members of 
the Commission gave their individual and collective views, the Land Reforms Comrnis-
188Report of the Land Reforms Commission, 1959, op. eit., p . 21. (fit. 119) 
1MIbid., pp. 21-23. 
132 
sion submitted its major recommendations to the army regime. The proposals were 
scrutinized again by the central cabinet and its decisions were made public by the end 
of January 1959. These decisions were incorporated in the Martial Law Regulation 
No. 64 already referred to above, with amendments in Regulations 64-A and 64-B. 
The following are the salient features of this Regulation: 1 8 5 
a. Ceiling on individual land-holdings: no person was permitted, as from 8th October, 1958, to 
retain more than 500 acres of irrigated or more than 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land. However, 
some exceptions were added to this rule. For instance, according to a formula arrived at by the 
Land Reforms Commission, an owner was allowed to keep, in addition to the limits already pres-
cribed, such other area as would bring his total area to the equivalent of 36,000 produce index units ; 1 8 8 
universities, other institutions of learning, religious and charity bodies were also allowed additional 
areas; livestock or stud farms in some cases were also permitted to keep additional areas; an in-
dividual land-owner was allowed to keep an additional area not exceeding 150 acres for orchards. 
The persons whose present holdings exceeded these specified limits were given an option to select 
compact blocks of land not less than the size of an 'economic holding', which was clearly defined. 
All excess land thus resumed by the government had to be redistributed according to the rules laid 
down. For the purpose of resumption and redistribution of such land and also for the implementa-
tion of other regulations a Land Commission was established immediately. 
b. Compensation to the land-owners, whose land had been resumed by the government, was to be 
paid with interest-bearing bonds, which were redeemable in 25 years. The detailed method of the 
payment of compensation was also described in clear terms. 
c. The land resumed by the government was to be sold, in the first instance, to those tenants already 
cultivating the land at reasonable terms of payment extending over a period of 25 years. 
d. All occupancy tenants were to become the owners of the land which they had been cultivating, as 
was already being done in the former provinces of the Punjab and N.W.F. 
e. All other tenants, the tenants-at-will or the hari of Sind, were to be given legal security against 
ejection by the landlord. 
f. The apportionment of the produce of land was to be based on the already existing system of 
fifty-fifty share of the landlord and tenant. However, except in special circumstances, the landlord 
was debarred from increasing his rent share or the share of the tenant in government dues. 
g. The landlord was also debarred from demanding any other illegal exactions from his tenants, 
either in service or in kind or in cash. 
h. To avoid further fragmentation of holdings and help the consolidation of existing ones, two con-
cepts were laid down. First, a 'subsistence holding' was defined as a land area in block of 16 acres 
in the former Sind and Khairpur areas and half a square or half a rectangle or 12j acres, whichever 
of these was the greater, in other areas of the province. Second, an 'economic holding' was defined 
as a compact area of 64 acres in the former Sind and Khairpur areas and two squares or rectangles 
or 50 acres, whichever of these was the greater, in other areas of the province. Thus, on the basis of 
these two concepts, it was stated that no holding, if it was less in area than that of an economic 
holding, could be fragmented below the size of a subsistence holding; and, in cases where a holding 
was greater than an economic holding in size, it was not to be fragmented below the size of the 
economic holding. These, in brief, were the criteria of impartibility of individual holdings. 
i. All jagir, areas held by ihejagirdar, were to be abolished without the payment of any compensation 
to thejagirdar. All other intermediary interests on the land, as may have existed in some parts of the 
province, were also to be abolished forthwith. 
1 8 6West Pakistan, Land Commission, Land Reforms in West Pakistan, Vol. 1, (Lahore, 1960), Chap-
ter 1. 
^Report of the Land Reforms Commission, 1959, op. cit., Appendix 2. (Jh. 119) 
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Besides the above-mentioned major clauses, the government emphasised that ade-
quate facilities were to be given to the new owners for their immediate needs for credit 
to purchase farm inputs. It was also stated that the Land Commission should make the 
necessary arrangements for upgrading the holdings at least to the size of a subsistence 
holding, and for a compulsory consolidation scheme for the entire province. Finally, 
to demonstrate the seriousness of this Regulation, the government warned all parties 
involved of the likelihood of punishments in case of non-compliance with any of the 
clauses stated therein. 
From the foregoing description it is clear that these reform measures embodied both 
short- and long-term provisions. Such provisions as the determination of individual 
holding, abolition of jagir, resumption of land, redistribution of resumed land to the 
cultivating tenants are relatively short-term measures. But consolidation of holdings, 
development of resumed cultivable waste land, provision of many needs for the new 
owners will obviously take a relatively longer time. With a view to achieving these ob-
jectives the Land Commission has been made an independent and powerful body. The 
first report of this Commission was published at the end of 1960, stating that the work 
of the determination of individual holdings was by then almost complete. 1 8 7 
In concluding this section on land reforms in Pakistan, two comments seem to be rele-
vant. First, as far as the present conditions of land tenure in the country are concerned, 
they must be regarded as only transitory. The success of such reforms, however modest 
or conservative they may have been, will eventually depend on, among other things, 
the boldness and ingenuity of the various State agencies involved in this task. Second, 
the most important and arduous task which the government in Pakistan in general, but 
in East Pakistan in particular, must resolutely face is the consolidation of fragmented 
holdings. 
5.3.3 The Control and Regulation of Other National Policies Affecting the 
Agricultural Sector 
Finally, in other areas of national policies affecting the agricultural sector, the role of 
the State has been even more direct and assertive, especially in the collection of land 
revenue and such other claims of the government outstanding against the farming com-
munity. The government has also been mtervening in the market to regulate and sta-
bilise the prices of various agricultural commodities, especially of foodgrains. 
5.3.3.1 The Collection of Land Revenue 
In countries like Pakistan, where the agricultural sector is the back-bone of the econo-
my, the revenue receipts of the State from agriculture must form a major source of its 
185Land Reforms in West Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 222-23. (fit. 185) 
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current and development expenditure. However, it has been felt that agricultural 
taxation in Pakistan has not been increasing correspondingly with increases in other 
taxes; nor has the system of agricultural taxation been uniform throughout the coun-
try. 
Table 45. Land revenue as a percentage of principal revenue receipts of the governments of East and 
West Pakistan, 1950-51 to 1960-61 
Particulars '50-51 '54-55 '55-56 '56-57 '57-58 '58-59 '59-60 '60-61 
EAST PAKISTAN 
Total principal revenues 
(in million rupees) 155.5 198.5 232.4 233.9 262.2 409.8 330.3 367.5 
Land revenue 
(in million rupees) 22.4 50.2 50.8 51.5 67.5 130.5 93.5 108.3 
Land revenue as a % of 
total principal revenue 14.4 25.3 21.9 22.0 25.7 31.8 28.3 29.5 
WEST PAKISTAN 
Total principal revenues 
(in million rupees) 147.0 205.5 262.7 344.1 360.6 522.7 425.1 502.3 
Land revenue 
(in million rupees) 32.8 44.0 75.5 117.5 119.5 178.5 138.6 133.6 
Land revenue as a % of 
total principal revenue 22.3 21.4 28.7 34.1 33.1 34.1 32.6 26.6 
Source: See Table 18; op. cit.. Statistical Section, Tables 75 and 76, pp. 140-41. 
From Table 45 it can be adduced that land revenue, as a percentage of the total 
revenue receipts of the governments of East and West Pakistan, though increasing 
initially from 1950-51 to 1954-55, has been fluctuating in an irregular manner during 
1950-51 to 1960-61. Another important conclusion from this table is that, on the aver-
age, land revenue as a percentage of the total revenue receipts has been higher in West 
Pakistan than in East Pakistan. 
In fact, in Pakistan the burden of taxation on the economy has not so far exceeded 
9 % of the GNP. However, there has been a clear improvement during the Second Five 
Year Plan period (1960-65) in that taxation increased from 6% in 1959-60 to 9% in 
1964-65. In order to meet the development expenditure during the Third Five Year 
Plan period (1965-70), the planners have proposed to levy additional taxes so that by 
1969-70 the total tax receipts of the government would be 10% of the GNP. 1 8 8 Al-
though the planners have not mentioned in any detail the exact methods by which this 
target would be achieved, for this exercise is being done by the Commission on Taxa-
lssThe Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., Table 8, p. V-10. (fn. 72) 
135 
tion and Tariffs, they have suggested to the government that, inter alia, ways and means 
must be found to capture some of the expected increase in agricultural production in 
the form of additional taxation on agricultural incomes. 
While at present it is very difficult to assert that the taxable capacity of agriculture in 
the country is greater than what the government has been able to take in the form of 
land revenue, it can safely be presumed that, with a change in the existing variety of 
land taxation systems and the expected increase in agricultural production during the 
following years, the taxable potential will be increased rather appreciably. How-
ever, in the enthusiasm to transfer capital resources from the agricultural to non-agri-
cultural sectors, the weight of this argument could easily be exaggerated, resulting in 
adverse consequences on the growth of the agricultural sector itself. 
The variety of land tax systems in Pakistan are only a natural outgrowth of the dif-
ferent types of land tenure systems outlined earlier. Thus, for instance, until recently in 
East Pakistan land revenue assessment was based on a system of permanent settlement. 
But, with the change in the land tenure system there, whereby all intermediary interests 
between the State and the actual tiller of the soil have been abolished, action is being 
taken to refix the revenue assessment at rates per acre according to the productivity of 
land. In fact, the Revenue Commission in 1959 recommended the fixing of fair and 
equitable rents with a maximum of 10 % of the annual gross product of the farm. 
In West Pakistan, land taxation has not been uniform, here again because of historic-
al reasons. There have been two major systems of land revenue collection: one was 
followed in the former provinces of the Punjab and N.W.F., and the other was in vogue 
in the former province of Sind. The Food and Agriculture Commission in 1960 was of 
the opinion that the existing systems of land taxation had been designed originally not 
with the specific purpose of development and increasing agricultural production but 
were in fact meant to collect land revenue for the rulers. Hence it was observed that 
uncropped land was not liable for land tax, with the result that large areas of cultivable 
land were lying unused even though something could have been done with them. And 
conversely, it was also true that if a farmer used capital and other inputs to improve an 
area of land, he was liable to be assessed at a higher rate at the time of next settlement. 
Thus, the Commission concluded that, since both of 'these conditions militate against 
development', they ought to be changed. Consequently, the Commission made some 
specific recommendations as follows : 1 8 9 
a. A uniform system of land taxation should be adopted throughout the country. 
b. The land-owners everywhere should pay a fixed rate of taxation per acre of land irrespective of 
whether the area under consideration was cropped or not. 
c. The tax rate should be fixed according to the present agricultural value of land. 
d. The tax rate should, therefore, differ from zone to zone and not from one plot to another as had 
been the practice in the past. 
e. Tax reductions should be given for some years to those of the cultivators who bring new land 
under cultivation. 
f. Concessions should be granted also in cases where small farmers combine either in co-operative 
^Report of the Food and Agriculture Commission, 1960, op. cit., pp. 283-84. (fit. 139) 
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fanning units or in some other manner which has the advantages of large-scale operations, 
g. Finally, in future, as and when new industries have developed significantly and the financial con-
ditions of the country improved, consideration should also be given to reducing the burden of taxa-
tion on very small holdings. 
While realising the immediate need to re-structure the entire tax system of the coun-
try, the central government has appointed a Commission on Taxation and Tariffs to 
examine in detail the present situation and recommend such changes as may be neces-
sary in the structure and rates of taxation in the various sectors of the economy. Per-
haps, from the point of view of agricultural development in Pakistan, the need for 
immediate reforms in agricultural taxation is second only to land reforms. It is being 
hoped that, in the predominantly non-monetised agriculture of Pakistan, the taxation 
system will be so devised as to suit this feature of the economy at least at this stage of 
economic development in Pakistan. 
5.3.3.2 Intervention in the Market 
The following are the three major areas in which the State in Pakistan has been inter-
vening in the market both on an ad hoc and permanent basis: 
a. From time to time the government takes direct measures to control and regulate the 
production of such cash crops as jute, tea, sugar-cane, cotton and tobacco. In most 
cases this is done through acreage specifications. The government has also been parti-
cipating a great deal in the marketing of these crops. 
b. The intervention of the government has been most extensive in the distribution of 
foodgrains, which have been in short supply to the urban areas for some years. The 
methods adopted by the government in handling the foodgrain situation, at least 
from 1953 to 1960-61, have also affected the domestic production. These methods 
have included direct State trading, through the procurement of grains in some surplus 
areas, and the distribution of these grains under a rationing system. Further, by 
putting a ceiling on prices of wheat and rice procured from the farmers during lean 
years, the government has tried to safeguard a small class of urban consumers. 
But, in 1960, the government abolished both the compulsory rationing and procure-
ment of wheat in West Pakistan, thus giving way to private trading. However, it 
continues to undertake open market operations in order to stabilise prices within 
certain upper and lower limits. These hmits have been so determined as to provide 
adequate incentives to the farmers for increased agricultural production and avoid 
undue hardships to most classes of consumers. 
The government has been building a 'buffer stock' of wheat and rice, both through 
imports and domestic production, to help avoid price increases and short supplies in 
case of unforeseen crop failures. In the case of rice, especially in East Pakistan, ration-
ing and procurement are only partial. However, because of the inadequate reserve 
stocks of rice in East Pakistan, it has often been difficult for the government to adopt 
an effective policy for price stabilisation. But, of late, thanks to the improved rice 
situation, the government has been able to loosen further its direct control. 
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c. Finally, the regulation and control over trade and distribution by the government 
extends considerably beyond its direct intervention in the marketing of agricultural 
products at home. Both internal and external trade, but the latter to a greater extent, 
are subject to various regulations both of short- and long-term nature. 
Before concluding this chapter, a few final remarks may not be out of place. Realising 
that Pakistan is making its first real strides towards sustained economic development, 
and also appreciating that its economy is as yet basically agricultural, the role of the 
State becomes at once central and problematic. It is central because it is the State 
which must facilitate and often provide an institutional frame-work congenial to eco-
nomic development; it must very often also play the role of an entrepreneur where indi-
vidual or collective initiative for change is either non-existent or weak; it must provide 
in many instances ready capital in the form of credit to the farmers, if it is inadequate 
or the saving capacity of the people is too hmited; it must help to improve and often 
initiate on its own the building of an infrastructure conducive to economic develop-
ment; and, finally, it must act as the watch-dog of the overall economic life of the 
country by using such short- and long-term policies which help rather than impede 
economic development. In short: the State seems to be involved, as it were, in almost 
everything. 
And yet, while the role of the State is central, it raises several problems, conceptual 
and organisational. This is the more so when the leadership, as was indicated earlier, is 
not committed to any doctrinaire predilections regarding the overall organisation of 
the economic system. Thus, being mixed as it is, the economy demands a development 
strategy which is pragmatic and yet consistent over a reasonably long period of time. 
Further, the problems of development planning are multiplied, on the one hand, by 
the many limitations on the side of the government and, on the other, by the variety of 
semi-educated and often ignorantly individualistic attitudes of the people in general 
and of the peasantry in particular. 
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6 The Prospects and Problems of Sustained Economic Growth 
in Pakistan 
6.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding the many formidable problems besetting the economy of Pakistan, 
especially the agricultural sector which is still its back-bone, it has shown definite signs 
in recent years of breaking out from a semi-stagnant phase. These initial strides, as 
illustrated by the increasing growth rates of various economic indicators, have been 
made with the active participation of the State. With the launching of the Third Five 
Year Plan in 1965, the economy can be said to have entered the take-off stage. Its more 
explicit expression is now contained in the Perspective Plan covering the period from 
1965 to 1985. 
Although the Perspective Plan is as yet only a tentative frame-work of the likely 
changes which the economy may experience during this period, it does purport to indi-
cate the nature and magnitude of the expected changes. Of course the tentative nature 
of the Plan is mainly due to the shortcomings which are quite natural at this stage of 
plan programming in Pakistan. 1 9 0 However, in the words of the planners, 'the Perspec-
itve Plan reflects in many ways the growing confidence of the country in its future', hen-
ce 'it is, in fact, a realistic statement of the goals to be achieved' and it 'gives a sense of 
direction to the current economic policies'. 1 9 1 
In this chapter an attempt will be made, firstly, to present the major objectives of the 
Plan and the structural changes projected for the period 1965-85. Then some basic 
similarities between these changes and those required for a successful take-off, as out-
lined in Chapter 1, will be pointed out. Then a critical appraisal of the changes pro-
posed in the Plan and their underlying assumptions will be made. In so doing, the 
major emphasis will be laid on employment and its inter-sectoral distribution, with 
special reference to the role of agriculture. This exercise will, however, be limited to 
analysing the fundamental weaknesses of the Plan, especially with regard to the rate 
of growth of agricultural labour productivity. Finally, it will be demonstrated that, 
during the Plan period, the population of Pakistan will most likely attain an unpre-
cedented growth rate, thus frustrating almost all the objectives of the Plan under 
consideration. 
1 9°For a detailed discussion on the limited applicability of long-term projections in the underdeve-
loped countries, see: United Nations, Problems of Long-Term Projections: With Special Reference to 
Economic Planning in Asia and the Far East, Development Prograrnming Techniques Series No. 3, 
(New York, 1963), pp. 1-6. 
1!>1The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. tit., p. E - l . (fit. 72) 
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6.2 The Perspective Plan Within the Frame-work of the 
Take-off Stage 
While the selection of the twenty-year period is 'necessarily arbitrary..., it seems to be, 
on the one hand, long enough to permit meaningful structural change in the economy 
and, on the other, not so long as to be without direct interest to the present working 
generation'. 1 9 2 In fact, as will be pointed out in the next section, the kind of structural 
change envisaged during this period shows, at least apparently, basic similarities 
with the conditions for the take-off. 
The Plan lays down the following objectives:1 9 3 
a. A four-fold increase in the gross national product and more than doubling of the 
income per capita; 
b. provision of near-full employment for the labour force even before the end of the 
Plan period; 
c. elimination of the existing disparity in incomes per capita between East and West 
Pakistan; 
d. achievement of universal literacy; 
e. termination of foreign economic aid. 
Within the scope of the present analysis the first two objectives are the most relevant 
to consider.1 9 4 They will be discussed below in detail. 
6.2.1 The Growth of the Gross National Product and Its Changing Inter-
sectoral Distribution, 1965-85 
The most important instrument by which the Plan indicates the development of the 
economy is embodied in a fast rate of increase of the GNP. Table 46 gives the projec-
ted values and average annual compound growth rates of the GNP and its inter-secto-
ral distribution. 
In the basic frame-work of the Plan the underlying key assumptions for projecting 
the growth of the GNP are the rates of growth of gross investment and the values of 
gross capital-output ratios. The Plan, however, indicates neither the assumptions about 
the projected rates of growth of output in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, 
nor does it provide any statement about the required investment allocation in these 
sectors; nor does it explain the reasons for projecting such impressive rates of growth 
in sectoral output (5.6 % per annum for agriculture and 8.5 % per annum for the non-
agricultural sectors). 1 9 5 
ie*Ibid. 
™Ibid., pp. H- l -2 . 
1 M T h e other three objectives, especially the third one, are of no less importance. 
" T h e exceptionally high rate of growth of the non-agricultural sectors is due mainly to the growing 
significance of manufacturing industries, of which the growth rate has so far been much above this 
average. 
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Table 46. The growth of the gross national product and its inter-sectoral distribution, 1965-85 in (million 




1965 1970 1975 pound 
growth rate 
Gross national product 43,365 60,886 86,977 123,870 177,176 7.2% 
Gross product of the agricul-
tural sector 21,055 27,648 36,306 47,675 62,605 5.6% 
(48.5) (45.4) (41.7) (38.5) (35.0) 
Gross product of the non-
agricultural sectors 22,310 33,238 50,671 76,195 114,571 8.5% 
(51.5) (54.6) (58.3) (61.5) (65.0) 
Source: See Table 42: op. cit.. Table 1, p. 11-4, and Table 2, p. U-6. 
'The figures in parentheses are the percentage shares of each sector. 
For projecting an overall growth rate of 7.2% per annum, the emphasis has been 
laid on the increasing rate of gross investment: from 18.5% of the GNP in 1965 to 
23.0% by 1985. The basic source of this increase lies in the growing importance of 
domestic savings, which are projected to increase from 10% of the GNP in 1965 to 
22.0% by 1985. 1 9 6 As for the other determinant of the projected rate of growth of the 
GNP, i.e. the gross capital-output ratio, the Plan assumes its value at 3.0 in 1965-70, 
then increasing by one point during each quinquennium to 3.7 by 1985. 
6.2.2 Population Growth, Labour Force and Its Employment and Inter-sec-
toral Distribution, 1965-85 
In projecting a substantial increase in income per capita, the Perspective Plan rightly 
emphasises the importance of the future size and rate of growth of population. It will 
also be a crucial determinant of the available labour force in the country. The Plan 
estimates that the population of Pakistan will increase from 112 million in 1965 to 187 
million by 1985: 61 and 104 million in East Pakistan and 51 and 83 million in West 
Pakistan. 1 9 7 Though the Plan does not give details about the underlying assumptions of 
fertility and mortality rates, except that the present fertility rate may decline by 1975, 
but it arrives at the following average annual rates of growth for Pakistan: 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.8% 2.6% 
lmThe Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., Table 1, p. H-4. (fn. 72) 
™Ibid., Table 7, p. 11-12. 
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Table 47. Estimated labour force, its employment and inter-sectoral distribution, 1965-85 (in millions)1 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Total labour force 37.25 41.45 46.75 54.00 62.30 
Employment: total 29.70 36.20 44.30 51.40 59.70 
agricultural 19.30 22.80 26.70 28.20 29.50 
(64.98) (62.98) (60.27) (54.86) (49.41) 
non-agricultural 10.40 13.40 17.60 23.20 30.20 
(35.02) (37.02) (39.73) (45.14) (50.59) 
Unemployment as a percentage of the 
labour force 20.3 12.7 5.2 4.8 4.2 
Source: See Table 42; op. cit.. Table 8, p. 11-13. 
'The figures in parentheses are the percentage shares of each sector. 
The Plan figures for the estimates of the future labour force and its employment are 
reproduced in Table 47. Some interesting features of this table may be noted. 
The total labour force during 1965-85 is expected to increase by 25.05 million. In 
projecting this increase, the Plan has assumed a constant participation rate of just over 
33.0 % for the labour force in the population. On the employment side, it estimates that 
30 million new jobs will be created, increasing the employed labour force from 29.70 
million in 1965 to 59.70 million in 1985. The Plan emphasises that by providing these 
jobs the existing unemployment, estimated at 20%, will be reduced to a minimum. 
Since most of this unemployment occurs in the form of underemployment in the agri-
cultural sector, the fulfilment of this objective will have a great bearing on the growth 
of agricultural output itself. 
The distribution of employment among the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
shows a considerable structural change: the agricultural labour force will be reduced 
from 65 % to 49 % of the total employed. This change is brought about by the fact that 
while the agricultural sector is expected to provide 10.20 million new jobs, the non-
agricultural sectors will absorb 20.80 million persons. Again, as in the case of the pro-
jected structural change in sectoral output, the Perspective Plan does not indicate the 
underlying assumptions by which the changes in sectoral employment are expected to 
occur during this period. 
6.3 The Perspective Plan and the Take-off in Pakistan 
From the above-mentioned features of economic change envisaged in the Perspective 
Plan it seems that the Pakistan economy has begun the take-off and that during 1965— 
85 it will be completed successfully. This apparent conclusion is founded on the basic 
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similarities which the projected growth rates and structural change share with the con-
ditions required for a successful take-off. Since the latter conditions were laid down in 
the analytical frame-work of Chapter 1, in the following only the similarities will be 
described.1 9 8 
6.3.1 The Increase in Investment Rates 
One of the fundamental conditions for the take-off is the evidence of an increase in the 
rate of investment from 5% or less to over 10% of the national income. Of course, 
any quantitative evidence on the scale of the increase in the rate of investment has to 
be seen in relation to the rate of population growth during this period. Thus, while 
ROSTOW may be correct in emphasising the lower hmit of the rate of investment in 
initiating the take-off in an economy where the rate of population growth is between 
1 to 1.5% per annum, the same level of investment will not even sustain income per 
capita if the rate of population growth exceeds this rate. In an economy like that of 
Pakistan, where the annual rate of growth of population is between 2.6 to 2.8 %, for 
achieving a sustained increase in income per capita the overall rate of investment has to 
be above 10 % at its minimum. 
Therefore, given the target of such high average rates of growth of output and per 
capita income as envisaged in the Perspective Plan, the estimated rate of gross invest-
ment and the increase required during 1965-85 indicate the magnitude of the effort for 
the take-off. In so far as the economy is able to generate such a high rate of investment 
the essential condition for the take-off should be fulfilled. 
6.3.2 The Development of the Leading Sector 
As regards the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors with a 
high rate of growth during the take-offstage, the Perspective Plan emphasises the role 
of the manufacturing sector during 1965-85 in the following terms: 
"The mantf actuxirig sector is expected to play a leading role in accelerating the overall growth rate of 
the economy, supported by the rate of growth in agriculture which is almost unprecedented in the 
experience of other countries.'1 9 8 
In making the manufacturing sector the avant-garde of economic development in 
Pakistan, with an average annual compound rate of growth of over 10 % during 1965-
85, the Plan has advanced several reasons. The more important ones are : 2 0 0 
1 8 8 The first two conditions are adopted from ROSTOW, and the ones regarding the agricultural sector 
have been proposed by the author in Chapter 1. 
""The Third Five Year Plan (1965-70), op. cit., p. H-5. 
2 0 0 See next page. 
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a. On the basis of the past performance of this sector, its average annual growth rate 
during 1950-65 being over 8 %, it has been asserted that it is not impossible to accel-
erate the growth rate to over 10 % per annum. 
b. The erstwhile rapid growth of the industrial sector coupled with the declining 
share of agriculture in the GNP has already reduced the vulnerabiKty of the economy 
to fluctuations arising from natural hazards. This means that the future strategy of 
development would be directed to further diversifying the economy on a basis which 
is not only less vulnerable but also more productive. 
c. The third reason lies in the need to increase the rate of saving and investment for 
fulfilling the projected growth rate of the national product during the Plan period. 
Since an increasing proportion of the projected rate of investment will have to come 
from within the economy, the major emphasis had to be laid on the manufacturing 
sector, in which a relatively higher than average rate of marginal saving is likely to be 
realised. 
6.3.3 The Development of the Agricultural Sector 
The fact that the Plan gives to the manufacturing sector a leading role does not in any 
way alter the primary significance of the development of agriculture in this period. The 
acceleration of industrialisation only increases the need for a rapid growth of agricul-
tural output, both for supporting the projected growth rate of the economy and for ab-
sorbing the increasing labour force in a more effective manner. Further, agricultural 
expansion at a relatively high rate is required to increase effective demand for indus-
trial goods, both for consumers and producers in the agricultural sector itself. To put 
all this plainly: a fast enough growth of the agricultural sector is the basis of the founda-
tion for sustained economic growth in Pakistan after 1985. 
The Perspective Plan's projections about the development of the agricultural sector 
seem to fulfil the conditions required for the take-off. They may be summarised as 
follows: 
a. With regard to the possibility of achieving substantial increases in agricultural 
production, or raising factor productivities during 1965-85, the projected average 
annual rate of 5.6 % in agriculture clearly implies the fulfilment of this condition. 
However, the Plan does not indicate the means by which agricultural output is ex-
pected to expand at such an unprecedented rate. In other words, it does not illustrate 
quantitatively the effects on land and labour productivity of such variables as the 
expected rate of investment and the overall rate of growth of population. 2 0 1 
''""See K. IKRAM, "The Role of Industry in Long-Term Development Plan (A Case Study of Pakistan),' 
in R. ROBINSON (ed.), Industrialisation in Developing Countries, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965), pp. 68-69. 
""It is only in reference to the strategy of the Third Five Year Plan that the planners have indicated, 
but only vaguely, the way they expect the agricultural output would be increased. Op. cit., p. VII-4. 
(fit. 72) 
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b. The projected structural change in agricultural employment during 1965-85 im-
plies the disappearance of underemployment in the agricultural sector. This objective 
is contained in the assertion that by 1985 the present state of unemployment (estim-
ated at over 20 % and existing mostly in the form of underemployment in agriculture) 
would be reduced to about 4 %. 
c. The third condition, that after 1985 there would be an absolute decline in the labour 
force employed in agriculture, follows partly from the second condition and partly 
from the rate of labour allocation to the non-agricultural sectors during this period. 
Quantitatively, this can be seen in Table 47: out of the projected total employment of 
30 million during 1965-85, the non-agricultural sectors are supposed to absorb 19.80 
million workers. Thus, if the figures of additional agricultural employment in each 
quinquennium are also taken into consideration, there is strong evidence that after 
1985 almost all increases in employment will originate in the non-agricultural sectors, 
thus showing an absolute decline in the country's agricultural labour force. 
6.4 A Critical Appraisal of the Perspective Plan 
Following the discussion in sections 6.2 and 6.3 one is led to conclude that the Pakistan 
economy will not only experience the take-off during the next twenty years but it will 
also enter the stage of self-sustained growth after 1985. However, as will be argued in 
this section, on closer examination of some strategic factors this conclusion appears to 
be quite unrealistic. Since the basic purpose of this study is the assessment of the role of 
agriculture in economic development, the discussion will have to be restricted to the 
analysis of only such factors as are relevant to this objective. 
While the Perspective Plan in its basic frame-work presents the overall increase in 
investment needed to generate the projected average growth rate of the GNP, it does 
not give any indication of the sectoral investment requirements. It may be assumed 
that such an exercise could not be undertaken for various reasons. Thus to find the clue 
to the projected structural changes in output and employment, or the changing distri-
bution of output and labour allocation between the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors, it is essential to raise questions about the underlying assumption of labour 
productivity in the two sectors. In fact the entire model on which the validity of the 
growth rates and structural changes are envisaged in the Perspective Plan hinges on the 
rates at which labour productivity in the two sectors would increase. From the point of 
view of agriculture, the spectacular increase in its output and the rate at which labour 
re-allocation is projected in the Plan, it is all the more essential to examine the assumed 
rate of increase of labour productivity in this sector. 
Since from the available data it is not possible to project the likely values of agri-
cultural labour productivity, here an indirect method will be used. Therefore, follo-
wing Tables 46 and 47, which give the projected output and employment estimates for 




Average labour productivity in Rupees ^v . a n n 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 growth rate 
agricultural sector 1,091 1,213 1,360 1,691 2,122 4.7% 
non-agricultural sectors 2,145 2,480 2,879 3,284 3,794 3.8% 
There are some interesting features in these figures which may be noted. The fact that 
average agricultural labour productivity in 1965 is just about one-half of the non-agri-
cultural labour productivity is indicative of the differential in the growth rates and 
capital intensities of the two sectors. But an average annual growth rate of agricultural 
labour productivity which works out to be higher than that of non-agricultural sectors 
and is unprecedented in the experience of Pakistan so far is something unbelievable. It 
does not even seem to be compatible with the projected rates of growth of sectoral 
outputs in the Plan. 2 0 2 
The doubts on the vahdity of such a high rate of increase in agricultural productivity 
can be justified for several reasons. Why should the rate of growth of labour producti-
vity in agriculture be higher than in the non-agricultural sectors? What is that magic-
wand which is expected to increase the rate of agricultural labour productivity so ra-
pidly in the next twenty years? These are the obvious questions to which there is no 
answer in the Plan; nor does the Plan mention any reason for projecting the magnitude 
of structural change in the labour force employment. 
In Pakistan, as the Third Five Year Plan mentions, the rate of increase in agricultural 
labour productivity during 1950-65 was on average not more than 1.5% per annum. 
This rate coincides with the state of production and employment in the agricultural 
sector throughout this period. On the other hand, in the non-agricultural sectors labour 
productivity increased at a higher rate. This was the more so in the rapidly expanding 
manufacturing industries. Further, considering the present state of underemployment 
in agriculture, it is quite unrealistic to suppose that a 5.6 % average rate of growth of 
output will be accompanied by a 4.7 % rate of increase in average labour productivity 
in the agricultural sector. This defies all available evidence.2 0 8 
Since this unrealistic rate of increase in agricultural labour productivity results not 
from any direct calculation but from the projected structural change in employment, 
the obvious thing is to reject this change itself. Then the conclusion would be that the 
labour re-allocation will not be as rapid as indicated in the projections of the Plan. This 
will instead be determined by the rate of growth of labour productivity and the rate of 
growth of output in the non-agricultural sectors. On the other hand, agricultural la-
bour productivity will itself be dependent on the rate of growth of capital input, tech-
nological progress and the extent of the outflow of labour from the agricultural sector. 
2 0 2 This can well be seen in Chapter 7 of the Third Five Year Plan, especially in Table 3, p. VH-8. 
2 0 8These rates are incompatible not only within the context of the Pakistan economy, but are also 
unrealistic in the light of the available evidence elsewhere. To quote but one example, Japan's case is 
very illustrative. FAO, Agricultural Development in Modern Japan, op. «V.,Table 2, p. 38. (fn.26) 
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The rejection of the projected structural change in employment in no way means 
that the projected average rate of growth of agricultural output may also be unattain-
able. Since the projected growth rate of agricultural output may be considered crucial 
in maintaining the overall rate of growth of the economy, this will depend rather more 
on the rate of increase in the productivity of the land. This latter rate will be the most 
crucial variable in fuffilling the output objectives in agriculture. 
Given as high a target of the rate of growth of agricultural output as has been pro-
jected in the Perspective Plan, and also given the commitment of spreading employment 
in the agricultural sector itself, the obvious questions should be about the proportion 
of total national investment or the possibility of agricultural savings to be invested. As 
was alluded to before, the Plan has not made any attempt to answer these questions. 
Obviously, both by the very nature of the agricultural production system (based as it is 
on the decision-making organisation of a multitude of small and individual peasant 
farms) and the attainment of apparently incompatible goals, such as relatively high 
rates of growth of output and employment, any detailed exercise would be extremely 
complicated. However, considering the investment potential as an obvious constraint 
on the system, the planners have indicated, but only very broadly, the strategy by 
which it is hoped to maintain a high rate of growth of output in agriculture. The major 
elements of this approach are: 
a. The expansion of the area under cultivation; there is still great potential for this in 
the country both by bringing new lands under the plough (or improving the cultura-
ble waste lands) and by increasing the intensity of cropping. 
b. The increase in such vital inputs as irrigation, fertilisers, improved seeds, etc. 
c. The integration of livestock farming into the existing farming system. 
d. An increasingly effective utilisation of the labour force and its wider distribution 
for increasing its productivity and the construction of the rural infrastructure. 
Even if it is granted that, considering the potential of increasing transformation 
rates of capital to land, the investment strategy in the agricultural sector will somehow 
be able to realise the projected rate of growth in its output during 1965-85, there is yet 
another crucial factor which must be considered at the same time. This is related to the 
expected population growth rate. 
The present size and future rate of growth of population are factors which obvious-
ly have great implications for the prospects of sustained economic growth in Pakistan. 
For one thing, from the point of view of agricultural development alone, with a rela-
tively high growth rate of population food production has not only to be substantially 
increased but has also to be diversified in order to improve the standard of diet. For 
another thing, given the constraints on investment potential, it is crucial for determin-
ing the employment of the labour force. In fact, the magnitude of the rate of growth of 
population alone can belie the entire frame-work of the Perspective Plan, its objectives 
and its saving and investment strategies. 
Although the Plan itself emphasises that the projections of per capita income and 
other such variables rest 'heavily on certain assumptions regarding the growth of 
population' during 1965-85, it does not demonstrate clearly the assumptions of fertil-
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ity and mortality underlying the estimated rate of population growth in Pakistan.20* In 
the light of the available evidence about fertility and mortality and the expectation of 
their future trends, it seems that the Plan has underestimated the rate of population 
growth. To demonstrate this in the following an attempt has been made to project the 
future population and its growth rate. 
The procedure of estimation and underlying assumptions will be discussed at length 
in the appendix. The population projections for the period under reference are here 
based on (a) the corrected age distribution of the East and West Pakistan populations 
as revealed by the 1961 Census, (b) the two alternative assumed rates of fertility for the 
two provinces separately, (c) the assumption of a linearly declining mortality rate, and 
(d) the assumption of the absence of any net gain or loss due to migration. 
The summary of these projections, I (High) and II (Moderate), is given in Table 48, 
which also shows the average annual growth rates for the East and West Pakistan 
populations from 1961 (or the end of 1960) to 1986 (or the end of 1985). From these 
figures it is clear that the prospective increases in the population of Pakistan even 
Table 48. Population projections and average annual per cent increase of population in East and West 
Pakistan from 1961 to 1986 
Population (in million) 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 
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""It merely says that "one of the basic assumptions of the present projections is that the rate of growth 
of population will decline after 1975 owing to a decrease in the fertility rate". Op. cit., p. H-12. (Jh. 72) 
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during the Perspective Plan period (1965-85) are much greater than those projected in 
the Plan. The figures given under Projection I may be regarded as unrealistic, since 
their underlying assumptions about the level of fertility are certainly overstated, the 
figures under Projection II clearly demonstrate that the population of Pakistan will 
grow at a rate exceeding 3 % per annum. This is despite the fact that fertility is assumed 
to decline after 1975. 
Obviously this population explosion will not only affect the entire frame-work on 
which the Perspective Plan has projected improvements in income per capita and 
savings but it will also mean an increase in the potential labour force. In fact, the ad-
verse effects of such a growth rate of population on the development of the economy 
cannot be overemphasised. 
From all the preceding considerations there is every reason to conclude that the eco-
nomy of Pakistan will not fulfil the essential conditions required for the completion of 
the take-off by 1985. This conclusion is well substantiated both by the invalidity of 
the basic assumptions contained in the Plan and by the inconsistencies inherent in 
the projections outlined in it. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that, if the development strategy in Pakistan during the 
Perspective Plan period can achieve the projected growth rate of agricultural output 
and also integrate a vigorous population control policy, self-sustained growth in the 
country may well be within easy reach by the end of this century. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6: Population Projections, 1961-86 
To arrive at estimates of the future populations of East and West Pakistan, the 1961 
Census data as corrected by KROTKI have been taken as the base. The procedure fol-
lowed here in using the component method for projecting the populations is as under. 
a. The 1961 estimates of the populations of East and West Pakistan were tabul-
ated separately by sex and five-year age groups, as can be seen in Tables 4 9 and 5 0 
which give Projections I and II for the two wings. Since in the 1961 Census only ten-
-year age intervals for ages 6 0 and over are given, the five-year age groups for these 
intervals have been computed by applying NEWTON'S formula. 2 0 5 For the present 
study only the age groups below 6 0 have been shown in five-year age groups, and 
those above 6 0 years have been lumped together. 
b. The entire period from 1961 to 1986 has been broken into five intervals, each inter-
val comprising five years, thus giving population estimates for the years 1961 , 1966, 
1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 8 1 and 1986. Since each of these years represents population estimates 
for the month of January - the 1961 Census was completed in January - the figures in 
fact should be taken for the end of each previous year. These five-year intervals were 
found convenient for using the survival ratios given in the Model Life Tables. 
c. The two alternative projections, I and II, for East and West Pakistan give what can 
be called the high and moderate estimates of the future populations of the two wings. 
The results in these two estimates differ mainly because of the assumptions regarding 
the birth rates, which are higher for the first projection. 
d. In following the component method, the following assumptions about the fertility 
and mortality rates have been used. 
Fertility Rates: Since at present there is no consensus of opinion about the exact 
magnitude of birth rates (both crude and standardised) in East and West Pakistan, ex-
cept that in the former they are higher, the following birth rates per thousand have 
been assumed: 
Projection P 0 6 (High) Projection I I 2 0 7 (Moderate) 
East Pakistan 58.0 50.0 
West Pakistan 55.0 47 .0 
"""United Nations, Methods for Population Projections by Sex and Age: Manual III, Population Studies 
No. 25, (New York, 1956). 
2 0 , M . ZELNIK and M . R. KHAN, "An Estimate of the Birth Rate in East and West Pakistan," The 
Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 5, No. 1,1965, Table I, p. 70. 
""'These rates have been assumed on the basis of the studies of HASHMI and KROTKI as given in Chapter 
3 of this study. 
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In both the projections the above rates are assumed to remain constant until 1976, 
thereafter falling at the rate of 5 % per quinquennium until 1986. This can be seen in 
Tables 51 and 52. In these tables it can also be noted that, for the calculation of births 
in the two wings, each of the five-year age groups of females of child-bearing ages 
(from 15-19 to 40-44) has been assigned a standard weight. These weights are slightly 
different from those commonly used because of the peculiar circumstances of the de-
mographic situation in Pakistan. In calculating the future births of males and females 
separately, the following ratios for East and West Pakistan have been assumed: 
Males Females 
East Pakistan 105 100 
West Pakistan 107 100 
Mortality Rates: In the absence of any concrete information about the age- and 
sex-specific death rates of the populations of East and West Pakistan, the following 
levels of life expectancy at birth have been assumed: 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 
m f m f m f m f m f 
East Pakistan 42.5 40.0 45.0 42.5 47.5 45.0 50.0 47.5 52.5 50.0 
West Pakistan 45.0 42.5 47.5 45.0 50.0 47.5 52.5 50.0 55.0 52.5 
There are two notable features in the above figures. Firstly, West Pakistan population, 
both male and female, has a better life expectancy than that of East Pakistan. Second-
ly, in both the provinces males have a higher life expectancy than females. 
The fact that mortality is assumed to decline over the years is well indicated by an 
improvement of life expectancy in both sexes: the standard being the increase of 2.5 
over each quinquennium. From these levels of life expectancy at birth, for each five-
year age group and for children at birth, the levels of survival ratios during each quin-
quennium have been taken from the Model Life Table. 2 0 8 The computations based on 
these survival ratios are shown in Tables 49 and 50. 
"""Methods for Population Projections by Sex and Age: Manual III, op. cit., Appendix, Table V, 
pp. 80-81. (fit. 205) 
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Table 49. Population of East and West Pakistan, 1961-1986 (in million): Projection I 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 
Age group 
male female male female male female male female male female male female 
EAST PAKISTAN 
0 - 4 5.48 5.44 6.84 6.53 8.09 7.73 10.02 9.59 11.84 11.33 13.99 13.38 
5- 9 4.80 4.81 5.04 4.95 6.35 6.01 7.58 7.19 9.46 8.99 11.27 10.72 
10-14 2.81 2.84 4.68 4.67 4.93 4.82 6.23 5.87 7.45 7.05 9.32 8.84 
15-19 2.42 2.48 2.74 2.76 4.58 4.55 4.83 4.71 6.12 5.75 7.34 6.92 
20-24 2.23 2.24 2.33 2.38 2.65 2.66 4.45 4.40 4.71 4.57 5.98 5.60 
25-29 2.00 2.00 2.14 2.13 2.24 2.27 2.56 2.56 4.31 4.25 4.58 4.43 
30-34 1.69 1.54 1.91 1.89 2.09 2.03 2.16 2.17 2.48 2.46 4.19 4.11 
35-39 1.56 1.25 1.61 1.45 1.82 1.79 2.01 1.94 2.08 2.08 2.40 2.38 
40-44 1.25 1.11 1.47 1.17 1.53 1.37 1.73 1.70 1.93 1.86 2.00 2.00 
45-49 1.02 0.80 1.16 1.03 1.37 1.10 1.44 1.29 1.64 1.62 1.84 1.78 
50-54 0.95 0.80 0.92 0.73 1.06 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.34 1.21 1.53 1.53 
55-59 0.61 0.43 0.83 0.71 0.82 0.66 0.95 0.86 1.14 0.94 1.22 1.12 
60 and over 1.46 1.19 1.47 1.18 1.68 1.41 1.87 1.56 2.13 1.87 2.52 2.22 
Born before 1961 28.28 26.93 26.30 25.05 24.77 23.61 23.26 22.21 21.76 20.86 20.28 19.57 
Born after 1961 - - 6.84 6.53 14.44 13.74 23.83 22.65 34.87 33.12 47.90 45.46 Total 28.28 26.93 33.14 31.58 39.21 37.35 47.09 44.86 56.63 53.98 68.18 65.03 
Both sexes 55.21 64.72 76.56 91.95 110.61 133.21 
WEST PAKISTAN 
0 - 4 4.05 4.01 5.36 5.03 6.25 5.86 7.57 7.10 8.82 8.28 10.40 9.76 
5- 9 3.46 3.47 3.76 3.69 5.02 4.68 5.90 5.50 7.20 6.72 8.45 7.90 
10-14 2.10 2.11 3.39 3.38 3.69 3.61 4.94 4.59 5.82 5.41 7.11 6.62 
15-19 2.07 2.07 2.06 2.05 3.32 3.30 3.63 3.53 4.86 4.51 5.74 5.33 
20-24 2.03 1.95 2.00 1.99 2.00 1.98 3.23 3.20 3.55 3.44 4.76 4.41 
25-29 1.59 1.46 1.95 1.86 1.93 1.91 1.94 1.91 3.14 3.10 3.46 3.35 
30-34 1.33 1.20 1.53 1.39 1.88 1.78 1.87 1.84 1.89 1.85 3.06 3.01 
35-39 1.13 0.96 1.27 1.14 1.47 1.33 1.81 1.71 1.81 1.78 1.84 1.80 
40-44 1.04 0.87 1.07 0.91 1.21 1.08 1.41 1.27 1.74 1.65 1.75 1.72 
45-49 0.84 0.67 0.97 0.82 1.01 0.86 1.15 1.03 1.34 1.21 1.67 1.59 
50-54 0.83 0.64 0.77 0.62 0.90 0.76 0.94 0.81 1.08 0.97 1.26 1.15 
55-59 0.49 0.34 0.74 0.58 0.69 0.57 0.81 0.70 0.86 0.75 0.99 090 
60 and over 1.56 1.16 1.45 1.08 1.59 1.23 1.69 1.38 1.90 1.63 2.12 1.89 
Born before 1961 22.52 20.93 20.96 19.51 19.69 18.41 18.48 17.38 17.31 16.38 16.15 15.41 
Born after 1961 - - 5.36 5.03 11.27 10.54 18.41 17.19 26.70 24.92 36.46 34.02 Total 22.52 20.93 26.32 24.54 30.96 28.95 36.89 34.57 44.01 41.30 52.61 49.43 
Both sexes 43.45 50.86 59.91 71.46 85.31 102.04 
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Table 50. Population of East and West Pakistan, 1961-1986 (in million): Projection II 
1961 1 9 6 6 1971 1 9 7 6 1981 1 9 8 6 
Age group 
male female male female male female male female male female male female 
EAST PAKISTAN 
0 - 4 - - 5.90 5 . 6 3 6.97 6 . 6 6 8 .64 8 . 2 7 1 0 . 0 5 9 . 6 2 1 1 . 4 4 1 0 . 9 4 5- 9 - - - - 5 . 4 8 5 . 1 8 6 .53 6 . 1 9 8 .16 7.76 9.57 9 . 1 0 1 0 - 1 4 - - - - - - 5.38 5 . 0 6 6 .42 6.07 8.04 7 . 6 3 1 5 - 1 9 - - - - - - - - 5 . 2 9 4 . 9 6 6 . 3 2 5 . 9 6 2 0 - 2 4 - - - - - - - _ - - 5.17 4 . 8 3 Born before 1961 2 8 . 2 8 2 6 . 9 3 2 6 . 3 0 2 5 . 0 5 24.77 2 3 . 6 1 2 3 . 2 6 2 2 . 2 1 2 1 . 7 6 2 0 . 8 6 2 0 . 2 8 1 9 . 5 7 
Born after 1961 - - 5 . 9 0 5.63 12 .45 1 1 . 8 4 2 0 . 5 5 1 9 . 5 2 2 9 . 9 2 28.41 4 0 . 5 4 3 8 . 4 6 Total 2 8 . 2 8 2 6 . 9 3 32.20 3 0 . 6 8 3 7 . 2 2 3 5 . 4 5 4 3 . 8 1 41.73 5 1 . 6 8 4 9 . 2 7 60.82 58.03 
Both sexes 55 . 2 1 6 2 .88 72 L67 85 . 5 4 100 L95 1 1 8 . 8 5 
WEST PAKISTAN 
0- 4 - - 4.58 4 . 3 0 5 .34 5.01 6.46 6 . 0 6 7.41 6 . 9 6 8.40 7.88 5- 9 - - - - 4.29 4.00 5.04 4 . 7 0 6 . 1 5 5.73 7.10 6 . 6 4 1 0 - 1 4 - - - - - - 4 . 2 2 3 . 9 2 4.97 4.62 6.07 5.65 1 5 - 1 9 - - - - - - - - 4 . 1 6 3 . 8 5 4 . 9 0 4.55 2 0 - 2 4 - - - - - - - - _ - 4 . 0 8 3 .77 Born before 1961 2 2 . 5 2 2 0 . 9 3 2 0 . 9 6 19 .51 1 9 . 6 9 18 .41 1 8 . 4 8 1 7 . 3 8 17 .31 1 6 . 3 8 1 6 . 1 5 15 .41 
Born after 1961 - - 4.58 4 . 3 0 9.63 9.01 1 5 . 7 2 1 4 . 6 8 2 2 . 6 9 2 1 . 1 6 3 0 . 5 5 2 8 . 4 9 Total 2 2 . 5 2 2 0 . 9 3 2 5 . 5 4 2 3 . 8 1 2 9 . 3 2 2 7 . 4 2 3 4 . 2 0 3 2 . 0 6 4 0 . 0 0 3 7 . 5 4 4 6 . 7 0 4 3 . 9 0 
Both sexes 4 3 . 4 5 4 9 . 3 5 5 6 . 7 4 6 6 . 2 6 7 7 . 5 4 9 0 . 6 0 
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Table 51. Calculation of births for East and West Pakistan population, 1961-1986: Projection I 
Estimated female population (in million) 
Age in years Weight •— 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 
EAST PAKISTAN 
15-19 4 2.48 2.76 4.55 4.71 5.75 6.92 
20-24 7 2.24 2.38 2.66 4.40 4.57 5.60 
25-29 7 2.00 2.13 2.27 2.56 4.25 4.43 
30-34 6 1.54 1.89 2.03 2.17 2.46 4.11 
35-39 4 1.25 1.45 1.79 1.94 2.08 2.38 
40-44 1 1.11 1.17 1.37 1.70 1.86 2.00 
Weighted sum 54.95 60.92 73.42 90.04 109.68 134.07 
Mean weighted sum (intervening periods) 57.94 67.17 81.73 99.86 121.38 
Sex-adjusted births 
assumed annual rate 58.00 58.00 58.00 55.10 52.60 
quinquennial rate: males 148.54 148.54 148.54 141.11 134.71 
females 141.46 141.46 141.46 134.39 128.29 
Estimated number of births (in million): 
males 8.61 9.98 12.14 14.09 16.35 
females 8.20 9.50 11.56 13.42 15.57 
WEST PAKISTAN 
15-19 4 2.07 2.05 3.30 3.53 4.51 5.33 
20-24 7 1.95 1.99 1.98 3.20 3.44 4.41 
25-29 7 1.46 1.86 1.91 1.91 3.10 3.35 
30-34 6 1.20 1.39 1.78 1.84 1.85 3.01 
35-39 4 0.96 1.14 1.33 1.71 1.78 1.80 
40-44 1 0.87 0.91 1.08 1.27 1.65 1.72 
Weighted sum 44.06 48.96 57.51 69.04 83.69 102.62 
Mean weighted sum (intervening periods) 46.51 53.24 63.28 76.37 93.16 
Sex-adjusted births 
assumed annual rate 55.00 55.00 55.00 52.25 49.64 
quinquennial rate: males 142.15 142.15 142.15 135.04 128.30 
females 132.85 132.85 132.85 126.21 119.90 
Estimated number of births (in million): 
males 6.61 7.57 9.00 10.31 11.95 
females 6.18 7.07 8.41 9.64 11.17 
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Table 52. Calculation of births for East and West Pakistan population, 1961-1986: Projection II 
Estimated female population (in million) 
Particulars 
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 
EAST PAKISTAN 
Weighted sum of all child-bearing 
ages 54.95 60.92 73.42 90.04 106.52 124.84 
Mean weighted sum 
(intervening periods) 57.94 67.17 81.73 98.28 115.68 
Sex-adjusted births 
assumed annual rate 50.00 50.00 50.00 47.50 45.13 
quinquennial rate: 
males 128.05 128.05 128.05 121.65 115.58 
females 121.95 121.95 121.95 115.85 110.07 
Estimated number of births 
(in million): 
males 7.42 8.60 10.47 11.96 13.37 
females 7.07 8.19 9.97 11.39 12.73 
WEST PAKISTAN 
Weighted sum of all child-bearing 
ages 44.06 48.96 57.51 69.24 81.05 95.02 
Mean weighted sum 
(intervening periods) 46.51 53.24 63.28 75.15 88.04 
Sex-adjusted births 
assumed annual rate 47.00 47.00 47.00 44.65 42.42 
quinquennial rate: 
males 121.47 121.47 121.47 115.40 109.64 
females 113.53 113.53 113.53 107.85 102.46 
Estimated number of births 
(in million): 
males 5.65 6.47 7.69 8.67 9.65 
females 5.28 6.04 7.18 8.10 9.02 
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Glossary of Some Local Terms 
Aman Rice crop season in East Pakistan - from July/August to November/ 
December 
Arhar Cqjanus cajan 
Aus Rice crop season in East Pakistan - from March/May to July/Septem-
ber 
Bajra Pennisetum typhoides 
Berseem Trifolium spp. 
Bheel Natural depression in the field in some parts of East Pakistan, where 
water makes the land marshy 
Bigha Unit of land measurement = 0.33 acres 
Bohras Business community of a Muslim sect, mainly concentrated in Karachi 
Boro Rice crop season in East Pakistan - from December/January to April/ 
May 
Burgardar Share-cropper in East Pakistan 
Gram Cicer arietinum 
Guara Cyamopsis psoralioides 
Hari Tenant-at-will in the former Sind province of West Pakistan 
Jagir Awarded land to persons whose loyalty was recognised by the 
British in India after 1857 
Jagirdar Person who owns a Jagir 
Jagirdari Jagirdar-tenant land tenure system 
Jowar Sorghum vulgare 
Kharif Crop season - from April/June to October/December 
Khas Self-sultivated land in East Pakistan 
Khesari Lathyrus sativus 
Khojas See Bohras 
Khud-kasht See Khas 
Mash Phaseolus mungo 
Masoor Lens esculenta 
Mattar See Khesari 
Memons See Bohras 
Purdah Social custom whereby Muslim women keep behind the veil 
Rabi Crop season - from October/November to April/May 
Raj Rule 
Ryot Tenant of the State with all proprietary rights 
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Ryotwari Land tenure system in which, the tenant pays land revenue directly to 
the State 
Sunhemp Crotalaria jwncea 
Thana Police Station or an administrative sub-division of a district in East 
Pakistan 
Zamindar Land-owner in general, but usually a landlord owning large areas of 
land 
Zamindari Landlord-tenant system 
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Samenvatting 
Voor een analyse van de rol die de landbouw speelt in de economische ontwikkeling 
van een land is het in de eerste plaats noodzakelijk het begrip 'ontwikkelingsproces' 
nader te preciseren. In het raam van deze studie behelst dit proces: (a) de toename van 
de produktie per hoofd van de bevolking, en (b) de veranderingen in de structuur van 
de economie in de onderzochte samenleving. Het eerste punt omvat tevens het zo be-
langrijke distributieve aspect van de opbrengst. De structurele veranderingen in de 
economie hebben betrekking op de verschuivingen die optreden in de samenstelling 
van de produktie en de tewerkstelling van de in het produktieproces betrokkenen. Hoe-
wel deze veranderingen wel de ontwikkeling van een economie aangeven, omvatten ze 
nog geen verklaring ervan; daartoe dienen de oorzaken van de wijzigingen te worden 
opgespoord. 
Het is mogelijk de behandelde stof in tweeën te delen: de voornamelijk theoretische 
hoofdstukken 1 en 2, en de hoofdstukken 3-6 die nadere (ten dele statistische) gege-
vens bevatten, speciaal betrekking hebbend op Pakistan. 
Het theoretische deel bevat een poging tot het opzetten van een raamwerk voor de 
analyse van de economische ontwikkeling in het algemeen, waarin de landbouw een 
centrale plaats wordt gegeven. In het speciale deel wordt aandacht besteed aan de 
grondleggende kenmerken van de landbouw in Pakistan, de oorzaken van zijn achter-
blijven in ontwikkeling, de rol van de staat in de pogingen tot vooruitgang, en de pro-
blemen en mogelijkheden voor een zichzelf in stand houdende verdere groei voor de 
landbouw in en na de komende twintig jaar. 
Pakistan is typisch een land met de economische structuur van een ontwikkelings-
gebied, gekenmerkt door een dualisme waarin de landbouwkundige sector overweegt 
maar nauwelijks enig teken van verandering vertoont. Deze toestand dient doorbroken 
te worden door het opwekken van een groei die de negatieve krachten overtreft: op dat 
moment kan de 'take-off' van de ontwikkeling geplaatst worden. De voorwaarden 
daarvoor zijn uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 1; aan de hand daarvan is in hoofdstuk 2 een 
poging gedaan de strategie vast te stellen voor de landbouwontwikkeling gedurende de 
'take-off'-periode, uitgaande van enkele factoren die als basis-gevend aangemerkt moe-
ten worden. 
De hoofdstukken 3 en 4 geven een gedetailleerde analyse van de structuur van de 
landbouw in Pakistan, waarbij het dualistisch karakter duidelijk tot uiting komt en 
waarbij speciaal aandacht is besteed aan die factoren die het achterblijven in ontwikke-
ling van de landbouw hebben veroorzaakt. De gegevens daarvoor hebben voorna-
melijk betrekking op de periode na het zelfstandig worden van het land tot 1960/61. 
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De toenemende inmenging van de staat in de ontwikkeling van de landbouw komt 
tot uitdrukking in hoofdstuk 5. Daaruit blijkt, dat de staat een leidende rol heeft ge-
speeld in deze ontwikkehng (en nog steeds speelt) door het opzetten en uitvoeren van 
twee vijfjaren-plannen, waarin men in redelijke mate van de deelname van de bevol-
king verzekerd kon zijn. De resultaten ervan komen niet alleen tot uitdrukking in ver-
beteringen in de infrastructuur van de landbouw en reorganisaties in de belangrijkste 
sectoren, maar ook in de mate van toename van die factoren die essentieel worden ge-
acht voor een tendens naar een zichzelf in gang houdende ontwikkehng. 
Kort geleden heeft de regering een plan doen opstellen voor een verdere economische 
ontplooiing van het land gedurende de jaren 1965-1985. De lengte van deze periode 
komt globaal overeen met die welke ondersteld wordt nodig te zijn voor de 'take-off'. 
Dit plan is beproken in hoofdstuk 6; de belangrijkste conclusie was, dat niet verwacht 
kan worden dat het gestelde doel binnen deze twintig jaar bereikt zal worden doordat 
aan enkele wezenlijke voorwaarden en eisen tot verandering niet kan worden voldaan, 
daar ze irreëel of niet met elkaar verenigbaar zijn. 
Enerzijds maakte het gecompliceerde karakter van het proces van economische ont-
wikkehng het verder noodzakelijk, in het theoretische deel (de hoofdstukken 1 en 2) 
een passend analytisch raamwerk te zoeken, waarin de analyse van Pakistans groei-
problemen paste, anderzijds dwongen feitelijke omstandigheden tot beperkingen. Ten 
eerste doordat het aantal beschikbare statistische gegevens onvoldoende was; ten 
tweede door de geografische scheiding in West en Oost Pakistan. 
En tenslotte dient bedacht te worden, dat een analyse van toekomstmogelijkheden 
altijd met de nodige reserve moet worden bezien. 
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